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East Europe Report

POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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2 January 1985

EAST EUROPE REPORT
POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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ALBANIA

ISAI READS HOXHA MESSAGE TO BRIGADE CELEBRATION

AU250901 Tirana ATA in English 1700 GMT 25 Nov 84

[Text] Tirana, 25 Nov (ATA)--Today the city of Shkoder was in festival. Its inhabitants enthusiastically celebrated the 40th anniversary of the formation of the 27th shock brigade.

A grand popular rally was organized on the occasion. Attending were also the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and minister of home affairs; Comrade Hekuran Isai, leading cadres of the party and state power in district, etc.

Amidst the revolutionary enthusiasm of those present, Comrade Hekuran Isai read out the greeting that Comrade Enver Hoxha, beloved leader of our party and people, has addressed to the former partisans and cadres of the 27th shock brigade on occasion of the 40th anniversary of its creation.

The creation of the 27th shock brigade is linked closely with the liberation of Shkoder and its people, whose prominent patriotic and militant traditions like of our entire people, have been raised by the party to a higher scale, the message of greetings says among other things. Since in the past, Shkoder has brought out from its fold outstanding patriots and fighters, of the rifle and pen, of renaissance and national independence. During the great national liberation war too, it gave birth to resolute revolutionaries who were devoted to the cause of the people and party as well as to many heroes and martyrs. Unforgettable will remain for us and for the coming generations of our country the heroes and martyrs who laid down their lives for the liberation of the homeland.

The 27th shock brigade, created on a land of brave fighters, the message says further on was the crowning of the work of the party and struggle of the partisans of the circle of Shkoder. The battalion "Perlat Rexhepi," which was the basis of the partisan group of that region and of your brigade, was tempered in great struggle and difficulties, where the struggle of [word indistinct], whose echo was felt not only in the circle of Shkoder and in the north, but all over Albania, occupies a brilliant page.

Although Albania was liberated, your newly-created brigade was charged by the party with important tasks to purge the northern regions from the reactionary gangs. The partisans of your brigade, educated by the party, everywhere where they acted, in the conditions of an organized reaction and in the backward zones, made a great work not only to ruin the reaction, but also to propagate the correct line of the party.

Like our entire people, you are celebrating proudly these days the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland. Our great victories in every field of the life over these 4 decades have their foundations in the heroic national liberation war, in the wisdom, courage and the correct leadership of our party. Therefore, socialist Albania, which we built with our hands, is very dear to us and we are resolute to march forward on the road shown by the party towards the construction of socialism and communism and to safeguard it from any enemy, the greeting says in conclusion.

The message of greetings sent by Comrade Enver Hoxha was listened to with great attention and was received with constant applause and acclamations.

Then Comrade Hekuran Isai greeted those present. His speech was often punctuated by enthusiastic applause and acclamations for the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha.

CSO: 2020/35

MYFTIU READS HOXHA MESSAGE TO 4TH BRIGADE CADRES

AU260923 Tirana ATA in English 0730 GMT 26 Nov 84

[Text] Tirana, 25 Nov (ATA)--The 41st anniversary of the formation of the 4th Shock Brigade was celebrated today in Voskopoja, Korce District.

A big popular rally was organised on this occasion.

Attending it were also the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and vice chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Manush Myftiu, leading cadres of the party and state power in the districts and others.

Amidst the revolutionary enthusiasm of those present, Comrade Manush Myftiu read the greeting that Comrade Enver Hoxha, the beloved leader of our party and people has sent to the former-partisans and cadres of the 4th Shock Brigade on the occasion of the 41st anniversary of its creation.

The formation of the 4th large unit of our national liberation army in the liberated Voskopoja, with patriotic, educational and cultural traditions and an important hearth of the legendary national liberation war, the message of greetings says among others, was a great joy for the party, for you and for the entire people of the district of Korce. distinguished in the struggle for freedom, democracy and progress, being closely united with the party, Korce [as received] big antifascist demonstrations, led by the communist and the courageous guerrillas, filled the ranks of the cetras, [guerrilla bands] battalions and later of the brigades of the national liberation army with its best sons and daughters.

December 28, 1943, the day of the formation of your brigade, holds a special place in the chain of significant events of the national liberation war, the clashes with the enemies during and after the enemy winter operation were fierce, but the new brigade came out victorious because you were educated by the party, enjoyed the support of the people and were tempered as fighters while working in the terrain, in the guerrilla units, the partisan cetras and battalions, the greeting continues.

The units of the brigade fought heroically in all the battles waged in the district of Korce and then in Mat, Diber and Mirdita. In the great epopee for the liberation of Tirana, which constitutes one of the most brilliant pages in the glorious history of our national liberation war, your brigade, incorporated in the 1st Shock Division, has played an important role, keeping the key positions of the enemy under constant fire for days on end and annihilating many of its living forces.

The communists of the first hours, the outstanding sons of our party and people, Rita Marko, Pilo Paristeri, Josif Pashko and Petro Papi fought and worked together with you in the brigade. With the words of the party on their lips and with unshakeable confidence in the victory, hundreds of martyrs of the brigade laid down the life, but you carried their deed further, and the war of the people led by the party crowned it with success. The victories in the liberation war were followed by those in the constructive work and today, from the heights of 40 years of liberation we see with pride our work, the work of the people and party: the free and happy socialist Albania, the message of greetings concludes.

The message of greetings of Comrade Enver Hoxha was listened to with great attention and was received with continuous applause and acclamations.

Then Comrade Manush Myftiu greeted those present. His speech was received with enthusiastic applause and acclamations for the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha.

CSO: 2020/35

ALBANIA

LEADERS ATTEND MILITARY PARADE

AU291335 [Editorial Report] Tirana ATA in English at 1305 GMT on 29 November transmits a report of the military parade held this morning in Tirana on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of Albania an editorial report on the live relay of which was filed as referent item. The report lists the following leaders as attending, in addition to Enver Hoxha, first secretary of the AWP Central Committee: "Comrade Ramiz Alia, secretary of the AWP Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the People's Assembly; Comrade Adil Carcani, AWP Central Committee Politburo member and chairman of the Council of Ministers; Comrades Hajredin Celiku, Hekuran Isai, Lenka Cuko, Manush Myftiu, Muho Asllani, Pali Miska, Rita Marko, Simon Stefani, Besnik Bekteshi, Foto Cami, Llambi Gegprofti, Prokop Murra, Qirjako Mihalj, Vangjel Cerrava, members of the AWP Central Committee, the Presidium of the People's Assembly, and the government."

No further processing planned.

CSO: 2020/35

LEADERS ATTEND TIRANA CONFERENCE

AU201322 Tirana ATA in English 1100 GMT 20 Nov 84

["The Scientific Conference of 'The Party of Labour of Albania and Comrade Enver Hoxha on the Creation and Strengthening of the People's State Power' Begins Its Proceedings"--ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, 20 Nov (ATA)--The scientific conference "The PLA and Comrade Enver Hoxha on the Creation and Strengthening of the People's State Power," organized by the Academy of Sciences and the Tirana University in the context of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and the triumph of the people's revolution, began its proceedings in Tirana yesterday before noon.

Attending were working people and cadres of the organs of the party, and people's state power in the center and districts, of the organs of economy, scholars of social sciences and other guests.

Present were also the secretary of the Central Committee of the party and president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, Comrade Ramiz Alia; the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party and chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Adil Carcani; Comrades Manush Myftiu, Rita Marko, Lenka Cuko, Hekuran Isai, Hajredin Celiku, Foto Cami, Qirjako Mihali; the member of the Central Committee of the party and directress of the Institute of the Marxist-Leninist Studies, Comrade Nexhmije Hoxha; members of the Central Committee of the Party, the Presidium of the People's Assembly and the government.

In the opening speech the chairman of the Academy of Sciences Prof. Aleks Buda stressed among the other things that in the new major work "laying the foundations of the new Albania" which our working masses are studying with an extraordinary attention, Comrade Enver Hoxha synthetizes in a lapidary way the results of the war waged by our people under the leadership of the party, when he says: "In the many centuries of the history of Albania, our people's state power and the monolithic unity of our people ... are two of the greatest and most brilliant achievements, two of the most monumental works of the epoch of the party." Further on, Prof. Aleks Buda pointed out that in these 40 years of war and work for the construction of socialism in Albania, the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country feels pride in the face of the history: the broad working masses with pride and love of the heart call this state "their own state," with the profound consciousness that here they are masters of the country, of everything, of the material and spiritual blessings, masters and forgers of their own destinies, and of the coming generations of the nation.

The report held by Prof. Luan Omari entitled "The Role of the CPA and Comrade Enver Hoxha to the Creation of the People's State Power During the Anti-fascist National-Liberation War" said among other things that despite having clear aims from the beginning, the theoretical thought of the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha in regard to the people's state power, its nature and organization, kept gradually developing and enriching on the basis of the revolutionary practice of the national liberation war, reflecting also the concrete development of the political situation and the differentiation of the social forces. Then the author dwelt on the revolutionary platform of the party, elaborated by Comrade Enver Hoxha, concerning the question of people's state power, on the elimination of all the organs of the enemy state power in the liberated areas and the recognition of the national liberation power as the only state power in our country, on the struggle waged by our party against the viewpoints and efforts of Balli Kombetar, legaliteti and Anglo-American imperialists, who aimed at imposing a bourgeois, authoritarian regime, on the Albanian people, although they tried to sugarcoat it with democratic liberal phraseology, etc.

The report by Prof. Petro Lalai and Dr. Petro Shapo "the party--the leading force of the people's state power" pointed out that the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha have resolutely and persistently strived to create and inculcate a correct Marxist-Leninist concept regarding the leading role of the party in the state power and in the entire life of the country, conceiving it in the theory and practice as a dialectic dynamic process which develops, and is realized every day in the heat of revolution and the socialist construction, then the authors dwelt on the problems of the sole and indivisible leadership of the party in the state power, on the harmonization of all the links of the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat by the party, on the sound party-state power relations, on the leading role of the party in the state power and everywhere, etc.

The report of Prof. Hasan Banja and co-author Bujar Koloneci was entitled "The Role of the State in the Development of Our Socialist Economy." Their report pointed out that in the wake of the establishment of the people's state power the working class and the other working masses carried out all those profound revolutionary transformations of a democratic and socialist character in the economic base, which were accompanied also by qualitative changes in the class structure and the superstructure of society. Then they dwelt on the creation of the socialist system of the economy which is based on the social socialist ownership on the means of production and on the common work of the members of the society, on the planned development of the economy and its running by the socialist state, on its progress relying on its forces, etc.

Comrade Aranit Cela held the report "The Relation of Democracy and the Dictatorship in Our Socialist State." He stressed among others that our many year long experience shows that the notion socialist democracy is a broad one, it starts with the elementary rights of the working people, the freedom of speech, meeting, the inviolability of the home, the person, the right of work, etc., and reaches the highest level that is the right of domination of the working masses, the right of taking part and controlling directly the running of the state.

In continuation, the doctor of sciences, Xh. Frasheri stressed among others in his report "The teachings of the party and Comrade Enver Hoxha on the struggle against bureaucracy as a permanent task for the consolidation and democratization of the peoples power" that the example of socialist Albania is an

incontestable testimony to the possibility of safeguarding and strengthening continuously the dictatorship of the proletariat its continuous consolidation, deepening of socialist democracy, avoidance of the destructive consequences of bureaucracy.

The report "The representative organs of the power and their relations with the executive organs," read out by Dr S. Luarasi, pointed out the correct relations established between the representative organs and the executive ones, the strict respecting of their competences fixed by law, the activity of the people's councils, etc.

In his report "The historic development of the organization of the apparatus of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the [words indistinct] Prof. Ismet Elezi dwelt on the main stages of this development such as the creation of the organs of the revolutionary power over the anti-fascist national liberation war, the further consolidation, democratization and perfection of the apparatus of the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat on the bases of the organization, set since during the war, and especially at the congress of Permet, but in accordance with the new historical conditions.

The conference continues its proceedings.

CSO: 2020/35

AWP PAPER STRESSES INDEPENDENCE STRUGGLE

AU271237 Tirana ATA in English 0920 GMT 27 Nov 84

[Text] Tirana, 27 Nov (ATA)—Under the above title, the newspaper ZERI I POPULLIT carries today an editorial which says among others: our entire people, all the Albanians wherever they live and work, are celebrating joyously and proudly one of the most marked days in our long century history. November 28, the day of the flag, the greatest historic event that crowned the long century efforts of our people for freedom and independence. This date will remain always unforgettable and dear to every Albanian, as a symbol of freedom, sovereignty of the homeland and the unity of [word indistinct].

Further on the editorial points out that the history of the flag and the proclamation of the country's independence by the patriot Ismail Qemali was a result of the century long struggles of our people, of the struggles against the imperialist powers and the neighbouring chauvinists. The banner hoisted on November 28 in heroic Vlore, the editorial continues, fluttered proudly in the Albanian League of Prizren, had been kept high in the people's uprisings and patriotic assemblies. It had given strength and optimism and had inspired Abdyl Frasheri and Sulejman Vokshi, Themistokli Ghermenji and Isa Boletini, Naim and Sami Frasheri, Pashko Vasa and Jani Vreto and many others who fought with rifle and pen for the national cause. This road, as Comrade Enver Hoxha has characterized it, "was not light, was not that of tricks and submissions, kneeling and fear before the stronger, but it was the road of clashes with fierce, external and internal, overt and covert enemies, the road trailed by the people frontally, with nimbleness and great political maturity, with pen and rifle in the hand, with blood and countless sacrifices."

The proclamation of the independence, the editorial continues was a great, far-sighted and courageous act, it marked an important turning point in our national history and opened up new vistas to the national unification and establishment of a democratic order. This act showed all the world that Albania, which contributed to the liberation of all the peoples of the Balkans, not only existed, but that now it was free and independent and wanted to exist and develop as an independent state with its government. But this great and so decisive victory for the history of our people was accompanied with a great tragedy, half of the Albanian territories was truncated from the homeland, among them were those regions that had been important hearths of the great anti-ottoman uprisings. These were fierce perfidious attacks that the neighboring chauvinists and the big imperialist powers launched against our people and our national movement. Nevertheless, the work of Ismail Qemali and of other patriots was a glorious one, and it will remain always unforgettable.

The banner of this brilliant deed, the banner of the people's resistance, the banner of the poor people is now kept aloft by the party of the working class, founded and led by Comrade Enver Hoxha with far-sightedness. "Since the party began the struggle at the head of the people, Comrade Enver Hoxha writes in the new book "Laying the Foundations of the New Albania" it based itself on these outstanding traditions of the war and heroism. For us, the national liberation war was not a separate link of the chain of battles our people had waged in defence of the homeland, to secure its existence as a nation, with their language, culture and all national features. It promoted these traditions, but at another time and with a richer content."

Celebrating the 72d anniversary of the proclamation of the independence, in the festive atmosphere that is created these days all over our country by the glorious jubilee of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland, our people honour with respect the glorious deed of our great patriots, the editorial says in conclusion.

CSO: 2020/35

ALIA, CARCANI, MYFTIU AT ARTS EXHIBITION

AU281054 Tirana ATA in English 0935 GMT 28 Nov 84

[Text] Tirana, 27 Nov (ATA)--The national exhibition of figurative arts devoted to the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and the triumph of the people's revolution was opened in the gallery of figurative arts in the capital, yesterday afternoon.

Attending the ceremony on the occasion were also the secretary of the Central Committee of the party and president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, Comrade Ramiz Alia, the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Adil Carcani, Comrades Manush Myftiu, Mohu Assllani, Pali Miska and Foto Cami, Comrade Mexhmije Hoxha, the minister of education and culture, Tefta Cami, the chairman of the Writers' and Artists' League, Dritero Agolli, members of the Central Committee of the party, the Presidium of the People's Assembly and the government.

Present were also delegations of the Marxist-Leninist parties, of the friendship associations and other foreign guests.

The speech on the occasion was held by the chairman of the Committee of Culture and Art of the PSR of Albania, Sefedin Cela.

Comrade Manush Myftiu cut the inauguration ribbon. Then, those present visited the exhibition with interest. It contains about 500 works selected from 2,100 works that are presented in the big literary-artistic contest on occasion of the great jubilee.

The exhibition reflects the development and mass character of our figurative arts, their ever higher qualitative level. It is a nice present of our painters and sculptors for the brilliant jubilee of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and to the triumph of the people's revolution.

CSO: 2020/35

ALIA, OTHERS ATTEND TIRANA CONCERT

AU291305 Tirana ATA in English 0925 GMT 29 Nov 84

[Excerpt] Tirana, 29 Nov (ATA)--A festive concert was given in the "Partizani" Palace of Sports in Tirana last night, on occasion of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and the triumph of the people's revolution.

Attending it were working people of work and production centers, different institutions, men of art and culture and other invitees.

Attending were also the secretary of the Central Committee of the party and president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, Comrade Ramiz Alia, the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Adil Carcani, Comrades Hajredin Celiku, Hekuran Isai, Lenka Cuko, Manush Myftiu, Muho Asllani, Pali Miska, Rita Marko, Simon Stefani, Besnik Bekteshi, Foto Cami, Llambi Gegprifti, Prokop Murra, Qirjako Mihali, the secretary of the Central Committee of the party, Comrade Vangjel Cerrava, Comrade Nexhmiqe Hoxha, members of the Central Committee of the party, the Presidium of the People's Assembly and the government.

Present were also the delegations of the Marxist-Leninist parties, of the friendship associations and other foreign guests who have come to our country to attend the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and the triumph of the people's revolution.

Attending were also heads and functionaries of the diplomatic representations accredited to the People's Socialist Republic of Albania.

CSO: 2020/35

ALBANIA

GREECE'S PAPOULIAS TOURS COUNTRYSIDE

AU061329 Tirana ATA in English 0945 GMT 6 Dec 84

[Text] Tirana, 6 Dec (ATA)--Yesterday before noon, the alternate member of foreign affairs of the Republic of Greece, Karolos Papoulias and the persons accompanying him paid a visit to the museum city of Berat, where they were welcomed by the chairman of the Executive Committee of the District People's Council, Kristaw Kule.

From here the greek delegation went to Bubes village, Permet District. The alternate minister of foreign affairs, Karolos Papoulias, laid a wreath at the hill with a height of 731 m, where during the Italian-Greek war of 1940-1941 a number of Greek soldiers and officers were killed in clashes with the fascist aggressors. A wreath was also laid in the name of the National Committee of the War Veterans of the Albanian People.

The ceremony organized on this occasion was also attended by the chairman of the Executive Committee of the People's Council of Permet District, Resul Zani, representatives of the National Committee of the War Veterans of the Albanian People and others.

In continuation of the visits, the alternate minister of foreign affairs of Greece, Karolos Papoulias and the persons accompanying him arrived at the city of Gjirokaster. They were received by the chairman of the Executive Committee of the District People's Council, Nedin Hoxha, the heroine of socialist labour, the vice-president of the Presidency of the People's Assembly of the PSR of Albania, Vitori Curri. A luncheon was given at the touristic spot of Kuculla, which passed in a warm and friendly atmosphere.

In the afternoon the Greek delegation visited the Museum of the Antifascist National Liberation War where it got acquainted with the contribution of the people of the district to the struggle for the liberation of the homeland against the Nazi-fascist occupiers and with the activity of the leader of our party and people, Comrade Enver Hoxha.

From this the Greek guests went to the "Pandeli Sotiri" Pedagogical Secondary School which trains teachers of Greek language. Karolos Papoulias showed interest for the programs and the subjects taught in this language. He evaluated the high level of the knowledge acquired by the pupils in this school.

The Greek delegation made also a visit to the Higher Type Agricultural Cooperative of Sofratike in Lower Dropuli [Greek minority region]. The Greek guests had a warm meeting with cooperativists and cadres at the palace of culture of the village of Dervican. The chairman of the cooperative Ilia Selo acquainted them with the great progress made in the region of Dropuli during these 40 years of the people's state power, with the constant raising of the well-being of the cooperativists who are living happily and joyously.

Then those present followed a concert with Greek and Albanian folk songs and dances by the amateur artists of "Dropuli" ensemble.

During these visits, the Greek delegation headed by the alternate minister of foreign affairs, Karolos Papoulias was accompanied by the head of department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Piro Biti, the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the PSR of Albania in Greece, Klsenofon Nushi as well as by the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Republic of Greece to the PSR of Albania, Apostolos Papasliotis.

CSO: 2020/35

ALBANIA

BRIEFS

VIETNAMESE DELEGATION DEPARTS--Tirana, 6 Dec (ATA)--The party and government delegation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, headed by the member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Nguyen Duc Tam, which at the invitation of the Central Committee of the PLA and the Council of Ministers of the PSR of Albania, attended the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and the triumph of the people's revolution left our country yesterday. The delegation was seen off at the airport by the member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the PLA, Comrade Lenka Cuko, the member of the Political Bureau of the CC of the party and minister of industry and mining of the PSR of Albania, Comrade Hajredin Celiku and other comrades. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0915 GMT 6 Dec 84]

FALLEN HEROES MONUMENT--Tirana, 26 Nov (ATA)--The lapidary devoted to the six martyrs of Orman-Ciflik, who fell on 30 July 1911 in the struggle for the independence of the country and as well as the 65 martyrs that laid down their lives during the antifascist national liberation war was inaugurated in the village of Ciflik of Korce District. Attending the inauguration ceremony were also the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Manush Myftiu, the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and vice-president of the Presidium of the People's Assembly, Comrade Rita Marko, the first secretary of the party committee of the district of Korce, Dhimiter Petro and the chairman of the executive committee of the District People's Council Fatbardh Harizi. Amidst the enthusiasm of those present. Comrade Rita Marko uncovered the inscription of the lapidary. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0730 GMT 26 Nov 84]

TRADE DELEGATION TO IRAN--Tirana, 24 Nov (ATA)--A government trade delegation, of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, headed by the minister of foreign trade, Shane Korbeci, left for the Islamic Republic of Iran, on 23 November. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0800 GMT 24 Nov 84]

SWEDISH TRADE DELEGATION--Tirana, 8 Dec (ATA)--The Swedish Government trade delegation, headed by Roin Carisson, minister of the state industry [title as received], left our country, yesterday. The delegation was seen off by Shane Korbeci, minister of foreign trade of the PSR of Albania, Andon Berxholi, head of department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other comrades. During its stay in our country, the Swedish Government trade delegation paid visits to the National Historic Museum, "Albania Today" exhibition, "Gjergje Kastrioti Scanderbeg" Museum in Kruje, etc. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0735 GMT 8 Dec 84]

Tirana, 8 Dec (ATA)--The chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Socialist Republic of Albania, Adil Carcani, received yesterday the head of the government trade delegation of the Kingdom of Sweden, the minister of state industry, [title as received] Roin Carlsson and had a friendly talk with him. Attending the reception were the Minister of Foreign Trade Shane Korbeci and the vice minister of foreign affairs, Sokrat Plaka. Present was also the ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Sweden to the People's Socialist Republic of Albania Lennart Myrtsen. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0730 GMT 8 Dec 84]

KPRP GREETINGS--Comrade Heng Samrin, general secretary of the KPRP Central Committee and chairman of the PRK Council of State, recently received a message of thanks from Comrade Enver Hoxha, first secretary of the Albanian Workers Party Central Committee. The message reads: I sincerely thank you for the greetings you sent me on my 76th birthday. I take this opportunity to return to you the expression of brotherhood and friendship linking our two peoples. I wish you and the friendly Kampuchean people more and greater successes in the future in the struggle to achieve your goals: national independence and socialism against the interference by the imperialist and reactionary forces. [Text] [Phnom Penh Domestic Service in Cambodian 0430 GMT 26 Nov 84]

DELEGATIONS ARRIVE--Tirana, 26 Nov (ATA)--At the invitation of the Central Committee of the PLA, the delegation of the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist), led by the first secretary of the Central Committee of this party, Hardial Bains, and the delegation of the Portuguese Communist Party (reconstructed), led by the first secretary of its Central Committee, Eduardo Pires, arrived in our country yesterday to attend the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and the triumph of the people's revolution. Present to welcome the delegations of the Marxist-Leninist parties at the airport were the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania Comrade Vangjel Cerrava, the member of the Central Committee of the party, Sofokli Lazri, the head of the foreign department at the Central Committee of the party, Agim Popa, and other comrades. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0735 GMT 26 Nov 84]

ECUADOR MARXIST DELEGATION--Tirana, 27 Nov (ATA)--At the invitation of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, a delegation of the Communist Party (M-L) of Ecuador, led by the member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of this party, Horhe Zambrano [spelling of name as received] arrived in our country to attend the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and triumph of the people's revolution. It was welcomed by the member of the Central Committee of the PLA, Sofokli Lazri, the director of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the party, Agim Popa, and other comrades. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0915 GMT 27 Nov 84]

HOXHA BOOK PUBLISHED--Tirana, 27 Nov (ATA)--Following the publication in the Albanian language, Comrade Enver Hoxha's new book "Laying the Foundations of the New Albania" memoirs and historical notes came off the press in English, French and Spanish. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0730 GMT 27 Nov 84]

MARXIST DELEGATIONS DEPART--Tirana, 6 Dec (ATA)--The delegation of the Communist Party of Brazil, headed by the first secretary of its Central Committee, Joao Amazonas; the delegation of the Communist Party of Denmark, (Marxist-Leninist) headed by the first secretary of its Central Committee, Klaus Riis Klausen; the delegation of the Communist Party of Spain (Marxist-Leninist), headed by the first secretary of its Central Committee, Raul Marco and the delegation of the Portuguese Communist Party (Reconstructed), headed by the first secretary of the Central Committee of this party, Eduardo Pires, which, at the invitation of the Central Committee of the Party of Labour of Albania, attended the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and the triumph of the people's revolution, left our country yesterday. They were seen off at the airport by the member of the Political Bureau and secretary of the Central Committee of the PLA, Comrade Simon Stefani, the member of the CC of the party, Sofokli Lazri, the head of Foreign Department of the CC of the party, Agim Popa, and other comrades. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0920 GMT 6 Dec 84]

ALGERIAN DELEGATION--Tirana, 3 Dec (ATA)--The Algerian Government delegation, led by the alternate member of the Political Bureau of the Front of National Liberation of Algeria and minister of information, Bachir Rouis, which at the invitation of the Council of Ministers of the PSR of Albania attended the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and the triumph of the people's power, left our country, yesterday. Present to see the delegation off at the airport were the vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers of the PSR of Albania, Besnik Bektashi, the minister of education and culture, Tefta Cami and other comrades. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0730 GMT 3 Dec 84]

LITERARY LANGUAGE CONFERENCE--Tirana, 9 Dec (ATA)--The scientific conference "The Albanian National Literary Language and Our Epoch" continued its proceedings yesterday before noon. Attending the proceedings of the conference were working people of scientific, didactic, cultural and publishing institutions, scholars and teachers of Albanian language and others. Present were also the member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the party and vice chairman of Council of Ministers, Comrade Manush Myftiu; the directress of the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, Nexhmije Hoxha; the minister of education and culture, Comrade Tefta Cami; the chairman of the Academy of Sciences, Prof. Aleks Buda; the chairman of the Writers and Artists League, Dritero Agolli; the rector of Tirana University, Prof. Osman Kraja; and other comrades. In this sitting many scholars read out other scientific papers. [Excerpt] [Tirana ATA in English 0900 GMT 9 Dec 84]

MORE DELEGATIONS ARRIVE--Tirana, 7 Dec (ATA)--The delegation of the Communist Party of Canada (M-L), headed by the first secretary of its Central Committee Hardial Bains, which at the invitation of the Central Committee of the PLA, attended the celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the liberation of the homeland and the triumph of the people's revolution, left our country, yesterday. It was seen off at the airport by the secretary of the CC of the PLA, Comrade Vangjel Cerrava, the member of the CC of the party Sofokli Lazri, the head of the foreign department of the CC of the party Agim Popa and other comrades. [Text] [Tirana ATA in English 0920 GMT 7 Dec 84]

WORKERS' PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT, POLITICS

Prague NOVA MYSL in Czech No 10, 1984 pp 48-55

[Article by Otakar Baudys]

[Excerpts] It is not enough for successful revolutionary practice to have revolutionary theory mastered only by the leaders of the revolutionary masses. A broadly based revolutionary practice requires that revolutionary theory also be mastered by the broad masses of working people. The revolutionary theory must become their property to the greatest extent; it must determine their attitudes and behavior. A revolutionary movement is revolutionary to the extent to which it accepts revolutionary theory and through practical steps transforms it into a new reality.

Many years of rich experience of the revolutionary workers movement clearly show that whenever this effort was lax the movement lost ground and it was the enemy who benefited from the situation. A deformed theory either in its right-wing revisionist or extremely leftwing anarchist version in its consequences objectively serves the counterrevolutionary forces, as illustrated in the "Lesson From the Crisis Development in the Party and Society in the Period Following the 13th CPCZ Congress."

Under the conditions of a socialist society the masses of the working people find themselves in a completely different situation than in a bourgeois society. In the socialist society the working people own the means of production. This objective position of theirs also fully determines the different character of their social activity than is determined in a society based on private ownership of the means of production. Defending social ownership of the means of production is an indivisible, important part of the social activity of the working people. The working people as owners of the means of production thus become the subjects, the creators of their presence and future.

A successful building of socialism requires ever growing activity on the part of the working people in the process of social management. It is this type of social activity of the working people which significantly determines their position and thus also the scope of social activity under socialism. An inseparable part of the revolutionary activity of the working people is also the activity aiming at the preparation of the working people for fulfilling the constantly challenging tasks in the transition of socialist society to communist society.

The participation of the working people in management and especially in decisionmaking will objectively require not only technical knowledge but also the active mastering of Marxist-Leninist world view. . . To fulfill the demanding economic and other society-wide tasks will naturally require deep theoretical knowledge, an understanding of Marxist-Leninist world view on the part of both managers and ordinary workers. Today we cannot approach the highly responsible participation in management with individual and often accidental experience and on the basis of uncontrolled world view. For this reason, the working people must get actively interested in Marxist-Leninist education because of their own needs and because of the feeling of responsibility for managing work. Under such conditions Marxist-Leninist education is fully accepted and will get many active adherents. Its various shortcomings as far as scope and form are concerned will be more easily overcome in this situation. These recipients of Marxist-Leninist education are also more demanding from their lecturers and study material, and it is a pleasure to work with them.

Technocratism is one of those bourgeois ideological concepts which, under the guise of a need for high expertise under existing demanding conditions of developed science and technology, is used to justify the permanent exclusion of the working people from their participation in management. In spite of the fact that this concept was born in a bourgeois environment and is directed against the efforts of the revolutionary workers movement, it has a broader aspect: in a certain way it also affects socialism. We are aware of the fact that in building a socialist society the people influenced by the legacy of a society worshipping private ownership also participate. Many of these people are willing actively to accept and pursue these technocratic concepts. A common denominator of technocratism is a centralist deformation of the basic principle of management--democratic centralism.

The participation of the working people in management is emphasized in the Report of the 14th CPCZ Congress in the following words: "We must see to it that responsible organs react to the suggestions submitted by the people, take care of the criticized shortcomings and inform the public." It is obvious that requirements on the level of management are high under socialism. The high level of management can best be secured through collective decision-making, through to consistent observation of the principle of democratic centralism in management. The broad masses of the working people improve the value and technique of management by submitting a large number of ideas stemming from the irreplaceable and familiar knowledge of concrete conditions under which they live and by acting as the most effective mass control of the practical implementation of the plans, thus making possible timely execution of the necessary changes through their comments and proposals.

It is obvious that the technocratic and related bureaucratic deformations have a serious negative impact on the formulation of world view of the working people and on the effectiveness of Marxist-Leninist education. Those working people who are excluded from the process of management become mere passive executors of labor directives and their creative activity is directed toward a private sector outside of their workplace. In the private sector there is

enough room for preferring selfish interests and intimately related individualistic notions of life and ideas.

For example, what kind of patriotism can be born in those places where the people consider as their own only their apartment, car, country place or garden? In those places where they participate only to a small extent in decisionmaking, they do not experience responsibility for the state of our society, for their role in it. In the end, their participation in social affairs becomes a mere formality. It is obvious that such technocratic deformations must negatively affect the education of our young people, who are in a period of intensive formulation of their world view. At the same time, the serious factor of the whole problem is the fact that shortcomings at the level of world opinion become a source of the most varied negative antisocial phenomena in both the work sector and outside it.

Technocratic deformations produce manifestations of subjectivism on the side of both the working people and the managing centers separated from the working people and in fact also from reality. These deformations also lead to a decline in expertise, because its level greatly depends on the world view of managers. A natural indirect consequence of the technocratic deformations is the creation of conditions favorable to liberalism.

In case this happens, Marxist-Leninist education does not have the necessary attraction, not even if it is carried out well formally. It also lacks the necessary appeal for the working people who, seeing the discrepancies between words and deeds, theory and practice, consider this education to be untrue. In the end, it is not appealing even to managers who, seeing the insufficient influence of Marxist-Leninist education on the work and other activity of the working people, sometimes conclude that this education is superfluous and underestimate it. This, however, strengthens technocratic and bureaucratic tendencies and opens more room for liberal tendencies. In those places where people excuse themselves or underestimate Marxism-Leninism, anti-Marxist theories and counterrevolutionary forces thrive.

1277

CSO: 2400/118

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

RECORD NUMBER OF ACCIDENTS REPORTED

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 24 Oct 84 p 5

[Article by Zdena Stepankova]

[Text] Last year the number of off-the-job accidents of gainfully employed persons in the Czech Socialist Republic reached a record number thus far--440,201 cases. The daily average number of people incapacitated because of an off-the-job accident exceeded 27,000, and the length of incapacitation averaged 22.5 days per accident.

The social losses and expenses reached 6 billion korunas a year, including 4.5 billion in national revenue, and an estimated 1.5 billion was paid for in-patient and out-patient care, for health-insurance payments and the like.

There are roughly three off-the-job accidents to every accident on the job. As for fatal accidents, the ratio is 420 accidents on the job to 5,000 off the job. This is an enormous difference.

These alarming figures are not being mentioned for the first time. For years already, attention has been paid to accidents and, above all, to their prevention. Unfortunately, until now good results have been achieved only in the on-the-job accident rate. It is lower. However, as far as the off-the-job accidents are concerned, the opposite is true: their number keeps rising. The causes of and reasons for this are well known. Most accidents occur when someone is doing some manual labor at home, in the weekend cottage, in the cabin, or when he is doing some kind of repair work, and especially when he is building something.

The second group comprises accidents that occurred on the pavement. They represent almost one-third of the total number, and most of them occur on level surface.

The third group includes sport and recreation accidents.

It would seem that with causes and reasons for accidents known, nothing would prevent one from drawing conclusions from established facts and from finding solutions, and that the result would have to manifest itself in a lower number of off-the-job accidents. Unfortunately, this has been but a wish until now.

Let us take a closer look at the individual groups. Accidents when doing manual labor at home, in the weekend cottage, in the cabin. Unfortunately, accidents also happen to skilled workers who want to speed up the work and do not abide by safety regulations, but they happen most frequently to someone unskilled.

The principle that one should do only what one knows how to do and what one understands cannot be applied thus far to various jobs and repairs at home. Yet to do them is often the only option a layman has. He cannot call a repair man, for there is no repair shop; the waiting period is often long, or the needed repair is so small that it is only an encumbrance for the shop, which simply does not accept the job. One of the main ways to improve things will probably have to be the establishment of repair shops that would do the kind of work which is most frequently the cause of accidents, work which requires genuine qualifications.

In the homes, many accidents occur on slippery, shiny floors. These are causes of accidents not only in homes, but also in corridors of various offices. The cleanliness of the floor is being proved by the shine, by a floor that looks like a mirror. It is nice, to be sure, but only as long as one does not need to walk on it.

In the second, also large, group belong accidents on the pavement. They are more frequent in winter months, on icy roads, but one can stumble in summer, too, on a flat surface, because the sidewalks are not even. This problem has also been discussed more than once. It is even said that it is simpler for the national committees to pay insurance, just in case something like that happens on the sidewalk, than to keep it clean and in good repair. It is a fact that no national committee in a larger city has enough workers to "watch over" the pavement. But what if one would take a different approach to the problem? For instance, what if a national committee would not approve any work as finished until the company that dug up the sidewalk, for whatever reason--for new water pipes, gas pipes, electric or telephone wires--would bring it back to its original state? And if each company did so, sidewalks and streets in general would be in order. Then it would be easier to maintain them.

Accidents in sports often occur as a result of inadequate equipment. Many skiing areas, including lifts, as well as swimming areas or playgrounds do not correspond to the requirements of safety regulations. Quite a bit is being done to improve the situation but, as one can see, it is still not enough. Each year there is a large number of drownings, especially among children, which indicates that children who cannot swim are sometimes left without supervision.

A certain and not negligible number of accidents occurs under the influence of alcohol. Sometimes this fact is even being excused, and it is pointed out that drivers, perhaps tractor drivers, were thirsty and that there was nothing but beer to drink, etc.

All accidents are a serious social problem, above all off-the-job accidents, since they are constantly on the rise. The economic losses are high, and human losses sometimes irreplaceable. It is proper to keep emphasizing what individual enterprises must do to eliminate the causes of accidents and what

responsibility they bear but, on the other hand, it is also necessary to emphasize that each person is responsible for his or her health and that recklessness is never in order. It can sometimes have irreparable consequences.

12435

CSO: , 2400/76

NO INTEREST IN WORKING IN BLIGHTED REGION

Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech 24 Oct 84 p 3

[Article by Pavel Fiala, director of Computing and Organizational Service, Chabarovice, Usti nad Labem District]

[Text] In recent years the problem of placing and utilizing graduates of all types of schools has been manifesting itself more on a regional than on a statewide level.

It is well known that, unlike in most other krajs of our republic, in the North Bohemia Kraj, especially in its western basin, there is a shortage of workers in all fields and professions.

In keeping with the policy of economic planning, we are making long-term projections concerning the need for high-school and university graduates, and are revising them every year. For any current year, this plan concerning the number of graduates to be accepted--and even their assignment according to their field of study--becomes binding. However, when we recruit we keep on finding that the projected number of graduates is not at all available, and thus we fail consistently to fulfill our recruiting plan.

We also recruit directly at the universities; we give scholarships in an effort to win students for work in our region even before they finish their studies. It surprises us, though, that even while using such means we are unable to find a sufficient number of students whom we could enlist as prospects.

We are also spending a considerable amount of money and energy in order to recruit university graduates in other areas, and as far as conditions permit we secure housing for them. However, here, too, the results of our recruitment are negligible even though it is by far not everywhere that there is such an abundance of opportunities for work.

Several years' experience in our service makes me doubt that the fiery appeals to university and other school graduates to get a job where they are most needed will meet with success. It will never be easy to persuade a person who has family, social, sometimes even property ties to a certain place to make a drastic change in the place of work, especially if it would mean going to the North Bohemia Kraj, which--in many instances quite unjustly--is in some kind of disfavor among the inhabitants of other regions.

The same thing should work the other way around and be true of the majority of the inhabitants of the North Bohemia Kraj; young people should be returning here after they have graduated from the university. Thus it is only a question of securing in the schools the number of places for applicants from our region that corresponds to our needs. I would very much like to know if this question has ever been discussed. I personally am convinced that in the last several years all applicants from the North Bohemia Kraj who have been rejected for university study (after they have passed successfully the entrance examination) would have found full employment in our area in any field, from medicine to economics. Yet we have not been able to find during the same period a sufficient number of graduates even in those areas in which, according to the yearly statements of the universities before the beginning of the examination period, there is "a surplus" of interested applicants.

12435

CSO: 2400/76

PROTECTION OF STATE PROPERTY

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 8 Nov 84 p 4

[Article by Jan Zigo: "Protection of State Property"]

[Text] A decree from the Federal Ministry of the Interior of 20 October 1983, ZBIERKA ZAKONU No 135/1983, regulates anew the protection of socialist communal property. It requires all the socialist organizations to secure more consistently the protection of such property, to be done in three ways: by security personnel, by mechanical hindering means, and by security techniques, possibly by a combination of these means of protection. According to this circular, central federal and national organs issue exemplary rules concerning the protection of socialist communal property. On the basis of these rules all socialist organizations must issue their own internal rules. In those rules, according to each kind of protection, the following in particular should be determined: the scope of property protection; provisions concerning procedure and technology or both, in the protection of property; the mode of the protection of property by security personnel; the duties of security personnel; the organization, armament and outfitting of security personnel.

The regime provisions are a set of obligations and rights established by an organization for persons in that organization's facility or for persons accompanying property transported through the organization's facility (e.g., defining the movement of persons and means of transportation within the organization's facility, entrance or transport access to the facility given only by means of an identification card or permission). By technical provisions one understands the use of mechanical antiaccess devices (e.g., fencing, lattices, shutters and locks) or security technology (e.g., electric security signalization, electric fire signalization and closed-circuit TV) together with mechanical antiaccess devices. By regime-technique provisions one understands a combination of procedural and technological provisions.

The decree determines that the security personnel include members of the factory security, watchmen, gate-keepers and the personnel of guard service. By guard service personnel one understands the personnel of an organization providing by contract property protection for other organizations and listed as such in the register of enterprises. Section 3 of the decree regulates qualifications for being a security employee. Only a person over 18 with a clean record who is physically, mentally and professionally able to fulfill the

established duties and rights may become a security employee. From this it follows that, for instance, a 70-year-old ailing retiree cannot become such an employee since it is impossible to expect from him either the physical or the professional ability to fulfill such a serious function. Security employees must also participate in professional training and firearms drills. Security employees, therefore, should be selected from among a younger category of people. This, of course, is directly connected with the remuneration of those functions. The salary scale for security employees is very important and should be in accordance with the policy of labor remuneration, difficulty of work and its importance. Only then will the function of a security employee become attractive for young people as well.

A security employee must wear an external distinguishing mark. Such a mark for a member of the factory security, watchman, gate-keeper or guard service employee would be a red armband 100 mm wide with the inscription: F(actory) S(ecurity), Watchman, or GATE-KEEPER, with letters 60 mm high and 15 mm wide. This band is worn on the upper left arm and must show the stamp of the organization whose employee or member the security person is. According to the circumstances a security employee, on the demand of persons against whom he intervenes, identifies himself with a factory security ID, an ID issued by the organization whose employee or member the watchman or the gate-keeper is, or with a guard service ID.

The following are among the fundamental tasks of the security personnel: to prevent theft, loss, abuse, damage or destruction of state property, to prevent any unauthorized means of transportation from entering a facility of the organization. They keep control over persons and transportation means leaving a building of the organization, above all to ascertain whether they are taking out without authorization any property whose protection is the purpose of the organization. Besides, they fulfill tasks assigned to them by the fire security rules of the organization. Members of the factory security work within the scope outlined by the internal regulations concerning the protection of state property, as well as cash and other valuables during transportation. While protecting state property the security personnel cooperates in particular with the units of fire security and peoples' militia, if such are quartered in the organization, with the local district department of public security, either with a unit of the National Security or Czechoslovak People's Army if those units participate in the protection of organizational property.

Control over the security personnel is entrusted to the local National Security service, which also renders that personnel methodical and professional assistance. Within the framework of such assistance it provides firearms training for the factory security and safety instruction. The above-mentioned decree raised the protection of socialist communal property to a higher level both in the method and in the procedure because it instructs all organizations to inform a unit of the National Security, within 30 days after receiving a warning from it, on the measures taken to eliminate shortcomings. Regulations contained in the decree do not deal with the protection of state property under special instructions or legal regulations. The new decree on the protection of socialist communal property became valid on 1 July 1984.

12758

CSO: 2400/109

VANDALISM ON CZECHOSLOVAK RAILWAYS

Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 1 Nov 84 p 4

[Letters to the editor]

[Excerpts] In the column "Comments" we published in PRAVDA of 4 September 1984 an article entitled "Vandalism or Irresponsibility in Service?" The letters which we have received have confirmed that vandalism is socially a very dangerous phenomenon and that it is high time to put an end to this nuisance.

Conductor Cannot Take Care of Everything

As a CSD [Czechoslovak State Railroads] worker I cannot remain indifferent to the above comment and I am therefore taking liberty of expressing my own views on the subject. Until some years ago I worked as conductor on the passenger trains and later on as dispatcher of passenger trains at a station where these trains originated and terminated.

Passenger railroad transportation in the CSSR is rather uneven and irregular during the day and week. As a result the sets of passenger cars are not continuously used. Some sets of cars, for example, are used exclusively by commuting blue-collar workers, other sets on Fridays and Sundays only. For the rest of the time they are sidetracked--in professional parlance "deposited." There is a lack of sidings for depositing the sets particularly in the big railroad junctions. The sidings constructed many years ago are no longer sufficient and their expansion or the construction of new ones encounters problems because the desirable adjoining land is either arable or developed. For this reason the sets of cars are deposited at the small neighboring stations and on various unused tracks--always in small numbers. These emergency depository capacities are neither fenced off nor continuously guarded by the CSD. If somebody discovers these sets of cars on remote tracks, not locked up and not illuminated because of economy measures at night, virtually nothing prevents him from committing a crime. It must be critically pointed out that among the pilferers are, alas, many CSD workers who are familiar with the local conditions.

The question is from whom (after the cars were deposited) and within what time the conductor is to take over the set. It must be realized that according to

the present regulations (the so-called Turnus Code) the work shifts of train crews are limited to 12 (exceptionally 15) hours. It follows that the set of cars would have to be turned over at least twice a day. On the long-distance express trains, however, two or three train crews work in turn. According to the existing CSD service regulations, the train crews should report for work 30 minutes (on diesel trains only 15 minutes) prior to the departure of the train from the originating station (these periods are longer in exceptional instances only). It is unrealistic to think that the conductor could take over and check the entire inventory in the set of cars because he must perform also other tasks and give information to the passengers who are about to board the train.

One conductor is assigned usually to 4 or 5 passenger cars with 8 to 10 outside doors which must be closed over a total distance of 98 to 122.5 meters, if all cars of the second class are fully occupied with 320 to 360 passengers. In no case, however, can he remember all passengers or pass through all cars between individual stops.

Recently there has been a shortage of conductors on the passenger trains. The reasons are to be found in the negative aspects of continuous service on several trains, in the fear of undisciplined passengers and low earnings. For these reasons the quality of present train crews is not of the required standard. Some workers take advantage of this situation and perform service superficially--in the first place they do not check the passenger tickets as carefully as they should. They take advantage of the fact that upon termination of employment the CSD could encounter problems with their compensation because no train can depart without a conductor. No wonder some leading CSD official tolerate many shortcomings on the part of conductors.

Eng Martin Fort
CSD officer in charge, Bratislava

Consistent Punishment Is Imperative

I witnessed a youthful citizen throw a bottle of wine into the train's window. The broken window glass and bottle injured the passengers, but the young delinquent received only a warning from the VB [Public Security]. A woman conductor told me how she caught an elegant hippie cutting the seat. When she reproached him for his behavior he became gruff with her, whereupon she slapped him on the face. He did the same several times in return and then pulled down the emergency brake when the train was approaching the station at which he got off. It took the CSD workers more than half hour to put the brakes in order. And the woman conductor I have mentioned? "It is better not to notice anything, no matter what big a mess anybody is making..."

It is tremendously difficult to catch the vandals in the first place. However, if this by some miracle does happen, another problem is that the perpetrator is not most severely punished. After all, somebody who never worked hard or has not created anything in his life will not be shocked by vandalism. I therefore ask: when will we have a law in our country which will appropriately

punish vandalism and sabotage? Only then will working people have the good feeling that their work will not be damaged and that great values will be saved!

Jan Lazorik, Krivany

Interventions Are Inefficient

The fact of thefts from and damage to the railroad cars is alarming. Spare parts often do not suffice even to meet the needs caused by vandalism. For this reason the furnishings of railroad cars, that is, travel comfort, is not of the standard we and the passengers would wish.

We must agree that the conductors of passenger trains could perform their work at least as conscientiously as most of the workers in other occupations. According to the service regulations the train crew takes over a set of cars at the originating station. It writes a report on the defects found. Because of the shortage of conductors on passenger trains, there are 5 to 10 cars per conductor and usually only 1 conductor on slow-moving trains (up to 12 cars). For this reason it is virtually impossible to protect the car furnishings from the vandals. Since the conductor is in charge of a larger number of passenger cars, the conditions do not exist for him to bear full responsibility for the damage caused to the cars during the journey. As a result the train crew (conductors) cannot be held liable, according to the Labor Code, for the damage or for paying for it.

In our Eastern Railway System we have 18 inspectors of passenger transportation who check approximately 1,500 trains every month.

Also in this way we want to appeal to all passengers and ask them for help. We cannot overcome the present situation--a high degree of vandalism--without the assistance of all passengers who are interested in improving the standard of travel comfort as part of the living standard in general. We have dealt with these serious problems several times already. In cooperation with our armed units we have selected certain trains, primarily on Fridays, Saturdays and Sundays, which, in addition to the conductors, are manned by the members of the railroad armed guards. During the first 6 months of this year they intervened almost 3,000 times against the passengers. Nevertheless, the overall effect is not appreciable. The starting point for preventing this socially negative phenomenon can only be the revision of the Penal Code, which would permit more severe punishment of criminals causing damage valued in the millions. We must keep in mind that these are the values created by the thousands of toiling hands into which human skill and know-how was put. Yet, a steadily increasing number of vandals are engaged with small risk in this antisocial activity.

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GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

DIALOGUE VS. CONFRONTATION: SED-CPSU DIFFERENCES ANALYZED

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/Article by Wolfgang Seiffert: "The Nature of the Conflict Between the SED Leadership and Moscow"/

/Text/ The late, hesitant cancellation of the date for Erich Honecker's visit to the FRG¹ has made Honecker's interest in the visit evident once again. Moreover, course and circumstances have shown that Moscow wanted the cancellation and finally prevailed.² Preparation started on 8 May when East Berlin's permanent representative in Bonn proposed to the Chancellor's office 26 to 30 September as the time for the visit. Despite the obvious irritation over the 23 Aug Dregger interview,³ the hectic speculations and unfriendly media commentaries, until the end of August East Berlin did not signal any coming cancellation; the preparations continued. A prolonged stop at the BASF stand had been planned by the protocol office for Honecker's traditional tour on the opening day of the Leipzig Fall Fair. The schedule was not changed until the last minute. The SED general secretary stopped only for a short time at the BASF stand; when reporters asked about his trip, he brusquely turned away. All other Western exhibitors were also given short shrift. Not even an agreed-upon visit with the former Japanese foreign minister Sakurauchi was kept.⁴ Only at the Soviet pavillion was there an extended stop and the exchange of ceremonial speeches with Soviet delegation chief Leonid Kostandov, who unexpectedly died in Leipzig from a heart infarct. In contrast to former tours, especially also at this year's spring fair, the otherwise relaxed and radiant Honecker this time looked pinched and unfriendly. If there was a signal, it was the style of this tour.

Two days later, on 4 September, the negotiation delegations met in the Bonn Chancellor's office for further talks on the final communique. Dr. Jenninger, minister in the chancellor's office, asked the GDR permanent representative, Ewald Moldt, before the talks to come to his office and demanded assurances about Honecker's visit. On that occasion he found out about the postponement of the date. Thereafter the delegations continued to confer about the communique. Thereafter Honecker intimated several times that he continues to adhere to the intention to visit.⁵

The subsequent cancellation by the Bulgarian party and state chief, Todor Zhivkov, on 9 September revealed the cause and the thrust of the cancellations. Zhivkov did not look for Bonn scapegoats as the SED did, he cited the changed

East-West relationship as reason and, moreover, pointed out the stationing of the missiles and the current NATO fall maneuvers--two facts known to him before arranging the visit.

This was the logical continuation of the things that had been continuously developing in the East Bloc since the end of 1983 and became public this April through publications in Prague, Moscow, Budapest, and East Berlin: namely the conflict on how to react to NATO's counterarming.⁶ The SED leadership has initially lost a battle for the implementation of its concept⁷ and with it also the leaderships of those Warsaw Pact states which supported the GDR in one way or another. If one adds to that that the replacement of the Soviet General Staff Chief Orgarkov probably should be ascribed to his warning that the nuclear arms race cannot be won⁸ rather than to his co-responsibility for the downing of the Korean passenger aircraft one year ago, and if one does not overlook the fact that the Communist Party of France has terminated just now the leftist coalition while Moscow, has admonished Italy's Communists once again to abandon the path of Eurocommunism, it would be foolish not to speak of progress by those forces in Moscow who back a hard, confrontational line in the West policy of the Warsaw Pact and their supporters in the West.

At the same time it can in no way be asserted that the "hardliners" have already prevailed in Moscow. Honecker as well as Zhiykov had expressly labeled their cancellations as "postponements of the date" and especially the behavior of the SED general secretary immediately after the cancellation makes it evident that he considers it as a tactical interlude to save the substance of his concept. More than ever, the disputes concerning the political "line" towards the West may also involve guaranteeing the cohesion in the Warsaw Pact.

All this necessitates investigating the causes of the conflict more thoroughly by the example of the SED. In this connection there might be definitely political-tactical reasons for not airing too publicly the differences between the SED leadership and the leadership in Moscow. But that applies at best to officials and politicians of which those who recommend such restraint, by the way, always exempt themselves from this stated rule. Scientists only rarely can live up to their political and moral responsibility by silence.

The longer the disagreement between East Berlin and Moscow continues, the more certain is the assumption that a serious and probably also prolonged conflict in principle is involved, a conflict, by the way, that did not originate with the PRAVDA article against inner-German relations but has been smoldering since the Soviet Afghanistan invasion. The public polemic brought the dispute only to light.

The European Policy Concept of the Warsaw Pact Is the Point at Issue

The conflict differs from most past ideological disputes between the Soviet leadership and one party leadership or another of a communist state. In the past, what was primarily involved--with exceptions that will be discussed later on--in such ideological disputes was a change of the communist system of power of the state concerned. At any rate, such aims were at least the starting point for possibly occurring international consequences, especially for the revolt of

the party leadership concerned against Soviet tutelage. (That was the way it happened in Hungary in 1956, in the CSSR in 1968, in Poland in 1969/70 and 1980/81, and basically also in the GDR in 1953.) The present conflict between the SED leadership and Moscow does not consist in differences over the internal system of the GDR and its further development, even though the PRAVDA articles conjure up a danger to the internal order of the GDR.

The conflict concerns the world political concept of the communist group of states (insofar as its members belong to the Warsaw Pact) and its special expression and effect in relation to Europe.

The differences between Ulbricht and Khrushchev and Brezhnev, respectively, in the middle and late 60's and early 70's also concerned the Germany problem and inner-German relations (with reverse understanding of roles)⁹ and in final analysis could only be "solved" by the replacement of Ulbricht by Honecker.¹⁰ But the present differences go far beyond that in their significance in principle and in many respects are more like the dispute between the Soviet leadership under Khrushchev and the Chinese leadership under Mao Tse-tung in the early 60's.¹¹

What was involved at that time was the Soviet leadership's greater stress under Khrushchev and his successor Brezhnev of the principle of "peaceful coexistence" in its policy towards the West following the settlement of the Cuba crisis. This was interpreted to be an armistice of long duration during which the spread of communism in the world was to take place as much as possible without resort to war.¹² Against that the Chinese party leadership under Mao Tse-tung advocated the view that the nature of "imperialism" of the Western industrial states had not changed, therefore there was no reasonable expectation that it would be possible to reach an agreement with the West and to be able to attain peaceful coexistence. Consequently, war, not even nuclear war, must be feared and preparations must be made for it. The new world will arise on the "ruins of the dead imperialism."¹³ In final analysis the dispute revolved around the question of the avoidability or inevitability of the war between East and West.

Two irreconcilable power interests were behind the Soviet-Chinese dispute. As did Stalin with his slogan of "building of socialism in one country," his successors appealed to the yearning for peace of the USSR's own population with the slogan of "peaceful coexistence," while the motivation of the Chinese leadership was the development of China into a superpower, for which it demanded from Moscow not only economic aid but also the secret of the nuclear bomb.

New Priority in Moscow: Military Parity Before Peaceful Coexistence

The Soviet leadership today (to start with I disregard here the differences that exist on this set of problems in the Soviet leadership, too) because of its changed interests increasingly returns to power politics, which no longer regards the policy of "peaceful coexistence," as it was understood in the 60's, as the sole answer. This is changed little by the formal avowal by the Soviet leadership of the principle of "peaceful coexistence" that is said to remain "the most important foundation" of the foreign policy of the USSR.¹⁴ For since the early 70's, the Soviet leadership has been emphasizing another principle in its

foreign policy towards the West, to which everything else is subordinated: That is the military-strategic parity which must "serve as sure guarantee for international stability"¹⁵ and must be irreversible.¹⁶ Absolute preservation of this parity has become the definite criterion for the decisions of the Soviet leadership. Since it fears that, owing to the policy of the U.S. administration under Reagan, it is exposed to an "unparalleled attack on the existence of socialism,"¹⁷ for its defense all potentials not only of its own country but of the entire "socialist community of states" (in other words, the Warsaw Pact and CEMA) must be concentrated and directed at the goal of preserving this parity. The "international protection of socialism"¹⁸ is said to be necessary. From this position follows not only a policy of self-isolation and refusal towards the West, but also that of propagandistic attack, of political pressure, of increasing the military threat potential, and possibly of the game with the threat of military measures.

In the face of this, the SED under Honecker, for reasons of its own interests, has pointedly adhered to the position that there continues to be "no reasonable alternative" to the policy of "peaceful coexistence" of states with different social orders.¹⁹ From this follows its readiness for dialogue and negotiations and its interest in expanding cooperation with the West, not least of all with the Federal Republic. Even though the policy of "peaceful coexistence" also does not exclude the use of military force,²⁰ within the framework of a foreign policy of communist states based primarily on this principle, these elements recede into the background in relation to the dialogue, negotiations, treaties, and general cooperation.

Thus the conflict between SED leadership and Moscow, while fully taking into account that it is a dispute about the "correct" communist world policy, attains a dimension transcending the communist territory. For of course it directly affects the interests of the states of the Western world, not least of Europe, if the communist group of states of the Warsaw Pact bases its policy towards the West on "peaceful coexistence" so understood or if it also includes indirect or direct use of its military power in its foreign policy.

The Soviet concept concludes from the official declarations and the behavior of the U.S. Administration²¹ that the United States has started an all-around struggle to push back the power of the Soviet Union in all fields and to reduce it to the status of a European-Asiatic medium-sized power.²²

In the face of this U.S. concept, so interpreted, that will continue at least for the next 4-5 years--whether with Reagan or without him--the position recognized by Nixon in 1972 of full parity of the USSR with the United States must be irreversibly maintained under all circumstances and with nearly all means.²³ Everything else is to be subordinated to this task. This applies to the Soviet Union and to all other Warsaw Pact and CEMA states. Whoever believed what was involved for the Soviet leadership was merely or above all to close still "unresolved questions" or "gaps" in the European order of the status quo in its (Soviet) sense, to break the (awakening) national consciousness of the Germans or to prevent in time possible consequences of a rapprochement of the two German states that "went too far," misunderstands the order of magnitude that is involved for the Soviet leadership: the absolute prevention of the--unstoppable--

decline of the USSR as a world power. At any rate, today the Soviet leadership assesses and coordinates all other questions exclusively under this aspect.

Purpose of the Campaign Against Bonn

From this view, the stationing of Pershing II and Cruise Missiles in Western Europe beyond their military effect is an important link in the U.S. policy to contain the power of the USSR in the view of the Soviet leadership. The FRG with its approval of this stationing on the one hand is the most important country in Europe for the implementation of U.S. policy; on the other hand, the Soviet leadership is convinced that preventing the stationing or its reversal in the Federal Republic is tantamount to preventing any stationing at all in Western Europe. Therefore, it is not possible to deny a certain logic to the Soviet policy when it regards preventing the stationing or the removal of the missiles from the Federal Republic as the key to pushing back the U.S. policy in Europe in general.

The Soviet leadership apparently starts from the assumption that this aim cannot be achieved with the peace movement in the Federal Republic alone, but on the other hand does not regard the struggle for this goal as ended nor is it of the opinion that it should be abandoned.²⁴ In this connection, it counts on the fact that the stationing itself has only started in Western Europe, that it will take a long time and that during this time movements against stationing, motivated by fear and worry, could again flare up in all West European countries. It bets on a radicalization of the relationship between government and opposition in the NATO countries and within NATO to a growing differentiation among the member states if only it attacks the NATO states decisively enough. Above all, it is determined to exercise political and propagandistic pressure on the Federal Republic and to increase this pressure over an extended period. The aim of its argumentation in final analysis is to provide a distorted picture of the Federal Republic in the international public, a picture that shows the Federal Republic in the state of "war preparations" that violate the Moscow Treaty of 1970²⁵ and justify the application of the enemy state clauses of Articles 53 and 107 of the UN Charter.²⁶ Application of this right of intervention of the victorious powers against the former enemy states of World War II requires that an "enemy state" pursues the "resumption of the policy of aggression." But this very charge is being made in the Soviet propaganda campaign against the Federal Republic.²⁷ Thus it is asserted at the same time that the Federal Republic has violated the Moscow Treaty and that Article 2 of the Moscow Treaty, which with its orientation toward exclusively peaceful solution of all disputes according to Soviet opinion only "overlaps"²⁸ the enemy state clause, is legally irrelevant as long as the violation by the Federal Republic continues. However, the mode of application of the enemy state clauses in connection with the Four-Power responsibility signifies that measures justified by the enemy state clauses, including preventive measures against Germany, are permitted to be made only jointly by the four allies, in relation to one of the two German states always only by the competent victorious power (principle of realistic division).²⁹ The Soviet argumentation is precisely aimed at the point that it is the United States that, jointly with the other NATO states, encourages and favors the revival of aggressive intentions, of revanchism, militarism, and fascism in the Federal Republic.³⁰ In this manner a phony justification is to be created for unilateral Soviet measures against the Federal Republic justified by the enemy state clauses.

Risk Assessment

Undoubtedly the decision on whether from the systematically developed chain of argumentation, political and under international law, practical consequences also are actually drawn in the form of unilateral preventive measures, depends not so much on how this Soviet argumentation is politically justified and tenable under international law, but in final analysis on the risk assessment by the Soviet leadership. In connection with political decisions in international relations, a distinction is generally made between irrational and calculated action³¹ with regard to the concept of risk. The behavior of the USSR, viewed over a prolonged period, shows that it a. takes risks only reluctantly, its readiness to take risks thus is rather limited; b. it does not itself get involved in the risk and therefore avoids the use of military force against the U.S. superpower and its allies; c. but if it takes risks, its action is carefully prepared, it strives to ensure the legitimacy of its action and seeks to minimize the risk in every conceivable way--such as by the use of surrogates. But within these limits it has not shied away thus far by any means from the threat or from the use of military force, whereby in the connection to be discussed here only cases are to be mentioned that went beyond the communist group of states of the Warsaw Pact: the 1939 Finnish winter war, the annexation of the three Baltic states in 1940, the 1948 Berlin crisis, the 1948 crisis in Yugoslavia, Suez in 1956, the Near East in 1958, Cuba in 1962, Near East conflicts in 1967 and 1973, China in 1969 and 1979, and Afghanistan in 1979. In this connection they had threatened with nuclear force in four cases: Suez in 1956, Near East, Quemoy-Matsu in 1958, Berlin in 1958-1961. In other cases--e.g. in the Cuba crisis--it retreated before the enemy power.

The question now arises whether the thus far ascertainable and analyzed patterns of behavior of the Soviet Union in situations of crises apply to the present situation without thinking twice and without qualification, since the Soviet leadership assumes the thus far unique situation that the superpower position of the USSR is directly threatened by the policy of the United States.

In addition, the attempt of an economic integration of centralized planned economies instituted in CEMA in 1971 has failed³² and the efforts of the Soviet Union to revive the attempt or to align the CEMA states economically at least more strongly toward the interests of the Soviet Union, but to reduce their economic relations with the West to the function of being a stopgap were hardly given a chance at the June 1984 CEMA summit meeting.³³ In the military organization of the Warsaw Pact and its foreign-policy coordinating organ, the "Political Consultative Committee," the Soviet leadership in important questions no longer sees itself in the position to prevail without difficulty with its concepts against growing tendencies of independence and attending to national interests. The documents of this organization, relevant in terms of foreign policy and under international law, increasingly show characteristics of compromise between different positions or offer the other Warsaw Pact states possibilities for appeal for their point of view in the approved versions.³⁴ In questions such as "counterstationing," no decision was made by the Warsaw Pact, but only bilateral agreements.³⁵ At present the Soviet Union is even faced with the problem of extending by negotiations with the member states the Warsaw Pact that will lose its legal force on 4 June 1985 because of its expiration or to conclude a new treaty. The Soviet leadership can hardly ignore the fact that

the "socialist community of states" becomes more strongly differentiated according to national interests. While Andropov apparently was inclined to permit greater possibilities for movement for independent action for the special³⁶ features and national interests of the individual Warsaw Pact countries, the present Soviet leadership again insists more strongly on solidarity, unity, and discipline, however without being able to prevail at all times.

Under these conditions it must probably be expected that the Soviet Union will escalate its policy toward Western Europe, especially against the Federal Republic, up to threats of military force, which include demonstrative maneuvers, troop reinforcements, and "counterstationing" in the GDR and the CSSR just as much as the threat of measures against the Federal Republic that are to be justified with the enemy state clauses.

In the USSR propaganda campaign, at any rate terms such as "precise counter-strike" against the Western nuclear system in Europe are already emerging.³⁷ The same Lev Bezymenski who authored the first PRAVDA article against the inner-German relations,³⁸ discusses in the Moscow NEUE ZEIT by means of reader letters from the Federal Republic and India (!) the question whether the Soviet Union should carry out a nuclear preventive strike against Western Europe.³⁹ As early as 1983, the newspaper of the GDR army reported on exercises to reconnoiter enemy missile positions on enemy territory.⁴⁰ But while the GDR has consciously stopped such manifestations of the increasing gravity of the situation, the Soviet press does not consider it as more than a taboo to quarrel over the question whether peace can be the sole aim of foreign policy.⁴¹ It is true, Arbatov in his polemic with Kissinger answers the questions in a way that is to give the impression that the Soviet Union has no goal other than maintenance of peace. But he does not dwell with even a single word on the fact that the primary aim of the USSR foreign policy--as we have seen--for a long time has been maintenance of the actual or supposed all-around parity with the United States.

Soviet Definition of Equilibrium

It lies in the logic of such a concept to keep pace with the rival with whom a relationship of parity exists not only in the field of the state of armament and modern weapons technology. To threaten and to use military force one also has to be ready where the relationship of parity appears to be threatened but where the territory of the rival himself is not involved. Thus the Soviet concept of military-strategic parity is also considered to be the capability of the Soviet Union to inflict nuclear wounds on the enemy (the United States) from its own (Soviet) territory. This concept includes the possibility of wounding Western Europe, but by the same token it does not grant Western Europe the same right.

Stuby, an active representative of Soviet positions in the FRG peace movement, has formulated this idea without restrictions in the presence of high-ranking Soviet representatives, including an active-duty general as follows: "As long as the basis of the arms control treaties resting on the principle of equality and equal security is still valid, the Soviet potential in Europe cannot be a disruptive factor for the existing equilibrium. The capacity of being able to wound the enemy from one's own territory--and that is the basis of the military-

strategic stability--logically includes for the Soviet Union the potential to wound Western Europe.

"Granting a balancing missile capacity to Western Europe in relation to the Soviet Union would do away with the respecting of parity."⁴² This "logic" of the Soviet version of nuclear parity is neither the nuclear parity agreed upon between the United States and the Soviet Union nor is the gaining of selective or regional superiority and the threat or use of nuclear force to compel other states to a specific behavior compatible with existing international law. But such comments demonstrate that such considerations play a real part in the Soviet concept and this all the more so the more obviously the premise of the Soviet concept: all-around parity with the United States (at present) is approximately correct as regards the nuclear weapons potential but largely looks more like a mirage in economic, technological, and political fields.

However, the Soviet concept in its consequences involves an open conflict--though territorially in Germany--but, according to the target, with the rival with whom the Soviets want to maintain a relationship of parity. With the charge of "revanchism," they are kicking the German dog but think of the U.S. master. Such a conflict with the United States, from which the Soviet Union thus far has always shied away, would involve the Soviet Union itself in the risk. Therefore, the focus of the question is whether the USSR considers the uniqueness of the situation asserted by it as a sufficient criterion to take this risk or whether it trusts the military-strategic concept of the lightning war, of the surprise and the time factor with which the nuclear threshold in Europe could be avoided.⁴³ Neither alternative reduces the dangerousness of the provocative and confrontational character of the Soviet concept. The strategy of the confrontational West policy moreover also denies Gromyko's 1975 thesis that the German question had ceased to exist⁴⁴; for this expresses the idea that the Soviet Union continues to start from the assumption of the unsolved German question. Only then is it understandable that and why Four-Power rights and the enemy state clauses can be coordinated in the hands of the Soviet Union "to hold down Germany"⁴⁶ and against the Federal Republic and the United States but also against the GDR.

What is a new manifestation in this connection and is revealed especially by the example of the dispute between SED leadership and Soviet leadership is the circumstance that other Warsaw Pact states, because of their specific interests, are attempting to contradict their leading power rivaling with the United States and to advocate another concept of the international policy of the Soviet system of rule,⁴⁷ to which they belong and that such differing views apparently also exist even in the Soviet leadership.⁴⁸

Nature of GDR Interests

If the GDR wanted to fit in unconditionally with this Soviet concept, then it would have to give priority in the relationship between the GDR and the Federal Republic to the extent to which Bonn follows or supports U.S. policy towards the Soviet Union or supports this policy of relegating the USSR from its relationship of parity with the United States to second place in the ranking of the states of the world. The consequence would be that the GDR would refuse progress in the relations between the two German states as long as the Federal Republic

adheres especially to the implementation of the counterarming decision. Adherence to counterarming would have to be declared as a violation of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements and especially as a violation of the basic treaty of 1972. This would be the transition of the GDR, too, to a confrontation policy. At the time of the Poland crisis, there were temporarily such tendencies in the SED leadership, too. Expressions of such tendencies were Honecker's Gera speech of 13 October 1980 or the threat by GDR Foreign Minister Fischer of December 1980 that Bonn would soon face the "broken pieces" of what has been achieved in the past 10 years.⁴⁹ In the SED leadership quite obviously the conviction has prevailed under Honecker's personal influence⁵⁰ that such a confrontational policy would be a game full of risk for the fate of the GDR.⁵¹

In case of a nuclear clash, the GDR would have no chance for survival. Therefore the SED general secretary--different than his defense minister--has no reservations about saying that there "would be neither victors nor vanquished" in a nuclear war.⁵² But even disregarding the "danger of a nuclear war," which the SED leadership as well as the Soviet Union are conjuring up time and again as a realistic current situation since such a danger, soberly viewed, does not exist because of the unpredictable risks for both sides, even a military clash with conventional means or also "only" an enduring confrontation policy toward the West, as the Soviet Union is now pursuing it, would burden the GDR politically and economically in a way that would be intolerable for maintenance of its internal and external stability. The SED would again be largely isolated from the GDR population and in Germany's West it would be regarded as an unacceptable partner in a dialogue to which Soviet Russian orders are closer than the interests of its own country. Not only would there be no improvement of the status of the GDR, but the GDR could easily be thrown back to the condition prior to the conclusion of the Basic Treaty.

But the SED leadership sees not only these dangers of a confrontational policy towards the West. It also starts from the assumption that continuation of the dialogue, negotiating, compromises while maintaining one's own principal positions in the long run will make it possible to implement the common goal of maintaining the military-strategic equilibrium not only by a less risky but also successful manner and "to reverse the international development." For by such a policy it will be possible "to align all peace-loving forces in order to reverse the present dangerous situation and to return to the detente."

By setting this goal, the SED leadership rejects any heightening of the situation, makes the safeguarding of peace the criterion for the relationship with the Federal Republic "especially also after the start of the NATO missile stationing," the safeguarding of peace which is "the question transcending all else." The SED leadership specifically emphasizes that the existing treaty system remains the basis for peaceful relations: "It is our aim not to release the FRG from the obligations it has undertaken under the treaties with the socialist states." From these motives, the SED leadership adheres to the view that "there is just as little a defensible alternative to peaceful coexistence as to the political dialogue."⁵³ Thus the difference between the SED leadership and Moscow is pinpointed: not confrontation and self-isolation but dialogue and peaceful relations serve the interests of the Warsaw Pact states.

This SED position is undoubtedly rooted in the specific nature of the GDR interests as an economic power highly dependent on foreign trade, an economic power which cannot master its problems of the technological future solely by cooperation with the USSR and the other CEMA states. For this purpose it requires cooperation with the Western industrial states, especially the Federal Republic. Moreover, it has raised expectations with the social policy course instituted by Honecker in the early 70's which it cannot completely disappoint. It cannot utilize the financial and economic advantages of a co-operative relationship with the Federal Republic in the long run and intensively enough without complying at least to a limited extent with the demands of the Federal Republic for human alleviations and possibilities for improved communication of the people in divided Germany. Finally it must not completely ignore the level of expectations of the GDR population that has grown also in this respect and its general need for sensible relations with the Federal Republic.

Nevertheless one has to think that a communist party leader such as Honecker, whose communist convictions are just as much out of the question as is his loyalty to the Soviet Union, who advocates his independent position also to the Soviet leadership in this consistency and in public, for doing so must have not only a direct cause and serious reasons. He must also see opportunities for being able to implement his course.

Since until now both factors are carefully guarded secrets of the Soviet as well as of the SED leadership despite the public polemic, one should have to beware of premature conclusions. However, the public statements of both sides contain certain circumstantial evidence. For the Soviet position, please refer to the concept already presented here. For the SED, especially two statements deserve attention which, like in a mirror, reveal the aim of the above-described Soviet concept of the West policy and what especially worries the SED leadership in this connection. One of the statements comes from SED Politburo member Hager. In December 1983 he quoted Bismarck at the SED "Social Science Conference" who in February 1888 emphatically rejected a preventive war on account of the "most compelling interests of the European balance of power and our own future."⁵⁴ The other comes from the SED general secretary himself. During the reception of the Greek Prime Minister Papandreou in East Berlin on 4 July 1984, Honecker stated in his toast: "It would be a tragic misjudgment wanting to solve world problems by military means, including the historical differences between capitalism and socialism. Such a road leads to disaster."

Who--we have to ask ourselves--is considering a preventive war in Europe? Thus far not even any one of the fiercest representatives of the Warsaw Pact has made this charge against the West. And who could consider war as a means of settling the differences between "capitalism and socialism"?

Honecker and the SED leadership quite obviously know not only the decisions of the Soviet Politburo and of the Central Committee of December 1983 in which the Soviet attitude toward the start of the NATO counterarming measures was determined,⁵⁵ they are also fully aware of the consequences and risks of this orientation. But they also apparently know that there are great doubts (Bedenken) about such a concept in the Soviet leadership itself as well as also in the

leaderships of such Warsaw Pact states as Romania, Hungary, and Bulgaria and that there are real chances that another concept may prevail in Moscow.

The SED Strategy

If one starts from this assumption, then otherwise sometimes incomprehensible elements of the policy of the SED leadership join into a logical concept. Then also the borrowing policy and the economic strategy of the SED leadership, which is incomprehensible to observing experts exclusively under economic aspects, is no longer a riddle: The SED leadership wants to develop "not least also the economic relations" with the Federal Republic as a form of peaceful relations,⁵⁶ prophylactically by reduction and transformation of short-term debts into medium and long-term debts wants to create accomplished facts and also wants to take precautions also in case of the unwanted worsening of the situation. (By the way, it is shown here that a "purely economic" or a "purely legal" etc consideration of any areas of a "real socialist" system, it is true, can provide important detailed knowledge but is unable to provide an accurate assessment of the intended actions underlying various behavior patterns because the totality of such systems brings about that fundamental decisions are always made primarily according to political aspects.)

But the SED leadership apparently judges the present ratio of power in East-West relations more realistically than does the Soviet leadership. While the USSR continues to believe it can force the West to meet the Soviet demands with political pressure, breaking off the negotiations, and threats to the West, the SED starts from the assumption that the West "by no means... is weak. It continues to possess a big economic, scientific-technical, and military potential as well as the means to manipulate broad masses in the capitalist countries politically and ideologically." Moreover, the SED leadership possesses detailed knowledge of the internal situation in the Federal Republic as well as within the individual parties, labor unions, movements, and of the views of individual personalities in politics, the state, economy and science, even though it consciously plays down the significance of the voter decisions in the provincial and federal parliamentary elections in its analyses. The Federal Republic can only dream of doing the same with respect to the GDR. Nevertheless this does not keep the SED leadership from making miscalculations.

But the core of the SED concept is clearly defined by the sentence that both German states "are independent in their internal and external affairs" and this statement is directly linked with the safeguarding of peace in Europe.⁵⁸ With this statement a strategy is being pursued directed toward uniting in a "coalition of reason" or in a German "community of responsibility" all neutralist, pacifist and nonpacifist peace movements, and ecological, national and nationalist currents in Germany. With an eye to the commercial interests of certain business circles, such as the interest of the Federal Government in continuity of the East and Germany policy, the autonomy and independence of both German states has been made the central issue of the peaceful order in Central Europe.

By the way, in this concept Honecker has assigned to himself the central role: apprentice roofer and communist youth functionary in the Saarland, anti-fascist resistance fighter imprisoned under Hitler, cofounder of the GDR, he regards

himself as leader of German communism, who as head of state of socialist Germany offers a grand coalition of reason that is to lead Germany finally out of the vicious circle of war and destruction.

This very thing is likely to be the "wonderfully interesting page" of which the former Soviet ambassador in the GDR, Abrassimov, speaks, that was opened up during Honecker's meeting with the meanwhile deceased Soviet secretary general Andropov on 4 May 1983⁵⁹ and to which Honecker and the SED leadership want to hold on, as is substantiated by the numerous references to Andropov in the speeches by Honecker and Hager. As the protocol treatment of the SED general secretary during his May 1983 visit in Moscow made evident, Andropov apparently had agreed with Honecker to permit the GDR to act more strongly as an independent, sovereign, and German state--especially in relation to the Federal Republic. In this manner, the GDR was supposed to influence the Federal Republic with the aim of advancing the differentiation toward the United States. The danger of greater independence of the GDR necessarily connected therewith also toward the Soviet Union was regarded as slight by Andropov in view of Honecker's known solidarity with the USSR, the political, military, and economic integration of the GDR in the Warsaw Pact and in CEMA, the existing bilateral treaties, and the stationing of 20 Soviet divisions in the GDR. At any rate, it was apparent in the West that since then Erich Honecker had, and also made use of, more "scope of action."

After Andropov's death, the sovereignty in relation to an independently acting GDR appears to have been lost once again. But the SED leadership adheres to it since the "Joint Communiqué" on Honecker's state visit and the commitments and positions included therein were not canceled in any way.⁶⁰ However, Honecker has made far-reaching and willful use of the leeway he had gained.

The SED leadership regards the orientation toward its independence also as a good starting position for its stepped-up international activities, especially its contacts and talks with heads of government, presidents, and other representatives of European states.

The National Component

Under this aspect the SED leadership has shown beginnings or sham beginnings of an unselfconscious relationship to the history of the German people, the nation of the Germans and its future. However, this is clearly directed towards the goal of tying the future of the nation not only ideologically to socialism/communism but to remove the unification of both states politically and legally from its international entanglement as much as possible and to make it into a matter almost exclusively between the two states. If necessary or desired, the Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact states nevertheless could be brought into play on the basis of the alliance obligations in the Warsaw Pact, but the GDR would act in the foreground.

Therefore, the SED continues to adhere to the view that in the German question "nothing is any longer open," that "capitalism" and "socialism" can be as little united as "fire and water."⁶¹ But it can be read in every physics book that joining together of water and fire produces steam and steam propels machines. Apart from that, the SED leadership thus only repeats what Honecker had said at

the Eighth Party Congress in June 1971: unification with the Federal Republic cannot occur "as long as the FRG" is "an imperialist state." But since according to Honecker the Federal Republic now "essentially" adheres (!)⁶² to the treaties with the socialist states, it should be difficult to categorize the Federal Republic as "imperialist" in the future, too. With a non-imperialist Federal Republic embarked on the path to socialism, the unification question arises anew, Honecker had announced to his applauding SED comrades as early as 1981.⁶³ It was also the impression of Richard von Weizsaecker that Honecker in final analysis wants a "socialist" reunification.⁶⁴

Of course, the SED continues to be disinterested in making reunification and the unification of both German states an object of operative politics at this time. What it rather wants to achieve is to establish the GDR as an unalterable political factor in Germany and Europe. By opening up an all-German perspective of a socialist-communist Germany, the GDR wants to free itself of the stigma of national asexuality, to legitimize its state historically and thus to cover up the deficit of freedom and democratic legitimation. With this turn towards the history of the Germans and their communist future, the GDR, however, frees itself not only of the burden of the suspicion of antinational separatism, but it also declares as ended the experiment of not being a German state but a state of its own "socialist nation" (without abandoning the thesis of the socialist nation completely) and consciously shows itself as a German state, as the "socialist Germany" to which belongs the future.

The Long-term Goals

Within the framework of this concept, the SED leadership has also fitted in its position on the Germany policy of the Federal Republic. It still designates these positions as "revanchism," generally sees in "revanchism" a "rusty trumpet," against which the main thrust was made with the founding of the GDR.⁶⁵ Now as before, the interest of the GDR is directed towards achieving in some way recognition of the GDR under international law by the Federal Republic. But demands in this direction, such as those made in Gera, are no longer formulated as a condition for the further development of the German-German relations but as a reminder to the Federal Government. In this connection, the SED turns out to be more flexible insofar as it generally speaks now only of "respecting" and no longer of "recognition" of the GDR citizenship⁶⁶ and differentiates between those demands that are insurmountable for the Federal Republic on constitutional grounds (GDR citizenship, transforming the permanent representations into embassies) and those demands that appear to be more easily achievable (Elbe border, Salzgitter registration point).⁶⁷ Apart from the fact that the motivation for the "Gera demands" were the events in Poland in 1980, the SED leadership apparently regards a degree of reserve as necessary in the status demands to concentrate everything on the central problem of the "independence of both states." Its experiences with the discussion concerning the demands for status in the Federal Republic moreover have shown it that a longer term dialogue is necessary here. However this does not prevent them from using every opportunity to make a breakthrough in the status questions as the negotiations on Honecker's visit to the Federal Republic clearly demonstrated.

In all that, the long-term strategy remains unchanged: first establishment of the GDR state--then its recognition on the one hand, loosening of the

relationship of the Federal Republic with the United States and the Western alliance on the other hand--, then full equal status with the Federal Republic, and finally the claim to be the true executor of German history.

All in all the concept of the SED involves a political strategy directed at pushing back U.S. positions in Europe, the cancellation of the NATO counter-arming decision and the protection, strengthening, and expansion of its own power positions as part of the Warsaw Pact group of states dominated by the Soviet Union. The present conflict between the SED leadership and Moscow to that extent is no conflict of the goal but a conflict concerning ways, means, and methods to achieve the common goal. But for the Soviet leadership the point of view of the SED leadership contains not only merely the "danger" that the GDR will not follow its present confrontation policy, thus weakening it, in final analysis it also means the GDR becoming independent toward the Soviet Union which could not easily be reversed and can hold the danger of incalculable developments for the Soviet leadership.

The Soviet leadership does not doubt the loyalty of the SED leadership under Honecker even today. But in the meantime his concept is also being assessed as striving for autonomy with financial backing from Bonn, which, in effect, makes even more difficult the anyway difficult coordinations in the Warsaw Pact and in CEMA, isolates the Soviet Union in its own sphere of power and takes the sting out of the USSR propaganda offensive against the "revanchist" Federal Republic.

Problems of the "Community of Responsibility"

Despite these differences with the Soviet Union, a communist policy is involved and moreover a policy that is directed towards weakening the basic positions of the foreign and Germany policy and the change of the internal balance of power of the Federal Republic while it does not change anything in the existing structures of rule in the GDR and also is not supposed to change anything.

The "coalition of reason" or "community of responsibility" for which the SED leadership is striving is defined in this very sense. This starts already with the one-sided handling of the formula "No new war must start from German soil," which is used by the SED leadership exclusively against the NATO stationing measures but never against the SS-20 armament program of the Soviet Union. The reinterpretation of the formulas that are used in Germany's West and in the GDR is continued when the SED leadership sees the meaning of the "community of responsibility" of both German states in returning to the status quo ante before the start of the stationing of the U.S. intermediate range weapons in the Federal Republic.⁶⁸ However, this would not be an application of the principle of equal security for all, but the exact opposite, namely the undermining of the security of the Federal Republic. Moreover, such an interpretation implicitly contains the element of active destabilization of the political conditions in the Federal Republic and therefore cannot be reconciled either with the "Treaty on the Foundations of the Relations" between both German states or with the free democratic constitutional structure in the Federal Republic. It speaks for the skill of the SED leadership that many politicians in the Federal Republic use these formulas but thus far only few have objected to such a politically untenable and legally inadmissible distortion of the true sense of

these formulas.⁶⁹ For the idea of "community of responsibility" developed by the Goettingen historian Rudolf von Tadden has an appropriate political meaning only if--and only if it serves to flesh out the Basic Treaty and can also be upheld under the Basic Law--it starts from the assumption that the Germans in both states in Germany are linked by a special community that arises from a common history, from a common (though in separate states) present and is directed towards a common future. In this sense, the "community of responsibility" is nothing but a synonym for the nation of the Germans in its present condition. Only that person does justice to this responsibility who does everything in his power to advance the cooperation of both German states in the interest of the people, to facilitate and promote the meetings of the people and to implement human rights. This also includes combining the clarity of one's own point of view with the sober assessment of the partner, firmness of principles with the good sense of what is achievable. But this sober assessment is lacking in the SED leadership, as long as its picture of the Federal Republic is the enemy image of a direct continuer of the Hitler state. Of course it cannot be expected of the SED to profess adherence to the FRG political system. Nevertheless it can be demanded of the treaty partner of the Basic Treaty that he respect the way the Germans in the Federal Republic see themselves, who consider their state as the newly organized community in Germany after 1945, the community that arose in deliberate delimitation from Nazi and totalitarian elements and in conscious linkage to the liberal democratic traditions of German history and is based on the principles of federalism, pluralism, and of the social constitutional state. A "class" assessment according to the known models of Marxism-Leninism does not have to prevent that.

Such a more precise statement of the idea of "community of responsibility" could make it into an acceptable formula for the development of the cooperation of both states in Germany. However, this also includes clarity over the limits of the cooperation. These limits are drawn especially by the fact that the GDR and the Federal Republic are two quantities that cannot be brought to a common denominator not only quantitatively but especially in qualitative respect concerning their democratic legitimation, their international prestige and their ideas on the goal for a reunified Germany. The idea of the "community of responsibility" in principle can only be politically supported as long as the period of the parallel existence of both states in Germany is involved. Also the reality of the power politics conditions in Europe demands the sober conclusion that the real partner to be addressed for the solution of the German problem in general in the area of the communist world is not the GDR but Moscow. It is true, the Soviet Union on the one hand is likely to adopt a much harder position to make its initial positions as strong as at all possible; on the other hand, on account of its other interests it has room for maneuver which also includes a classical solution of the national question of the Germans by application of the right of self-determination prescribed by valid international law; an option that from the SED interest situation would only be considered if the attitude of the Soviet Union would induce it to do so.

Chances of Both Concepts

Both concepts--that of the Soviet leadership and that of the SED leadership--of course raise the question what chances they have to be implemented and to be successful and how long they can exist side by side, thus how long the conflict

between East Berlin and Moscow can last. The aim of the Soviet concept of a confrontational attitude towards the West--as previously stated--consists in preventing a power decline of the Soviet Union under all circumstances. Insofar this concept pursues a general interest of the Soviet Union. Within the Soviet Union this concept has strong advocates in the Soviet party leadership in Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko,⁷⁰ in G. Romanov, Central Committee secretary for industry,⁷¹ and Defense Minister Ustinov.⁷² Within the USSR population, the propagandistic manipulation of the thesis that the United States wants to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union has triggered strong tendencies of solidarity and patriotic feelings. Nevertheless there are noticeable counterpositions. Especially those party leaders who are dealing with the economy and domestic policy, such as Tikhonov, Gorbachev and others and some of whom have achieved their positions in the years of the detente policy favor the technical re-equipment of industry, especially of the consumer goods industry, consider a solution of the economic problems without the expansion of economic cooperation with the West as impossible, and combine their economic strategy with the concept of a settlement with the West, of the continuation of, or return to, the policy of coexistence, disarmament and the rechanneling of the funds to the civilian sector. Andropov was their strongest advocate.⁷³ Since his death their position has been weakened. But on the other hand, lately even Soviet military have expressed more realistic positions counseling caution in view of the armament progress of the United States and the realization that it is getting more and more difficult for the USSR to keep up the technological race in the armament sector. The one who went farthest was Marshal Tolubko, chief of the Soviet missile forces, who declared that a first strike as a killing strike against the USSR is not possible⁷⁴ and thus exploded the crucial thesis against Western counterarming. In December 1983, Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov had also warned: "However complicated the military-policy situation may be, it should not be dramatized."⁷⁵ Such statements show that influential representatives advice caution, reserve, and level-headedness including in the military leadership of the Soviet Union despite continuous "countermeasures," extensive maneuvers, and even though the propagandistic hate campaign against the West has been carried on with special aggressiveness for months, particularly in the Soviet armed forces publications. However, similarly to most representatives of the economic and domestic policy (exception: Gorbachev), they have no direct influence on Soviet foreign policy. The concept of continuing the coexistence policy is apparently also being advocated by the KGB leadership which, in Chebrikov, has, however, only one candidate in the Soviet Politburo, who has, however, gained influence in another way--for example by filling party functions in the Union republics. The new general secretary, Chernenko, who is rather inclined towards the continuation of Brezhnev's detente policy, practically occupies a mediating position, but appears "absent" from the active leadership since the official start of his vacation on 15 July 1984. If to that is added the fact that the outstanding representatives of a confrontational foreign policy course with the exception of Romanov will leave active politics for reasons of age and that this also applies to the general secretary, a personnel decision at the top of the USSR is inescapable. This personnel decision is also likely to bring a decision on the political course of the Soviet Union in relation to the West. If that is accomplished without developing a crisis going beyond threats between East and West, the chances are that a decision will prevail, in terms of personnel and conceptions, that signifies a turning away from the present

confrontational foreign policy of the Soviet Union and a turning to a political accommodation with the West and new possibilities for expanded East-West economic cooperation.

But avoidance of a confrontation phase going beyond threats in East-West relations in Europe will depend above all on the West facing the attacks and threats calmly and with level-headedness but also unitedly and resolutely and not letting any doubts arise that the demonstrative threatening gestures will not be able to demoralize or divide the West.

As far as the concept of the SED leadership is concerned, as long as the SED, apart from the occasional support by some other Warsaw Pact states, does not get the full support of the Soviet leadership--and that appears to be impossible as long as the inevitable personnel decisions have not been made in Moscow--, will remain a concept which in the decisive point for the Soviet Union--namely the return to the status quo ante before NATO counterarming--must remain without result. Also in the point that concerns the specific power interest of the SED leadership: raising of its status in relation to the Federal Republic, the SED concept cannot be successful in view of the hardened legal bases of the inner-German relationship and the present Germany policy of the Christian-Liberal coalition. What can be achieved is a stabilization of the internal and external positions of the GDR if it makes use of the offer of the Federal Republic to expand cooperation on the basis of the cohesion of the nation without questioning the basic positions of the security and Germany policy of the Federal Government. What cannot be completely excluded are the destabilizing effects on the FRG internal policy situation coming from the concept that is more skillful and is differentiated from that of the USSR.

As long as the Soviet Union persists in its confrontational foreign policy position, the conflict between the SED leadership and Moscow will continue because the SED concept cannot satisfy the security needs of the Soviet Union. For--looked at soberly--it cannot be denied that in this manner neither will the missiles disappear from the Federal Republic nor will NATO be shaken nor will the Federal Republic break out of the Western alliance. The concept of the SED leadership (on its own) cannot impair the enhanced U.S. position in Europe and therefore cannot hold its own before the eyes of the Moscow leadership. The pressure from Moscow to give greater emphasis to the Soviet security interests as a criterion of its relations with the Federal Republic thus will continue and even now leads to verbal sharpening of the SED policy toward Bonn.⁷⁶ But, as in the past, it would be conducted on the party level and will be reflected in the discussions between the foreign ministries of both states but will not involve the state relations as a whole. Furthermore, the SED leadership bets on the fact that the CPSU general secretary, Chernenko, whom Honecker regards as the sole partner on the Soviet side competent for him, thus far has not exercised such direct pressure. The SED leadership finally hopes for changes in personnel and concepts in Moscow that will be confirmation of its position. It would be speculative to answer the question now if and when this SED hope will be fulfilled. But it can definitely be predicted that until that time the game about the Honecker visit in the Federal Republic will continue as "waiting for Godot."

However, the concept of the SED leadership would have to be judged completely differently if it should become a policy supported in every respect by the Soviet

Union and organically linked with its West policy (for which there were beginnings in the case of Andropov). In that case the SED concept would receive an importance and an effectiveness which could have--under certain circumstances far-reaching--effects not only on the internal political situation of the Federal Republic but could also jeopardize the present Germany policy of the Federal Government. However, such a step would also be linked in an important point with the change of the SED concept: the idea of German unity would have to be included in it as a prospect for the future if it is supposed to have realistic chances to better satisfy the security and economic interests of the Soviet Union. This would provoke new contradictions between East Berlin and Moscow, because the Soviet Union from the situation of its interests then can also consider a classical solution of the national question of the Germans (which by no means would have to signify the simple task of the GDR), but the GDR, from its own interests is likely to have other ideas.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf. Documentation in this issue, p 1113.
2. The most unmistakable reference was included in the PRAVDA article of 27 Jul 84 with the following sentence: "The relations between both German states cannot be viewed separately from the international situation." Cf. also the detailed report in DER SPIEGEL, No. 37, 10 Sep 84, p 17 ff.
3. Cf Documentation in this issue, p 1115.
4. Cf. DIE WELT of 5 Sep 84, p 1.
5. Honecker for example to a delegation of Japanese parliamentarians on 4 Sep, DIE WELT and FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE of 6 Sep 84 and to a delegation of the Citizens Environmental Protection Initiative under the leadership of Jo Leinen, whom Honecker received without having planned it for a one-hour talk on 5 Sep; cf. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 6 Sep 84, reprinted in this issue, p 1114 and report in FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 6 Sep 84.
6. Cf. Ilse Spittmann, "Among Brothers," DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No. 9/1984, p 897 ff.
7. Cf. Wolfgang Seiffert, "A Lost Battle," DER SPIEGEL, No. 37, 10 Sep 84, p 20.
8. DIE WELT, 8/9 Sep 84, p 1; NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG, 11 Sep 84, p 3.
9. An interesting description of this development until 1970 is available in Botha Kirsch, "Storm Over Eurasia," Stuttgart 1970; for the time after that, cf. Wolfgang Seiffert, "Ulbricht--a German Stalinist of Stature," in: DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No. 8/1983, pp 851-854; how the roles and arguments have now "changed" in comparison to then and how little inventive spirit was used then as it is now is shown by an Ulbricht quotation cited by Kirsch (p 253) with which Ulbricht in

Budapest tried to keep Kadar in 1964 from establishing relations with Bonn.

"German imperialism now as before has the aim to correct the defeat of 1945.... The chronic failure of this policy has now persuaded them to pursue the goal by two different tracks. First of all, they continue to adhere to the old concept ...to incorporate the GDR and other territories by force. But secondly they are going to try to loosen the ground for such adventures by penetrating the socialist camp by various contacts, by economic and ideological means and to break up their solidarity."

It is evident, PRAVDA did not use much effort in 1984--they took the arguments of 1964 and changed only the authors and addressees.

10. Cf. Ilse Spittmann, "Why Ulbricht Was Deposed," in: DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No. 6/1971, p 568,
11. Described by Kirsch, op. cit. (footnote 9).
12. Cf. also B. Meissner, "The Detente Concept of the Hegemonial Power: Detente Concept and Detente Policy From the Aspect of the Soviet Union," in: Schwarz/Meissner, "Detente Policy in East and West, Cologne 1979, pp 1-18.
13. Cf. Kirsch, op. cit. (footnote 9), pp 25-41, 109-121.
14. Andrey Gromyko: "Concerning the International Policy and the Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union," in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18/19 Jun 83, pp 5-6.
15. Ibid.
16. Wolfgang Seiffert, "The Soviet Concept of the Military-Strategic Parity," in ZEITSCHRIFT FUER POLITIK, No. 3, 1984.
17. V. Samyatin, "Europe's Future and FRG Policy," in NEUE ZEIT, Moscow, No. 31, 1984, pp 5-8.
18. V.G. Kulikov, "The International Protection of Socialism," in: PRAVDA, 29 Apr 83, p 3.
19. Erich Honecker, "In Battle-filled Times We Successfully Continue the Tested Course of the Tenth Party Congress for Peace and Socialism," Seventh SED Central Committee Plenum of 24/25 Nov 83, East Berlin, p 16.
20. Cf. Hannes Adomeit, "The Soviet Power in International Crises," Baden-Baden, 1983, pp 420-445.
21. Cf., e.g., the speech by U.S. Secretary of State G. Shultz, 15 June 1982; the speech by U.S. Vice President George Bush before

the Society for Foreign Policy and International Relations in the Vienna Hofburg on 21 Sep 83, published by the U.S. Information Service of the U.S. Embassy, Vienna; the speech by Ronald Reagan on the eve of the KVAE (Conference on Confidence-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe) conference in Stockholm, German text in FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU of 19 Jan 84, p 15; speech by G. Shultz opening the KVAE conference, cf. DIE WELT, 18 Jan 84, pp 1 and 5.

22. Cf. the speeches and declarations: Speech of 14 Feb 84 in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 15 Feb 84, pp 3/4; letter of reply to the chairman of the Socialist International, in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 5 Apr 84, p 1; the interview with PRAVDA, 8 Apr 84; speech before the CPSU Central Committee in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 11 Apr 84, pp 3/4; speech at the conference of the Komsomol organization of the Soviet Armed Forces, in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 29 May 84, p 2; speech at the conclusion of the CEMA Summit Conference, in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 15 Jun 84, p 2; cf. also the reply of the Soviet PRAVDA commentator Shukov to the speech by Shultz in Stockholm, in: PRAVDA, 8 Feb 84, p 5; and the article of Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov of 23 Feb 84 in PRAVDA, pp 4/5; furthermore, the same on 28 Aug 84 in Bauska-Bistrize, in PRAVDA, 29 Aug 84, p 4.
23. This was, e.g., the summary of the conversation between McGovern and Gromyko in Jul 84, cf. DIE WELT of Jul 84, p 2.
24. Cf. the article of the collaborator of the CPSU Central Committee Department for Foreign Information, N. Portugalov, probably addressed especially to the West German peace movement, in the BLAETTER FUER INTERNATIONALE POLITIK, Cologne, No. 6/1984, p 683 ff.; "Atlantic Goetterdaemmerung--The United States, Western Europe, and the Role of NATO."
25. Treaty of 12 August 1970 between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, BGBL. 1972, Part II, p 353 ff., reprinted in DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No. 9/1970, p 956 ff.
26. A new detailed political-science study of the problems of the enemy state clauses can be found in "Enemy State Clauses, Four-Power Responsibility and German Question" by Monica H. Forbes, Ebenhausen 1983.
27. Cf., e.g., "The Kremlin Warns Bonn against breaking the Moscow Treaty," in: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 13 Aug 1981, p 1; Ustinov, op. cit. (footnote 22); also the memorandum of the USSR to the Federal Government on the repeal of certain regulations of the WEU, PRAVDA, 13 Jul 84, p 14; R. Dolzer, "Moscow Uses the Potsdam Agreement Against the European Security Policy," in: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 16 Jul 84, p 2.
28. Forbes, op. cit. (footnote 26), pp 5/41-43; D. Frenzke, "Interference as a Problem of International Law of East-West Relations," Cologne 1982, p 6 f.

29. Forbes, op. cit. (footnote 26), pp 59/60.
30. Cf. the PRAVDA article mentioned in footnote 2 and also the TASS report on the meeting between Chernenko and Honecker, in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 15 Jun 84, p 1.
31. Cf. for the following Adomeit, op. cit. (footnote 20), pp 57, 420-445, 438, 431-434.
32. Cf. Wolfgang Seiffert, "Is the East Bloc Able to Survive?," Bergisch Gladbach 1983; the same author: "Integration and Disintegration in CEMA," in: "The GDR Facing the Challenges of the Eighties," Edition DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV (26th Conference on the Status of GDR Research in the Federal Republic of Germany), Cologne 1983, pp 53-65.
33. Siegfried Kupper, "Arduous Ascent--Bad Prospects," in: DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No. 8/1984, pp 843-848.
34. Cf., e.g., the "Political Declaration of the States Participating in the Warsaw Pact of 4/5 Jan 84"; "Communique of the Conference of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the States Participating in the Warsaw Pact," in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 21/22 Apr 84, pp 5/6; and also the Declaration of the CEMA Member States "Strengthening Peace and the International Economic Relations," in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 16 Jun 84, pp 1/2.
35. Cf. in this connection Wolfgang Seiffert, "The Moscow 'Revanchism' Charges and the Validity Clauses of the Warsaw Pact," in: DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No. 9/1984, pp 900-903.
36. See especially his article: "The Teachings of Karl Marx and Some Questions of the Socialist Development in the USSR," in: Yuriy Andropov, "Selected Speeches and Writings," East Berlin 1983, here pp 280/281.
37. Cf. Portugalov, op. cit. (footnote 24), p 684.
38. "Under the Threat of U.S. Missiles," PRAVDA, 27 Jul 84, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 28 Jul 84, reprinted in DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No. 9/1984, p 992 f.
39. Lev Bezymenski, "Should We Put Our Foot Down?," NEUE ZEIT (Moscow), No. 17/1984, p 26. Cf. in this connection also Fred Oldenburg, "Are Moscow's Shadows Getting Longer?," in: DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No. 8/1984, p 837 f.
40. "Missiles in Grid Square", VOLKSARMEE, No. 15, 11 Apr 83.
41. Cf. article by G. Arbatov, "What if not Peace?," in: PRAVDA, 13 Aug 84, p 6.

42. G. Stuby, in: Norman Paech/Gerhard Stuby, "Jurists Against the Danger of War in Europe," Cologne 1983, pp 122/123.
43. British researcher in the INTERNATIONAL DEFENCE REVIEW 1982 warned against a "lightning war strategy" of the Soviet Army, Cf. Donnelly, "The Soviet Operational Manoeuvre Group a New Challenge for NATO," No. 9, 1982.
44. Gromyko in 1975 after the Helsinki CSCE Conference before the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, PRAVDA, 5 Dec 75, pp 1/3.
45. This demonstrates the dangerousness of the statements by Western politicians that the German question is "no longer open" even though it may be a slip of the tongue; cf. also Karl Feldmeyer, "How Useful Is Apel's Slip of the Tongue," in: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 17 Aug 84, p 1.
46. Cf. article by V. Nekrassov, "Caution, Revanchism!" in the Soviet party newspaper KOMMUNIST, No. 9/1984, pp 126-127, in which the author cites Stalin's words that if "Germany" is not held down, it will quickly "rise again."
47. Cf. Romania's attitude in Hacker, "The East Bloc 1984," pp 667-678, 739-744; the article by the Hungarian Central Committee secretary M. Szuros, "Common Goals--National Interests," German in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 12 Apr 84; as well as the Article signed AZ: "On the Ninth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act," in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 12 Aug 84, p 2 (reprinted in DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 9/1984, p 999 ff.) and Erich Honecker's interview, in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18/19 Apr 84, pp 1/2 (reprinted in this issue, p 1103; cf. also Documentation in DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, No. 9/1984, p 991 ff. and in this issue, p 1103).
48. At any rate, what is remarkable is the reference of the SED leadership to Andropov and Chernenko and to an article in Soviet newspapers, such as IZVESTIYA and others; cf., e.g., Kurt Hager, "Laws of Our Epoch--driving Forces and Values of Socialism," East Berlin 1984.
49. Honecker's Gera speech in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 14 Oct 80, reprinted in DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 11/1980, p 1221 ff., Fischer's speech at the 13th SED Central Committee Plenum in NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 13/14 Dec 80, reprinted in DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 2/1981, p 212.
50. That there were also other opinions in the SED Politburo is shown by the speech of the SED Politburo member Konrad Naumann at the Seventh SED Central Committee Plenum, cf. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 25 Nov 83, p 3; see also the article by Gerhard Zazworka, "Once Again Truth Is to Become the First Victim," in: HORIZONT No. 20/1983, pp 6/9, who advocates the thesis that stationing of intermediate range missiles in the Federal Republic was in contradiction

to treaties according to international law" and, citing Honecker, mentions the "Potsdam Agreement" as well as the East treaties including the Basic Treaty.

51. This assessment is based on an analysis that is derived especially from the following speeches, statements, and other documents of the SED leadership since November 1983; Erich Honecker, "Discussion Speech at the Seventh SED Central Committee Plenum, 24/25 Nov 83, East Berlin 1983 (DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 1/1984, p 103 ff.); "Successfully and Energetically Toward the 35th Anniversary of the GDR," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 26/27 May 84, p 2; "On the Ninth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 1 Aug 84, p 2 (DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 9/1984, p 999 ff); "On Some Current Questions of the Domestic and Foreign Policy of the GDR," Interview of Erich Honecker, in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 18/19 Aug 84, pp 1-2 (reprinted in this issue, p 1103).
52. Honecker thus corrected GDR Defense Minister Hoffmann: "Therefore we are not sharing the opinion that is advocated even by progressive people in the peace movement that a just war is no longer possible in the nuclear age," Heinz Hoffmann, "Armed Forces in our time," in: EINHEIT, No. 3/1976, p 356. This opinion was still advocated recently; cf. Reinhard Bruehl, "On the Role of Military Force in Social Revolutions," in: MILITAERGESCHICHTE, No. 5/1983, pp 517-521. Bruehl starts from the assumption that military force in history always has class character; therefore a nuclear first strike of (Western) imperialism is a crime against humanity, but not the counterstrike. "The armed struggle would have a just character on the part of the attacked socialist states even in this horrible and presumably last war."
53. All quotes from Honecker, Interview, op. cit. (footnote 51).
54. Kurt Hager, "Laws of Our Epoch, op. cit. (footnote 48), pp 64/65.
55. The plenum took place on 26/27 December 1983; cf. PRAVDA, 27/28 Dec 83, pp 1/3; the speech by the seriously ill Andropov was read at the plenum. The publications do not reveal anything about the decisions, but members of the Soviet Central Committee have spoken to politicians of the Federal Republic of "fateful decisions" in relation to the Federal Republic.
56. Honecker, Interview, op. cit. (footnote 51).
57. Hager, op. cit. (footnote 48), p 6.
58. "On the Ninth Anniversary of the Signing of the Helsinki Final Act," p 2; Honecker, Interview, op. cit. (footnote 51), p 2.
59. Abrassimov, "300 Meters From the Brandenburg Gate," Moscow 1984 (Russian); the report of the SED Politburo to the Sixth Central

Committee Plenum of 15 and 16 June 1983 also refers to a "new era" in the relations between the GDR and the USSR, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 16 Jun 83 (DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 8/1983, p 892 ff.).

60. Text in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 9 May 83 (DEUTSCHLAND ARCHIV, 9/1983, pp 995-1002).
61. Honecker, Interview, op. cit. (footnote 51).
62. Ibid.
63. Honecker on 15 February 1981 at the SED Berlin Bezirk Delegates Conference, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 16 Feb 81.
64. Cf. his interview with the magazine QUICK, 13 Oct 83, p 9: "Honecker Wants Socialist Reunification."
65. Honecker, Interview, op. cit. (footnote 51).
66. On this problem see also: Wolfgang Seiffert, "The Terms 'Recognition' and 'Respecting' in Inner-German Relations," in: RECHT IN OST UND WEST, No. 2/1984, pp 49-60; lately for the GDR point of view: Wolfgang Weichelt, "The Citizenship Question and the Sense for Political Realities," in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 19 Sep 84, p 2.
67. Cf. report on the conversation of Vogel with Honecker in: DIE WELT, 12 Aug 83, p 4. Honecker did cite completely the Gera demands for the first time again in a long while but he prefaced it with the general statement that both German states are obliged by the Basic Treaty to mutually "respect" their "independence and autonomy" in internal and external affairs.
68. Cf., e.g., the comment by SED Politburo member Hager, in: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 25 May 83, p 3; Honecker, Interview, op. cit. (footnote 51), p 2.
69. Thus State Secretary Mertes, "Mertes Points Out the Different Interpretation of the Security Partnership," FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG, 13 Aug 84.
70. To consolidate his position in the Soviet Union, Gromyko published a book in 1982 in which he tries to define capital export as the economic basis of the "aggressive U.S. foreign policy"; cf. A.A. Gromyko, "The Foreign Expansion of Capital," published in East Berlin in 1984 (German).
71. Cf., e.g., his speech in PRAVDA, 7 Nov 83.
72. Cf. also B. Meissner, "Soviet Course Corrections," Zurich 1984.

- 73. Cf., e.g., Andropov's speech of 15 June 1983. Text in: PRAVDA, 16 Jun 83.
- 74. Tolubko's interview in the Moscow News, 8 Jul 84.
- 75. TASS report, 14 Dec 83.
- 76. Cf., e.g., Honecker's speech at the reception for graduates of the military academies on 24 September, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 25 Sep 84.

12356

CSO: 2300/102

'MARTYRDOM' OF COMMUNIST POET IN COMMUNIST JAIL REMEMBERED

[Editorial Report] Budapest ELET ES IRODALOM in Hungarian 7 December 1984 carries on page 6 a 1,000-word article by the Marxist critic Erzsebet Vezser. Titled "A Martyr Twice Over," it is a memorial to the Communist poet Endre Havas, who was active in emigre circles on behalf of anti-fascist, leftist political groups. He went mad and was killed in jail in the early fifties in Hungary.

In recalling that part of his life, the author writes the following:

"Since today, contrary to the original meaning of the word, we call all those martyrs whose lives were extinguished even though they were innocent of any crime, then Endre Havas was a martyr twice over. The martyrs of World War II were the victims of their enemies, or at least of ideas which declared them as enemies. Havas became the victim of his own beliefs, the victim of sadistic murderers, acting in the name of a distorted idea. He could not comprehend what had happened to him, and he went mad in jail."

CSO: 2500/110

MODERNIZATION OF FIXED ASSETS, REQUIREMENTS FOR GROWTH

Budapest MAGYAR NEMZET in Hungarian 30 Oct 84 p 3

[Article by Dr Ivan Berend, assistant head of department at the National Planning Office: "Intensive Growth Will Succeed or Fail, Depending on the Degree of Modernization of Fixed Assets"]

[Text] In structure and technical level, economic development of the intensive-innovative type and foreign demand (that of the CEMA countries and the Western capitalist countries emerging from the recession) differ entirely from what we have been used to in the age of an extensive type economic development or of the world economic boom period which concluded with the 1970's.

It is a question how demand-oriented development and expansion can be coordinated with the present structure and technical level of fixed assets. Or can fixed assets appropriate to the new structure be created within a short time? In way of a preliminary answer: no. With the present structure of fixed assets is it possible to achieve production appropriate to demand? The preliminary answer: hardly.

One of the basic conditions for an extensive type economic growth was the rapid rise in the volume of fixed assets. To achieve this, the growth rate for investments in the Hungarian economy for three and one-half decades was greater than that of production. Fixed assets grew more rapidly in industry, the construction industry, and agriculture than did the national income; more slowly in the infrastructural sub-branches. The fixed assets of the latter made up 80 percent of total operating capital in the 1950's, but only 60 percent at the beginning of the 1980's.

Infrastructure Deemphasized

In the 1960's economic policy gave priority to the large scale reorganization of agriculture, and therefore agriculture occupied a 17 percent higher position in the investment structure than in fixed assets. But in this period industry, too, kept its investment preponderance, where its share exceeded by 15 percent its share in fixed assets. As a consequence of all these things, the lag became greater for the producer and nonproducer infrastructural sub-branches. In transportation and communication the share of investments was 11 percentage

points below (6 percent in the preceding decade), and in the nonproducer infrastructural sub-branches 22 percentage points below their share in the fixed assets.

The economic strategy of the first half of the 1970's no longer followed the stormy trends of structural transformation. In this period, the investment lag of the infrastructural sub-branches was reduced. Investment in the transportation and communications sub-branch was only 0.3 percentage points below that which would have come from the fixed assets structure. On the other hand, the investment lag of the nonproducer infrastructural sub-branches was reduced to 8 percentage points, which basically altered the scale and dynamism of structural transformation, and more or less put the brakes on ratio modifications.

Because of the structural changes, which have been mentioned only tangentially, there will be important consequences for the second half of the 1980's and the first half of the 1990's. Beginning with the postwar restoration period (transportation and communications) which we have not as yet mentioned and continuing with industrialization and the reorganization of agriculture, particularly and emphatically with the structural change in energy sources that developed in the 1960's and the emphasis on the use of hydrocarbons, and the large housing construction program that began in the early 1970's, the large concentrations of resources in the past three and one-half decades, together with the effect of these pulsating structural changes, cast their shadow and consequences all the way to the turn of the century. (By large concentrations of resources we mean fixed assets and capacities which are put into operation at the same time, at the same technical level and which "deliver" and wear out physically more or less at the same time and to the same degree.)

The renovation of fixed assets which are established at different points of time recur in a cyclical manner. Resource concentration spread over time created fixed assets of different life spans, and interestingly their replacement requirements develop in the same period. It is due to the impulses of the past that their wear should also bring on a speed-up if they are retired, discarded or exchanged at the same time and in the same sub-branch where they are now operating. On one hand, the present investment endowments do not make this possible, and on the other hand a process like this would lead to the conservation of the structure, and in the competitive sphere would retard growth and efficiency.

Declining Freedom of Decision

In our economic planning calculations--primarily in those for long term planning--we have been accustomed to equalize the replacements with an annual or annually planned amortization. To put it simply, we plan in such a way that we regard the annually formed amortization as replacement, and we plan the investments designed to increase the fixed assets to come from the net savings of national income. Naturally, in global calculations the importance of this is simply in the value of the outlays which are necessary to maintain appropriate fixed asset stocks and in the value of fixed asset growth that can be expected as a result of the outlays.

The replacement ratio of annual investments increases from year to year, which reduces globally the freedom of decision for investment policy. Of course, in regard to investments that must be decided centrally this statement is more precisely true of investments that may be decided in the state administration and government sphere. In practice, however, replacements and exchanges are not necessary in those sub-branches where the amortization occurs, and even to the same extent and in the same place--if we think of the enterprises. That is, it is not the quantity and quality of the individual specific capacities that must be maintained.

Most investments are realized on the basis of decisions by the economic organizations, the enterprises. But amortization and the total investment ratio do not give an answer regarding the degree of freedom, for in an economic organization, the degree of freedom for making investment decisions is essentially greater than this. There are other instances: an item of fixed asset may be discarded at the retirement point or kept in operation. Investments may be financed with the fixed funds deriving from unused amortization. New capacities may be created from the development fund, more exactly from the profit-branch fund, or by replacing fixed assets not yet due to be retired before the deadline for amortization.

Perhaps it is advisable to be aware over the long run that this fact in itself--namely, that the growth in amortization is dynamic whereas for years investments have been declining--does not as yet unequivocally limit the degree of freedom. But undoubtedly we are faced by a new structural problem: according to this the existing structure of fixed assets determines the amortization structure. On the other hand, the requirement for long term production structural change requires a different investment sub-branch distribution. But since the regrouping of capital or the allocation of sources differs from all these things, it is necessary to have one investment structure, differing significantly from former practice, to carry out a long term development policy.

"Amortized" Machinery in Production

The dynamism of amortization is determined partly by the outlays and partly by the changes that have occurred in the material-technical composition of the fixed assets, that is, the modifications in the ratio of machinery and technical furnishings. As a consequence, the structure of amortization is tied to the sub-branch and material-technical composition. Behind all this, another process has developed which has been strengthened in accordance with the narrow investment possibilities: an increase in the ratio of fixed assets which have been amortized but not yet discarded. Over the long run this can lead to the conservation of technical cultures and structure. As a consequence of this phenomenon the ratio of worn out and obsolete fixed assets has increased; resources increase which are not discarded at the time of retirement, and both processes--tied to a moderating investment process--slow down the advance of modern technique and technology.

To return to our opening thought: among many other factors, the dynamism of economic growth is guaranteed by a fixed assets base which differing in

in structure from the one that exists today is suitable to attract modern technique and technology. Both conditions must be created and can be created under lesser savings possibilities and also under the conditions of a fixed assets renewal cycle. The dynamism of economic growth--given other factors, it must be emphasized--cannot be made a function of the vigorous growth of investments, and chiefly not of net savings. That is, the intensive nature of the economic growth track succeeds or fails with the rapid exchange and structural transformation of the existing fixed assets.

Two-thirds or three-fifths of the investments--in some sub-branches the whole--may be built on amortization sources. The fixed assets base of several large development lines, programs--for example, the technical-technological procedures that reduce specific value in material and energy consumption, the use and the manufacture of certain elements in microelectronics, certain areas of biotechnical solutions and the infrastructure including the telephone information-communications system--may be developed partly or for the most part through state intervention. At the same time, by virtue of market impulses, the competitive sphere can select the fixed assets that are awaiting renewal. This kind of grading--which in most cases is an economic compulsion--is able to divide the fixed assets from the viewpoint of exchange replacement to the advantage of the dynamic, so-called carrier sub-branches and to the cost of the retrodeveloping sub-branches.

6691

CSO: 2500/87

POPIELUSZKO MURDER SEEN EXPLOITED BY OPPOSITION, KSS-KON

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 9 Nov 84 pp 3,4

[Article by Jerzy A. Salecki: "We Shall Not Depart From the Road Taken, Despite the Attempt To Strike a Blow at the [National] Accord"]

[Text] The tragic death of the Rev Jerzy Popieluszko has caused universal outrage in our country. The perpetrators of the crime were equally condemned by believers and nonbelievers, including those who disagreed with the slogans proclaimed by the clergyman and were opposed to his political activities, which exceeded the bounds of his priestly duties. A murder is always a horrendous deed that is not justified by any circumstance or rationale.

An equivocal position on this matter was taken by the PZPR Central Committee in its Declaration of 26 [October 1984]: "The Central Committee resolutely rejects and condemns all illegal deeds and methods of activity, both those of the representatives of the authorities and those of the citizens. The Central Committee emphatically declares that it shall not tolerate anarchy and terrorism in any form whatsoever."

In his television address the Minister of Internal Affairs Gen of Arms Czeslaw Kiszczak declared: "The kidnappers shall be subjected to the severe penalty provided for by law and the background of their crime shall be publicly clarified."

Intensive pursuit by the law enforcement organs resulted in the rapid apprehension of the direct perpetrators of the kidnapping and murder. The investigation now in progress will provide the answers to the two principal questions of who were the inspirers and their accomplices and what aims they pursued. The course of the investigation demonstrates the absolute certainty and definitiveness of the promise to provide a complete explanation of the background and motives of the crime.

We will say plainly that not only public opinion but also, and to no less a degree, the authorities of our state are concerned about elucidating this whole matter without leaving any omissions or doubts. By documenting thereby their feeling of responsibility and duty, and confirming yet again their resolute will to translate into reality the principles of socialist morality and statehood and the implementation of the renewal program, [the authorities] yet again fittingly rebut liars and slanderers--individuals who attempt to batten on death and desire to utilize it in order to make anew anti-Polish and antisocialist capital.

1

The NEUE ZUERICHER ZEITUNG correspondent was right when, as early as on 24 [October], in a report titled "Popieluszko's Kidnapping in Poland Is a Blow Against Jaruzelski's Reform Policy," he wrote, among other things, that: "...It is chiefly the persons dissatisfied with the developing situation in Poland who profit from the kidnapping."

On the other hand, those who in the recent past had been leading the country toward a catastrophe owing to their destructive actions consider themselves entitled to make their voice heard and, even more, to hurl accusations and judgments and pronounce verdicts.

Even while the fate of the kidnapped priest had as yet been unknown, some persons already claimed publicly that he was kidnapped "by the authorities." During the next few days afterward long-known spokesmen for chaos and confrontation called for a strike by the workforce of the Warszawa Iron and Steel Plant or again by the Gdansk shipyard workers. And at the same time, strange declarations were made to the effect that Popieluszko's death promotes undertaking "a genuine dialogue."

"Genuine," meaning, we shall say without beating about the bush, a dialogue with the representatives of the antistate opposition, which still is dreaming of what it terms "political pluralism," that is, of something which is essentially in conflict with the Constitutional principles of our system of society. It is no accident that well-known activists of the KOR [Committee for the Defense of Workers], considering the situation to be favorable, again are desirous of creating old structures of the opposition under new labels and legalizing groups which are remembered for their antistate programs.

Wishing to "heat up" the atmosphere, several days ago the Polish-language programs of Western radio stations popularized a "declaration" signed by 16 persons from among the leadership of the former KSS [Social Self-Defense Committee] KOR and the former Solidarity. The authors of this frippery protested against the statement of the press spokesman of the Polish government who, while meeting with journalists, cited specific instances and names and stated the obvious fact that the leaders of the opposition want to exploit the death of the Rev Popieluszko for their own aims. It is exactly this statement that is regarded by the signatories of this "declaration" as "inciting hate against the persons named."

"The law is the keystone of the Polish Republic." This was stated at the 9th Congress by the Premier Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski. "We do not claim that the law should be unchanging... At the same time there is not and cannot be any condition of higher necessity that would justify violations of the mandatory public order. This applies to everyone without exception. Only a law-abiding state can be a democratic state. Only a law-abiding and democratic state can be a strong state."

On carrying out a thorough analysis of the sociopolitical and economic situation and guiding itself by responsibility and concern for the fate of the nation and state, the 9th Congress defined in its Resolution the principles of political action known by the name of the line of [national] accord and struggle. This refers to accord with all the forces, organizations and individuals who acknowledge the systemic principles of People's Poland and are ready to work for the country's good. This also refers to the struggle against those who actively demonstrate their hostile attitude toward our reality and act against the repairing the wellbeing of the Republic.

The Resolution states: "The Congress declares that the formation and activation of a national front of the forces of goodwill, reason and patriotic responsibility is a particularly important matter." The Appeal to the Polish Nation declares: "We are struggling against anarchy, against all those who attempt to demolish, weaken, paralyze our state... We are struggling against those who wish to divert Poland from the road of socialism."

Hardly anyone need be reminded that, from the very beginning, the party's concept of a /political accord/ [emphasized] with the broadest circles of patriots and a /political struggle/ [emphasized] against the circles of the enemies of socialism was--and to this day is--questioned, undermined and attacked from various directions. The imposition of martial law, which prevented the dismantling of the state, the undermining of the systemic principles and the spread of anarchy in public life, became the point of departure for materializing the program for renewal and shaping the idea of the national accord in the form of an authentic citizens' movement with differentiated forms and purposes. The rebuilding of the trade union movement, the restoration of public societies and organizations and, above all, the formation of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth, signified continuing progress in normalizing public life, a progress achieved by the joint effort of party and non-party members, believers and nonbelievers.

The facts and actual accomplishments during such a difficult period confirm the validity of the party program and the meaningfulness of the idea of socialist renewal. It is precisely facts that are causing the ranks of the doubters, the unconvinced ones who wait and stand aloof, to steadily diminish month after month. Life itself has confirmed the wisdom of the maxim serving the national accord: "Whoever is not against us, is with us."

The question of whether the killing of the Rev Jerzy Popieluszko is a political provocation can be answered only affirmatively. In terms of its political consequences, this was an attempt to discredit the party and its program and leadership. This was yet another attempt to undermine the idea of renewal and weaken the movement for national rebirth. This death was intended again to divide Poles, cause tensions and result in a conflict between the state and the Catholic Church. The hope was entertained that the state's consistent and firm religious policy would be swayed and that the dialogue between the representatives of the government and the Episcopate--who, while taking different positions on matters of world outlook, do find a common language on many questions that are fundamental to the nation, serving the common good, that is, the fatherland--would be disrupted. However, the permanence of the principles of the religious policy was affirmed in the documents of the 17th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee.

The theses presented at that plenum contained the statements: "...Religious differences are not and cannot be a basis for sociopolitical conflicts. The line of dividing citizens of the Polish People's Republic according to their attitude toward religion would be an artificial and highly harmful one. The socialist state rejects such divisions. No one who cherishes Poland's good should introduce them ..."

In this place it is difficult to resist the reflection that the clergy unfortunately also includes certain individuals whose illwill or even hostility toward socialism overshadows to them the obvious civic, patriotic, /Polish/ [emphasized] rationale. While demanding tolerance, they publicly proclaim intolerance. At a time when reconciliation is so greatly needed, they propagate slogans causing divisions and mutual prejudices. They laud hate instead of propagating Evangelical love of one's neighbor--that love which is achieved by dialogue, cooperation and co-responsibility under the conditions of the state.

Those who had reckoned on demolishing the bridge of national accord were frustrated in their calculations. As for the society, it judged rightly, in its overwhelming majority, the perils harbored in lack of deliberation; submission to emotions and lack of reflection at a time when reflection was particularly needed. Poles did not let themselves respond to the provocation.

The reactions of the supreme authorities of the party and state leave not a grain of doubt. The Politburo report, the speech of First Secretary of the PZPR Central Committee Wojciech Jaruzelski at the 17th Plenum, the Declaration of the PZPR Central Committee, the successive communiques of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Polish Press Agency and the position taken by the Government's press spokesman followed these three guiding ideas: a resolute condemnation of the act of political banditry, affirmation of the constancy of the line of renewal and [national] accord, and affirmation of the will to

identify and make public the motives of the crime and to punish all perpetrators in accordance with the norms of legality.

As in various other cases, the opponents of the Polish socialist reality refuse to acknowledge the facts. They gloss them over and attempt to present every action of the authorities in a distorted mirror on falsifying and reducing its significance, as well as to open good intentions to doubt.

Battening on a tragedy and attempting to make political capital out of a man's death is bound to cause revulsion that is all the greater when this is accompanied by ordinary lies and calumnies. The citizens of various Western countries who call themselves friends of Poland or even consider themselves Polish patriots have been in the last 2 weeks or so presenting our country as a lair of terrorists tolerated by... the authorities. This is being said and written about by individuals who are perfectly aware of the numerous instances of political assassinations, mysterious kidnappings and missing persons in their own countries.

The Mafia, the gangster crime syndicates, the "Red Brigades," and the "death squads" operated and still operate not in Poland but in those vaunted "democracies." In Poland the street on which the head of the government lives is not barricaded, the president is not protected by a double row of special bodyguards, and opposition politicians who return to the country are not assassinated. Despite this, in recent days attempts were made to present precisely our country as a land of political terrorism, on linking this to its "systemic features."

A curious example of such thinking, in which a psychosis of hate displaces reasoned analysis and sober appreciation of facts, is provided by the "open letter" of E. Lipinski, one of the founders of the KSS KOR, who identifies socialism and communism with "a social order based on terror, lies and slavery."

5

Terror, including of course individual terror that is traditionally linked to anarchist concepts, has never been a recommended or even tolerated procedure in the theory and practice of the Marxist-Leninist parties. On the contrary, anarchism and terrorism were criticized by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and subsequently--and with unusual sharpness at that--by Vladimir Lenin.

Lenin wrote in ISKRA in 1903: "In practice, lack of ideology and principle results in revolutionary adventurism which is expressed in the noisy propaganda of 'systematic' terror."

This thought was developed by the leader of the Revolution in an article published in 1923: "In including terror in its program as a means of political struggle, the social revolutionaries ["Eserites"--J. A. S.] thereby cause grave harm to the movement and destroy the inseparable bonds linking socialist work with the masses of the revolutionary class. Terror... is in no way

related to work among the masses, for the masses and together with the masses."

The [Bolshevik] party's position on this issue did not differ from the above appraisals, and at its 2nd Congress it adopted a special resolution on terrorism which declared: "The Congress resolutely rejects terror, i.e., the system of individual political assassinations, as a means of political struggle that is utterly purposeless, disrupts bonds between the revolutionaries and the masses... and spreads the most mistaken ideas about the principles and techniques of the struggle."

V. I. Lenin's position and that of the party he led leaves no doubt whatsoever. It remains topical to this very day, and it is fully accepted by all the communist parties, including of course the PZPR.

6

In the year 125 B.C. the Roman judge Lucius Cassius Longinus recommended that cases be examined so as to find the answer to the question, "Cui bono fuerit?" Whom is this to profit or benefit?

At a time when the investigation of the tragic death of the Rev Jerzy Popieluszko still is under way, when the perpetrators have already been caught but a judicial trial and a verdict are yet to come, it is possible even now to answer the question of whom this crime has yielded propaganda advantages and whom it was intended to harm.

This [crime] is a pretext for arousing revulsion against the socialist system and people's Poland, and is being exploited as a reason for undermining the validity and nature of the realistic appraisals of the Polish reality that had recently appeared in the West. It also offered a chance for activating the domestic political opposition and intensifying ideological diversionary activities. It moreover offered an opportunity for compromising the authorities in the eyes of the society and paralyzing the activities of the militia and the Security Service.

All this had been reckoned upon: emotionalism, absence of sober thinking, irresponsibility and primitivism of reaction. But what happened was the converse: the society judged rightly the nature of the provocation.

7

We are struggling, and will continue to struggle, for the victory of the socialist rationale by /political/ [emphasized] methods. In the strategy of the party and the policy of the state an inviolable canon is represented by dialogue, accord, and cooperation among various social forces to accomplish socialist reforms.

The diversity of the attitudes and opinions of the citizens is something totally different from hostility to the system or antisocialist acts. In the name of the highest values--the protection of the achievements of our system

of society, the permanence and strengthening of the state, and the future of the nation--the authorities have the duty of resorting to lawful means of neutralizing hostile machinations. As declared at the 17th Plenum by Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski, there is not and cannot be any compromise with persons who are against the supreme values of socialist Poland. The political struggle against the opposition is the behest of class, patriotic and national responsibility.

Definite conclusions must be inferred from the events of the last few days. They must be inferred by the authorities, the institutions, the citizens, and the spokesmen for the Church. For this concerns an important idea serving to eliminate hate, hostility and prejudices and promote reconciliation. Poles may differ about many things, but we have only one Poland. It is the same fatherland of all, and our future is common as well.

"We shouldered the burden of one of the most dramatic decisions in Polish history, in order to protect the nation and preserve the system of society, the state and the chance for socialist reforms," declared the First Secretary of the Central Committee at the 17th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee. "That is, not in order to deviate from the line of the 9th Congress but in order to defend it and subsequently implement it in its entire extent."

1386

CSO: 2600/211

PAX CELEBRATES ANNIVERSARY

Objectives Defined

Warsaw SLOWO POWSZECHNE in Polish 26 Nov 84 pp 1,3

[Unsigned article: "The PAX--An Integral Part of the History, Present and Future of the Polish People's Republic: Board Session of the PAX Association Inaugurates 40th Anniversary of This Socially Progressive Catholic Movement"]

[Text] On 23 and 24 [Nov 84] the Kazimierz Pietrzak Club in Warsaw was the site of the deliberations of the Board of the PAX Association inaugurating the 40th anniversary of activities of this socially progressive movement of Catholics in People's Poland, commenced with the publication of the first issue of the weekly DZIS I JUTRO on 25 November 1945. The session was chaired by the Board's chairman, Deputy Premier Zenon Komender, who also presented the introductory report for discussion. The second day of the deliberations was preceded by a Holy Mass celebrated at St Barbara's Church. In the course of the deliberations a delegation consisting of Zygmunt Lichniak, Jozef Majkowski, Stanislaw Piestrak, Mieczyslaw Stachura, Alfred Wawrzyniak and Jozef Wojcik placed a bouquet of flowers on the grave of the founder and longtime chairman of the PAX Association, Boleslaw Piasecki, who died in 1979.

On the eve of the 40th anniversary of the socially progressive movement of Catholics in Poland there is a need for reflection on both the road traveled so far and the realities of the present day, in order to outline the directions of activity of the PAX for the coming new year. This was stated by Z. Komender, who presented in his extensive address a number of internal organizational problems as well as tasks of the Association against the background of an analysis of the country's ideological-political and social-economic situation.

[Further on, Z. Komender declared:] The progress occurring in many domains of our life has recently been perturbed by the provocative political assassination of the Rev Jerzy Popieluszko; which reflects the thoroughgoing cynicism of its perpetrators and eventual inspirers. It is not accidental that this murder coincided with important events such as the visit of the Premier of Greece to Poland and the 17th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee. The Plenum's declaration, which stresses the desire to conclusively shed light on this tragedy and unambiguously condemns its perpetrators, as well as the dignified and deliberate position of the Church, which demonstrates a feeling of patriotic responsibility, as particularly reflected in the comments of the Primate of Poland and the Holy Father and during the funeral ceremonies organized by the Episcopate, caused the entire society to demonstrate its understanding of the gravity of the situation and the menacing dangers as well as its deep feeling of responsibility. Our position is expressed both in the commentary, "The Need for Wisdom," published in SLOWO POWSZECHNE, and in the complex whole of information on this topic provided by the Association's press organs. It was the intent of the perpetrators of the murder to obstruct the stabilization of the situation in our country and the emergence of Poland from international isolation, as well as to undermine our standing in the socialist camp. Against this background, emphasis should be placed on the Church's activities in behalf of public tranquility in our country, which cannot be overshadowed by sporadic instances of the abuse of ceremonies of a religious nature by certain individuals for destructive aims.

[Z. Komender continued:] The tasks facing the PAX in the 40th year of its existence reflect the continuity of its service for the needs of the nation, the Church and the state. It is the duty of every member of the Association to take an active part in promoting the processes of the democratization of political life in this country. This is reflected in our position and activities on the platform of the Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth [PRON]. The PAX, being a signatory to the July Declaration of the PRON, must orient the whole of its organizational and opinion-making activities toward promoting the deep and authentic penetration of the great idea of national reconciliation, contained in the program planks of the PRON, into the whole of its structures, fostering the growth of the sovereign role of the society in the socialist state, and broadening dialogue and cooperation for the sake of the common good. We are opposed to that apathy, that passivity of world outlook, which deprives men of the sources of inspiration as well as of moral rationales and values on which to base their actions. Cooperation in the absence of dialogue, when enriching differences are glossed over, does not promote developmental socialism. This accounts for the importance of the deep and serious treatment of the requirements, conclusions and consequences ensuing from pluralism of world outlook, as well as for the importance of enriching the ideological formula of the PRON, of which we are co-creators. This also accounts for the importance of stimulating the activities of all of the PRON's elements serving to broaden the base of governing and promote national reconciliation.

[Further, Z. Komender stated that:] It is precisely such activities that condition the materialization of goals and reforms aimed at an improved functioning of the state, as expressed at the 17th Plenum. The deepening of

the trends toward a democratization of political life is also promoted by the elections to the people's councils and territorial self-governments, and the preparations for the coming elections to the Parliament, in which the PRON is taking an active part. At present, more than 900 members of the Association are active in the structure of representative bodies at all levels. The exercise of social duties in these structures by our activists provides a genuine chance for broadening the possibilities for influencing the decisions, plans and programs they adopt and formulate, and thereby also for enhancing the importance of self-government structures in all domains of Polish life.

After presenting an analysis of the current international situation, characterized by, among other things, positive trends that open vistas for reducing the existing tensions, particularly as regards arms control, Zenon Komender pointed to new directions of cooperation among socialist countries within the framework of the CEMA, primarily as regards the management of raw materials, fuels and energy.

[He stated that] it is not easy to completely overcome our country's economic difficulties, although all elements of our economy by now perform almost normally. On analyzing Poland's socioeconomic situation and its domestic and international circumstances, the speaker stressed the need to create a long-range program, the need for ambitious thinking about long-range tasks transcending the next 5-year plan. In this respect, all the existing partial programs, projects and initial-planning studies, as well as all partial plans, should be integrally synchronized with the possibilities of the economy. This requires determining and selecting the strategic directions of development of our country. The coming year will not be easy, because it should be a time of definite solutions, a time of refinement of the developmental perspective. This accounts for the great importance of creating the premises for the social and moral consolidation of the entire nation, creating the conditions for gaining public support for the proposed solutions.

Zenon Komender further declared that the PAX is an integral part of the history and present of People's Poland, and it has the ambition to be a part of its future as well. This is demonstrated by the outcome of the Association's activities so far, performed in line with the concept of its creator Boleslaw Piasecki as a critical continuation of its past accomplishments and through emphasis on what is innovative in the PAX's history and what corresponds to particular social needs. We should answer the question of what experiences in the history of the PAX empowered us to formulate the "Directives" outlining its ideology, and we should describe the manner in which we approach our program theses. In 1985 several sessions of the Association's Board will be devoted to this task by analyzing such topics as: the accomplishments and tasks of the press and publications of the PAX; the problems of culture, education and science in the PAX's activities; the PAX in the service of the Christian world outlook; activities promoting socioeconomic development; and Poland's place in the world, on indicating the Association's activities abroad. The summation of these analyses will represent a synthesis of the accomplishments of the PAX Association on its 40th anniversary. In addition, during the first few months of next year, three symposia will be held in honor of the 70th anniversary of the birth of

Boleslaw Piasecki, to present the contributions and importance of the thought of the founder of the PAX.

The following took part in the discussion: Zbigniew Czajkowski, Szczepan Balicki, Mieczyslaw Gajdzinski, Leonard Barszczewski, Pawel Gorski, Jozef Szczawinski, Jozef Wolkowski, Jozef Wojcik, Andrzej Hagmajer, Jacek Strozynski, Antoni Kaplinski, Benedykt Kloskowski, Jan Wagner, Michal Malisiewicz and Alfred Stenzel.

The participants in the discussion elaborated on the principal topics of the report concerning the determination of the PAX's tasks for the next year, on contributing to them with their own numerous proposals and comments.

They pointed to the important place occupied in the PAX's activities by matters of culture, science, upbringing and national education, which enabled the Association during its 40 years of existence to work out a coherent concept of activities in behalf of Polish culture, consistently stressing its pluralist sources and nature. Against this background, an important need is to open a world-outlook and philosophical dialogue conducted by equal partners, as a condition for world-outlook democracy. It also is important for dealing on a broader scale with the whole of the problems of upbringing, within the framework of the PRON. The Association has scored considerable publishing accomplishments, and the PAX's Publishing Institute is not just a publishing office but also a major culture-creating institution, and this role of the Institute should be constantly nurtured (Zbigniew Czajkowski).

Much attention was devoted to the participation of the PAX aktiv in the activities of the PRON, on postulating further expansion of its activities to promote overcoming the negative phenomena occurring in certain of the movement's elements. It is highly important to foster the pluralist-outlook nature of the PRON if it is to be a movement taking increasingly deeper root in the life of the society (Szczepan Balicki, Leonard Barszczewski, Andrzej Hagmajer, Alfred Stenzel). The importance of the local branches of the Association was pointed out: it is in these branches that the activities of the PAX as a whole acquire a specific nature and its Ideological-Political Directives become translated into the language of practical tasks of the PAX (Leonard Barszczewski). Mention was made of the consequences of the feedback between ideology and societal life, the need for an authentic materialization of the pluralist-view nature of the socialist state as a condition for democracy (Jozef Szczawinski), and the need for internal dialogue in the plane of the Directives (Jozef Wolkowski).

It was stressed that the past and accomplishments of the PAX are linked to the great historical tasks of People's Poland. These tasks included the resurrection of the country from ruins, the return of Poland to the Western and Northern Territories, the integration of these territories with the Motherland, the struggle for international recognition of the Western boundary, the elimination of feudal modes in the countryside, the spread of universal education and the cultural advancement of the society. Against this background, the challenges on the historical scale facing Poland nowadays were considered. It was emphasized that one such primary challenge is the assurance

of the civilizational, economic and scientific advancement of Poland. To this paramount goal many other aspirations have to be subordinated. Another historical task is the complete implementation and credibility of pluralist-view nature of socialism, as well as the assurance of a worthy place and authority of Poland in Europe and the world (Jozef Wojcik). These issues were considered in subsequent discussion (Jacek Strozynski, Antoni Kaplinski, Michal Malisiewicz). Attention was drawn to the need to perceive that the 1980s are a new time, a new era, in the life of not only Poland but also the Church and the world, which poses increasingly more difficult tasks. This requires searching for a perspective in many planes of life (Antoni Kaplinski). Various aspects of the world-outlook situation in Poland were analyzed, on pointing out that negating the significance of world-outlook inspiration in the life of the society results in social apathy (Jan Wagner). It was stressed that a consistent implementation of pluralism and the building of the "citizen state" make socialism more credible, and that the dispute over world-outlook inspiration is of broader significance. The historic importance of the PAX is due to individuals, the aktiv, the activists at local branches, and the base of sympathizers (Alfred Stenzel).

After the deliberations were summed up by Deputy Premier Zenon Komender, chairman of the Board of the PAX Association, and the assumptions for the work of the PAX during the 40th year of its existence were adopted, a full meeting of the Board took place and adopted by-laws decisions. The memory of the recently deceased members of the Association was honored with a moment of silence. The admission of new members of the Association was performed. On the proposal of concerned individuals, membership rights were restored to applicants. In addition, verified deletions from the membership rolls were performed, and the meeting ratified the composition of the newly elected boards of the province branches of the PAX Association in Bydgoszcz, Krosno, Tarnobrzeg, Zielona Gora, Krakow and Torun. It also ratified the composition of the boards of the Association's urban branches in Biala Podlaska, Parczewo, Czersk, Osie, Sepolno Krajenskie, Plonsk, Myszkow, Tychy, Krosno, Rawicz, Zgierz, Mszana Dolna, Cedynia, Tarnobrzeg, Staszow, Chelmo, Karczewo, Pruszkow, Wloclawek and Bilgoraj.

Komender Speaks to Press

Warsaw SLOWO POWSZECHNE in Polish 28 Nov 84 p 2

[Interview with Zenon Komender by Wojciech Janicki: "On the Eve of the 40th Anniversary of the PAX" under the rubric "From the Weekly ZORZA"]

[Text] The weekly ZORZA in its issue of 25 November [1984] published an interview with Deputy Premier Zenon Komender, chairman of the Board of the PAX Association, by Editor-in-Chief Wojciech Janicki. Below are excerpts from that interview.

"The PAX was conceived at a time when the foundations of People's Poland began to be laid. It was intended to try to meet an objective social need engendered by the new situation of the Polish nation and state, when the conditions for

the socialist transformations of the state and the society were just arising. In this connection, it was necessary to define the place and role of the community of believers, Catholics, in a system of society founded on Marxist ideology and Marxist theory of social development. Already at the very beginning of the movement, long before the Second Vatican Council, those rallying round the periodical DZIS I JUTRO had taken the position that divisions in world outlook need not and do not overlap with political divisions. This assumption led us to formulate the idea of the threefold commitment, an idea precisely defined in the "Directives," whose very preamble states: "The ideological-political identity of the PAX Association and the socially progressive movement of secular Catholics that it has organized is defined by Polish patriotism, Christian world outlook and the idea of socialism. The PAX has been faithful throughout its history to these sources and basic directions of its threefold commitment...."

"This idea also derives from love of the fatherland, which we tried to implement in accordance with the hierarchy of values in the plane of universal human ideals as well as in accordance with the universal values derivable from the idea of social justice on which socialism is based, as declared in 'General World-Outlook Principles,' a document that was conceived in July 1945. We attempt to introduce into the political culture of Poles principles of a realism that commands correlating common national goals with the resources available for accomplishing them at a given historical stage. We have expressed these ideas in the principles of the 'Polish School of Patriotic Thinking'...

"In promoting the values contained in the Polish historical identity, we desired to inscribe them permanently into the process of the socialist transformations occurring in People's Poland. We have expressed this in constructing a new program for national education that takes into account the continuity of the effort of generations and the pluralist nature of the Polish culture with its underlying Christian tradition, Christian ethical principles and patriotic role of the Church. We have always viewed the Church's pastoral activities and Apostolic mission as a task that must be implemented regardless of the system of society. We attempt to serve the creative presence of the Church's mission under socialism and the related need to create a Polish formation of intensified Catholicism. This is demonstrated by the accomplishments of the PAX's Publishing Institute as well as by the quotidian work of the PAX press and all the organizational elements of our movement...

"...Seen from the vantage point of the years past, it should be observed that we were not able to exploit all the opportunities for expanding our commitment and activities. Our movement operates on the national scale, but it still is chiefly based on cadre personnel and disposes of a significant but essentially modest organizational base. This also determines our tasks for the future...

"A consequence of the program and activities of the PAX as summarized briefly here is the desire to exert a palpable influence on the evolution of the processes decisive to the development prospects of People's Poland, of the socialist Polish state. We have never concealed this, and Boleslaw Piasecki had mentioned these aspirations very explicitly in his speech--unfortunately, his last speech--at the October 1978 meeting of the Board of the PAX Association

('Our Orientation'), a speech which we consider his ideological-political testament. Our position on this question is also spelled out in the 'Directives.' Let us recall the last point, Point 121, of that document: 'The PAX as an ideological-political organization considers itself to be a reliable multigenerational and national representative of those believers-citizens of People's Poland who share the ideological-political theses of the PAX's Directives. We thus aspire to make of our movement a genuine road toward political advancement for individuals with this civic attitude. The growth of the influence of this civic attitude on the solution of national and state problems is a major factor in achieving Poland's development prospects. This also ensues from the fundamental thesis, namely, pluralism of world outlook, whose implementation we regard as our historical task ...'

"Our anniversary year should be a year of expanded reflection and internal dialogue. This dialogue should deal both with the historical experience of the PAX and the discussion and self-identification of our cadre on the basis of the 'Ideological-Political Directives of the PAX Association,' and with the attempts at a joint formulation of the answer to the question of which needs of the Polish society should be met by our movement at present and in the future. This question concerns the prospects for our duties and the services we can render to the nation and state at a particular time and place and hence also the prospects for the further advancement of the PAX as measured by the yardstick of its suitability and ability to accomplish the purposes inherent in the idea of the threefold commitment and the vision of pluralist world outlook ..."

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IMPLEMENTATION OF NINTH CONGRESS LINE IN PRZEMYSL

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 10, Oct 84 pp 55-66

[Article by Zenon Czech: "What Place Are We In?"]

[Text] An attempt to determine the place of the Przemysl Province party organization as regards implementing the line of the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress logically necessitates a critical and objective view of the entire period of more than 3 years separating us since the 4th Province PZPR Reports-Elections Conference.

This period should be considered from two different standpoints. For on the one hand it was a period of organizational efforts by the party, in principle ensuing from ideological and intraparty fluctuations and external (ideological and public) pressures, while on the other it was a period of ideological measures based on organizational work which was intended to and indeed did strengthen the effectiveness of our party.

On viewing the situation nowadays from the vantage point of the 9 years of existence of the province [as an administrative unit], it is readily perceived that the initial period of its formation concided with the commencement of the economy's collapse on a national scale, the growth of Poland's foreign indebtedness and the adoption of improper proportions of the distribution of national income. At the same time, the establishment of the province released among its inhabitants qualitatively new social and economic aspirations, which were besides justified by the longtime neglect and developmental backwardness of this territory. The great difficulties in meeting these expectations in the presence of growing economic problems manifested themselves quite rapidly. Many just and socially justified assumptions could not be translated into reality.

In such a situation a mood of public discontent gradually grew and the confidence in the province authorities as well as in the leadership teams declined in certain cities and gminas [parishes]. This atmosphere was additionally exacerbated by the steady deterioration of the supply of consumer goods on the internal market. In addition there was the growing feeling of social unfairness and injustice due to the rise of unfavorable socioeconomic

disparities that unfortunately resulted from the policies of the coeval leadership of the party and the government. The distance between the poles of wealth and poverty grew increasingly larger, both in town and in country.

The surge of social discontent made itself manifest in the campaign preceding the 8th Party Congress. Even so, hope for a better future still did exist at that time, the more so considering that the impression was that the congress did consider the feelings of the broad party masses and the adopted program was in principle accepted by the people.

The reality turned out to be different, though. The official explanations of trends and facts began to glaringly contradict the quotidian reality. This further intensified the unfavorable influence on the attitudes and behavior of individuals as well as on the style of party work.

In effect, what was postulated by party organizations and plant workforces, and what should have been deepened and undertaken by the party, was exploited in the fall of 1980 by the enemies of socialism. Under the slogans of repairing the health of the Republic, they were going to settle the hash of the party, of the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, of all that is socialist, of the entirety of accomplishments of People's Poland.

At the time when the previous term of office started within the party, in mid-1981, the danger to socialism, the party and the people's state mushroomed. To the public and the party in Przemyśl Province, too, that was an unusually difficult period, abounding in social conflicts and dramatic events. Although ours was not one of the principal regions of militancy of the political opposition, our province too was the site of the--terrible as it was--wave of strikes and various kinds of social tensions, symptoms of the collapse of social discipline and of basic principles of law and order, etc.

The situation was in a sense also complicated by the fact that as many as three power centers of Solidarity were located on the province's territory: the MKR [Interfactory Worker Committee] of the Southeastern Region, with its seat in Przemyśl, the MKZ [Interfactory Founding Committee] in Jarosław and the MKZ in Przeworsk, which organizationally gravitated toward the MKR in Rzeszów. A substantial role in heating up the public atmosphere, above all in the rural communities, was played by a considerable party of the clergy under the strong pressure of certain of its superiors.

Proceeding from the premise that the protest of the working class on the Coast in 1980 was a justified demonstration against distortions in our sociopolitical and economic life, and drawing conclusions from the past, we placed special emphasis on measures promoting the recovery of public trust in our party.

Our first priority was to develop various forms of political and ideological-upbringing work and streamline the operating mechanisms of party echelons and organizations, with the object of achieving the consolidation of our own ranks and ideological-political unity. This was necessary in order to regain its previous role in the society. In this place some reflections arise. Having been accustomed for many years to operating under stable conditions and in the

presence of public tranquility, we failed--in spite of more precisely defined goals and methods of action--to immediately face up to the crossfire of the acute political struggle. This applies not only to rank-and-file party members but also to the party aktiv and apparat.

The electoral campaign on the eve of the 9th Congress shed a pitiless light on all the deficiencies of the province party organization. Many plant and rural POPs [basic party organizations] toned down their activities under the influence of events, and there occurred an explicit differentiation of attitudes and blurring of explicit criteria of party-mindedness. Instances of local parochialism, often lacking any social justifications, even took place. This may be exemplified by the city conference in Przeworsk, which adopted a resolution in favor of detaching the territory of the former Przeworsk Powiat [county] from Przemyśl Province and attaching it to Rzeszów Province. A reflection of the violation of principles of democratic centralism, of a uniquely conceived democracy, was the disregard of the decisions on the selection of delegates to the 9th Congress; such instances were recorded at the conferences in Przeworsk and Jarosław, where local delegates to the Congress were elected directly. Following the 9th Central Committee Plenum, these resolutions were voided.

Profound changes took place in the numerical size and socio-occupational composition of party members and candidate members. During the period between August 1980 and the end of May 1981 a total of 2,497 persons were deleted and expelled from the membership of the province party organizations; of this total, workers and peasants accounted for 66 percent. Those leaving the party after August 1980 included chiefly young people--449 up to 29 years of age and 780 of 30 to 39 years of age.

The extremely high proportion of the young among the departing members is bound to prompt reflections on the effectiveness of the ideological-political work implemented within the party organizations in the 1970s. To be sure, many of them indeed did not withstand the pressure exerted by the political enemy, if not the moral terror. But I consider the principal cause of their departures to be the improper forms and methods of ideological-upbringing work, schematism in propagating Marxist-Leninist ideology and, above all, the growing discrepancy between the proclaimed principles of socialism and the actual life of the society. All this resulted in a refusal to accept the entire system of training. Likewise, forms of mass propaganda and visual aids were not assimilated. As a consequence, the possibilities for reaching the young generation within the party in particular diminished.

The surrenders of party cards were an elemental and onesided process which grew during periods of particular social tensions.

A major element of the campaign prior to the 9th Congress was the replacement of a large proportion of first secretaries and other executive-board members. Forty-two percent of the comrades then elected to party authorities began to fill these offices for the first time. Such an extensive rotation of members of the executive organs of the party organizations and echelons was viewed as an important safeguard for depriving the executive organs and the comrades

belonging to them of the possibility of making mistakes and tolerating anew distortions in the operating practice of the PZPR, by placing them under the control of the "party grassroots." On the other hand, however, many of these newly elected comrades were insufficiently familiar with the foundations of the theory of Marxism-Leninism and lacked thorough knowledge of the party and its operating system.

Such extensive personnel changes were viewed by the enemies as an opportunity for a fundamental weakening of the party. They were mistaken in this case as well. Time showed that a definite majority of the newly elected aktiv became toughened in the political struggle and did not let itself be crushed. Not only has it endured until the end of its term of office, but most of these comrades were again entrusted with the same functions in 1983.

Although the electoral campaign revealed many deficiencies in the work of the POPs [basic party organizations] and party echelons, the report of the province committee to the PZPR province conference contained the following passage: "The electoral campaign, while revealing many deficiencies and shortcomings, has revived markedly the life of the province party organization. It has enabled a large number of party organizations to emerge from paralysis, and it has restored to a substantial number of comrades faith in the justice and effectiveness of action."

It may be that this statement had been at the time too optimistic.

As outlined by the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress, the program for socialist renewal provided the conditions for the party's rebirth and the recovery of its leading role in the system of socialist democracy. The course of the deliberations and the resolutions of the congress met the expectations of the comrades as a whole as well as of a large part of the society.

The sociopolitical situation following the congress resulted, however, in that not all of the contributions made by the congress were fully utilized. The new basic documents voted by the Congress, namely, the program and the Statute, while fully accepted by party members, had not as yet become in the second half of 1982 known throughout the society.

At the time, we failed to rally a majority of the citizenry around these documents. The attacks of the political enemy against the party and its program, and the absence of satisfactory progress in stabilizing the economy, still continued to prevent it from effectively solving urgent political and economic problems.

This was confirmed in the report of the province-committee executive board at its plenary session in September 1981. This report stated: "It is an unacceptable situation when, 2 months after the congress, it is not being mentioned by the society or even within the party itself, when its resolutions, worked out by the entire party and universally accepted, have to wait too long to be implemented by party echelons and organizations."

Yet the party remained alive and the basic and branch party organizations remained active despite the marked decline in their membership and the extensive ideological loosening within the party ranks. The efforts undertaken were mostly in a vacuum. We strived for the [national] accord based on the socialist renewal stated in the decisions of the 9th Congress. But our proposals were being rejected. We were subjected to successive accusations. We were reproached with the lack of a program and a vision of the future. At the same time, however, the other side had nothing constructive to propose other than continuing the spread of anarchy, ruining the economy and engaging in incitation and demagogery.

A major role in supporting the economic and political measures initiated by the party leadership was played by the military operating groups assigned to work establishments, cities and gminas. They contributed to eliminating many vexatious and negative phenomena. Their participation in inspections and evaluations also was important. The undertakings of the military representatives obviously could not, however, solve all the problems.

Given the worsening situation in this country, an important moment occurred following the 4th Plenum of the Central Committee. Strengthened by its decisions, the party yet again affirmed its desire for a national accord, while at the same time warning the enemies of socialism that their aspirations to overthrow socialism in Poland are doomed to fail. As we recall, the 4th and 5th plenums of the Central Committee recommended to the state authorities resorting to extraordinary measures in the event of peril to the existence of the state. The events of November and early December 1981 demonstrated that the opportunity for national accord was trampled by the extremists of Solidarity.

Resorting to extraordinary measures became the sole rational way out of the situation, consonant with the Polish *raison d'etat*. This, too, was how a majority of the population of Przemysl Province had responded to this decision.

The December decision found the province party organization in a weakened condition. However, its aktiv was ready for intensive and consistent action under the new circumstances. This was of fundamental influence on the slow but systematic recovery of initiative by the province party organizations.

On 28 January 1982 the first session of the province party committee during the martial-law era was held. At that session the state of the organization's membership, its ideological-political condition and the effectiveness of its performance so far were thoroughly analyzed. At the same time, on the basis of this assessment, the plenum outlined the political and organizational measures that should be taken in the immediate future by all party elements in the province.

These tasks were formulated in two principal planes. First, this concerned an exact determination of what should be done in order that the party organizations in work establishments and the countryside would regain full efficiency of action as well as their ideological and organizational unity,

and that the society would regain its faith and trust in the party. Secondly, this concerned determining directions of political work with the society that would be relevant to current conditions and designed principally to eliminate rapidly the conflicts and divisions existing within the society and rally the population and the workforces round the solution, through common effort, of the principal economic and social problems of the communities concerned.

These tasks were neither simple nor easy. Although the martial law put an end to the propaganda pressure and other forms of destruction exercised by Solidarity, many party elements still had not been able to bestir themselves and commence a resolute political offensive. The total negation, practiced throughout 1981, of everything proposed by the party caused many comrades to lose faith in the effectiveness of their own personal as well as collective action. Once again, the weakness of intraparty work in the 1970s, particularly as regards ideological education, made itself felt.

To assure the implementation of the plenum's decisions, many organizational and propaganda measures were taken. Among other things, a numerous and experienced aktiv devoted to the cause of the party was grouped within party committees, and it assumed responsible political tasks and cooperated with the representatives of the People's Polish Army and the forces of order and security. A rapid and, insofar as possible, extensive and continuing flow of information to all local party echelons and organizations was assured. The members of the leadership, staff and aktiv of the province party committee maintained regular and direct contact with the POPs and OOPs [branch party organizations]. To this end, the structure and forms of work of the party apparat staff were altered. A major role in coordinating the work of basic-level committees was played by the ROPPs [regional party work centers]. On the initiative of the executive board of the province committee, many indispensable personnel changes were carried out in state and economic administrative posts as well as in the posts of first secretaries of plant party committees, POPs and OOPs.

Of major importance to consolidating our ranks were the resolutions of the 7th Central Committee Plenum. They provided a new impetus for action, particularly to party organizations. A new stage of changes in the status and composition of the province PZPR organization took place. In most party elements, through various measures, particularly through personal talks (comprising 2,267 party members and candidate members), the attitude and behavior of individual comrades were vetted. These talks became an energizing factor and a reflection of the party's concern for the purity of its ranks.

In accordance with the resolution of the 7th Central Committee Plenum, ideologically alien persons who violated statutory norms and did not subordinate themselves to the rigors of the martial law were eliminated from the party.

I am not exaggerating when I say that the reports campaign conducted in the late 1982 and early 1983, during which we assessed thoroughly the extent of the implementation of tasks in every domain, represented a turnabout leading to the revival of party work everywhere. In the course of that campaign the program of action for the second half of the term of office of the party's

executive organs also was determined. That successive stage also was marked by the initiation and implementation of tasks relating chiefly to surmounting the political and economic crisis.. In this connection, the onus of implementing these tasks rested on the POPs. A prerequisite for this was the full and authentic inclusion of these basic party organizations in the solution of the day-by-day problems and cares of the workforces and discrete communities. The process of decline in the membership of the province party organization was halted.

On evaluating our activities during the martial-law era, it can be stated that, while the province party organization could not completely cope with many of its own internal problems, it has generally succeeded in maintaining its identity and recovering its proper place in public and economic life. Despite its intense efforts, the political opposition proved unable to discredit the undertakings of the reviving party elements in work establishments and in the countryside, and neither was it able to weaken their activism. Similarly, the attempts made to disturb public order on 31 August 1982 in Przemyśl, demonstrated that the population of Przemyśl Province, and primarily the working class, is in favor of public tranquility and against anarchy and lawlessness.

The basic party organizations became increasingly effective in resolving many quotidian problems of workforces and work establishments, and they joined in materializing the economic reform. The postulates offered during the pre-congress campaign were translated into reality. And this is as it should be, because our motto is that the party should be as close as possible to human problems, that these problems should always lie in the center of attention of the party collectives.

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At the 5th Province PZPR Reports-Elections Conference we summed up one of the most difficult periods in the work of the Przemyśl Province party organization, but probably also one of its most fruitful periods. The then elapsing term of office was a major test to the party ranks, a test of the effectiveness of our activities. The party elements and their aktiv became toughened in the struggle for a Marxist-Leninist countenance of the party, for the defense of socialism and the state. As we stated at that conference, an overwhelming majority of the members of the province party organization has successfully passed this historic test.

The common denominator of our struggle was and invariably remains the line, formulated by the 9th Extraordinary Party Congress, of struggle and [national] accord. This is a struggle for our own party, for its Marxist-Leninist ideological countenance, vanguard nature and recognition by the people. The struggle for socialism means acting in behalf of justice and in the interest of the working class, but it also means rebuffing anyone who attempts to menace the interests of the laboring people, sow unrest and strike at the foundations of law and order in our socialist state.

The reports-elections campaign enriched the province party organization with more complete assessments and innovative ideas. This campaign differed from its predecessor of 2 years previously. At that time we had struggled for the very existence of the party, whereas now we are struggling for a better quality and greater efficiency of our performance.

Do the effects achieved so far provide grounds for satisfaction? I think so. Major proofs of this may include the favorable trends and occurrences with respect to the growing mobility of the party ranks and the increasing requirements posed to individual comrades.

The numerical decrease in the membership of the province party organization should not be equated with a decline in its strength. Our province organization has retained its mass nature and at present numbers 18,500 members and candidate members (during the years 1981-1983 5,500 persons were deleted and expelled from the party; of these, the largest proportion, 43 percent, consisted of those who surrendered party cards at their own request), grouped within 1,002 basic and branch party organizations. They are, in principle, present in every basic socio-occupational community of the region, so that the POPs can set the tone of political work and exercise their leading role there. Clearly, if that is to be so, presence in the numerical, formal sense alone is not enough. The constant activism and tenacity and consistency of their action must be assured. This is how we viewed the matter during the past term of office, and this was the direction we actively pursued following the 7th and 13th Central Committee plenums; we repeatedly considered these issues at plenary sessions of the province party committee.

Party organizations are increasingly making felt through tangible work their presence in the various communities. The doors of party committees and POP secretaries are open to any seeker for help, regardless of whether the help he needs concerns on-the-job, social or personal problems. The party aktiv and functionaries do not avoid meetings and discussions with workers, farmers and intelligentsia groups, and often it is they themselves who organize and inspire them. The system for collecting and attending to the proposals, postulates and complaints received by party and non-party members has been expanded to an unprecedented extent. Salaried party workers, too, mostly new ones who often lack much experience, have been able to cope with their tasks. They contributed many new initiatives and have been continually streamlining their organization of the public aktiv for political activities. These are major positive factors which provide a good foundation for effectively implementing the tasks ensuing from the program of action for the next few years.

The basic force in the party and the country should be the workers. That is why we are perturbed by the fact that the proportion of blue-collar workers has declined within our province party organization too. They now number 6,300 or 34 percent of the total membership of the party in this province. Our basic aim and the direction of future work is to win over to the party masses of representatives of the Przemysl working class. A no less important question is the proper representation of workers within the party authorities. Unfortunately, during the recent campaign too few blue-collar workers have

become members of the elective party bodies. This also applies to the election of delegates. We are particularly perturbed by the situation in the city party organizations in Przemyśl and Jarosław, cities where, after all, the working class is the strongest and most numerous.

The just slogan of the 13th Central Committee Plenum that our party needs greater class-mindedness and class consciousness will remain a mere slogan unless we assure a proper place in the party's entire structure for authentic representatives of the working class. The conclusion for the future is that the need to assure a broad representation of workers should be considered farther in advance. It simply is necessary to work better with the worker and peasant aktiv--to form that aktiv.

Another priority task is the further internal strengthening of the party elements. We are resolutely in favor of increasing the personal requirements posed to party card-holders, because it is not only their number but also and principally their personal attitudes to the PZPR's policies and programs, as well as their day-by-day party-mindedness, that determine the authority enjoyed by particular party echelons and organizations. That is why to us the development of the PZPR means a steady increase in its membership based on winning over the best people. During the past term of office the party admitted 208 new comrades, of whom one-half were blue-collar workers. This is a good symptom, though still not filling the need. In this respect the point is not that the size of membership should be increased at a forced pace but that the party's forces be strengthened in the communities in which, for political and class reasons, they should be suitably large.

An unfavorable phenomenon, which could not be eliminated in the past few months, has been the stagnation in the development of small POPs operating in the communities where the needs for strengthening the party are the greatest. In this province, and chiefly in the countryside, about 70 percent of all POPs have a membership of not more than 15 persons each. Their influence on the communities they operate in is still relatively weak. We desire to utilize fully for political work within these communities the party members and candidate members who reside in them but belong to outside party organizations.

The acuteness of the struggle for the party has revealed the entire scale of the negligences in ideological work. Hence, the province committee has focused its attention on aspects of political-ideological and economic education. In this field, intensified measures were taken to promote the complete introduction of a training system that comprises mass training within the POPs, the training of candidate members and junior members of the PZPR, and community training. The system of recruitment for the WUML [Evening University of Marxism-Leninism] was expanded, and this recruitment itself was carried out among the community party and worker aktivi as well as among the managerial cadre of work establishments and institutions and also among the members of public organizations. For example, during the 1982/1983 academic year a total of 274 students had attended six branches of the WUML whereas now the total enrollment at seven branches is 403. To implement the program tasks, the cadre of lecturers was vetted and new instructors were additionally

hired--chiefly young party activists. The new Chair of Methodology and Propaganda became operational; it trains lecturers specializing in these problems.

The ideological work within the province party organization was markedly stimulated by the resolutions of the 7th Central Committee Plenum. As part of the implementation of these resolutions, the POPs and OOPs broadly discussed at their training meetings the Leninist norms of party life, the principles of socialist democracy and the economic program of the 9th Congress. An important event in party life was the party-wide discussion on the draft ideological-program declaration of the PZPR, "What Are We Struggling For and Where Are We Going." Discussions lasting more than 3 months took place in every party organization, often with the participation of non-party members. These discussions enabled party members to assimilate more readily the basic assumptions of the PZPR program.

It is difficult, though, to question the assessment, confirmed by the reports-elections campaign, that while the province party organization has undoubtedly seized the political initiative, this is not being accompanied by fully satisfactory progress as regards ideological-upbringing work. There still are too many lacunae in that field to satisfy us. Hence also, we want to augment as rapidly and extensively as possible what we already have accomplished and rebuilt.

We consider our most important task to be expanding the scope of ideological work with the public and increasing its effectiveness in all the elements of the ideological front, and assuring a cohesive nature of that work as well. We anticipate specific measures in connection with the province-committee plenum devoted to these issues. We are enlisting the assistance of a growing number of aktiv teams in conducting the complex whole of the measures promoting the organization of ideological, intraparty and public activities. This is needful at every level of our activity--from party groups and POPs to the province committee of the PZPR.

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The basic element of the bond between the party and the working class is the trade unions. The reality in our province is such that nowadays trade-union organizations are gaining in membership, starting to operate energetically and winning the growing recognition of the workforces in the plants and occupational communities in which the party aktiv demonstrates a proper commitment. At present 252 trade-union organizations are registered on the area of this province, and their overall membership is more than 39,000, which is 48 percent of the total employment in the province. In some occupations or professions the proportion of trade-union members is very high, for example, 66 percent of the total employment in education, 70 percent in culture and as much as 70 or even 100 percent of the workforces at, e.g., the Construction Machinery Plant in Lubaczow, the Przemysl Furniture Works, and the Makowisko State Farm. The political leadership and plant managers as well as the local authorities are creating a favorable climate for the work of trade unions, acknowledging the need for close contacts on a partner basis. The trade

unions are becoming genuine spokesmen for worker interests and authentic partners of the political-economic management of plants and institutions.

Of special importance to the party is the struggle for youth, for its convictions, way of thinking and active participation and presence in economic, social and political life. This is also of tremendous importance to the rising generation itself. We have considered the problems of refining and developing the activities of the party and the entire upbringing front among youth in our province at the plenary session of the province party committee on 16 May of this year, which was devoted to the topic, "For Greater Effectiveness of the Work on Upbringing Youth, and for an Active Participation of Youth in the Solution of Socioeconomic Problems." For we believe that only properly conducted ideological upbringing work can become a stimulus releasing the activism of youth, which as a consequence will assure its broad participation in the solution of problems at workplaces and places of residence. We desire that the young themselves perceive their place and role in building the socialist reality and achieving their personal aspirations. They must be assisted in this by party organizations and echelons.

It is impossible to overlook economic problems, which also have political and ideological aspects. The performance of the economy in 1983 has been positively assessed. Special emphasis is deserved by the strengthening of the growth trends in the sphere of material production. All of the province's industrial enterprises have exceeded their plans on a scale greater than the nationwide average, and the volume of sales of their output increased by 14.1 percent compared with 1982. In addition, favorable changes in the structure of production have been recorded, as reflected in, among other things, the 29-percent rise in the output of consumer goods and 33-percent rise in production for export. The good results are principally due to the economic reform, to the liberation of initiative and efficiency of performance. Party organizations and echelons accomplished extensive political-organizational work promoting the practical application of the reformed operating principles of the economy. The POPs provided practical support for the activities of the plant teams for reforms and teams for price and cost analysis. Considerable effort was invested in drafting conservation and anti-inflation programs at work establishments. We are aware that the economic situation in this country, and in our province as well, continues to be complicated. Hence also party organizations were obligated to initiate and support projects promoting the growth of autonomy and initiative in and exploration of possibilities for expanding production by exploiting latent potential and streamlining operations, and at the same time to brand any distortion of the reform as well as insular thinking confined to narrowly conceived interests of the enterprises themselves.

An extremely vexatious social problem is housing construction. In our province the program for expanding this construction is a good and realistic one. The Province Reports-Elections Conference has taken the following position on this matter: "The housing construction program is to be consistently implemented by those to whom it is addressed, namely, the housing cooperatives, the construction enterprises and the state and economic administration. But it is the province of the party echelons and organizations to assure that keys to

new apartments be received by those who need them most, those who live in damp cellars, in attics, and sometimes even in shacks that offend human dignity. Thus it is not only one's place in the queue but also and above all the feeling of social justice that matters most when housing allocations are to be decided upon." The province party organization also raised the issue of providing housing to persons dwelling in cellars, as well as initiating the construction of low-cost housing through the efforts of the party cadre. It is by such concrete deeds meeting human needs that credibility and trust in the party are best regained.

The party's interest in aspects of the development of the countryside and agriculture ensues from both the needs of the national economy and the agro-industrial nature of this province. The province conference has positively assessed the progress made in this field. For crop output was markedly increased and, as a result, the trends toward a decline in the livestock population could be reversed. The performance of state farms and agricultural producer cooperatives--the socialist sector, which we will continue to develop and strengthen--has markedly improved. But there also are domains of agriculture in which no progress has been registered so far. This concerns, among other things, the agrarian structure, land conservation, maintenance of facilities and the regression in the work to enlarge land parcels. We find that the storage and processing of crops are much too inefficient owing to shortages of the needed facilities. This applies in particular to milk processing. These are problems to which the province party organization will consistently devote its attention during its current term of office. The principal measures are specified in the program drafted by the joint plenum of the PZPR Province Committee and the ZSL [United Peasant Party] Province Committee in March 1982 and implemented last year.

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The 3 years of work of the province party organization on implementing the tasks of consolidating and strengthening its ranks, strengthening socialist democracy, tightening the bonds with the working people, and stabilizing socioeconomic life have resulted in considerable accomplishments. These accomplishments should not be questioned by any one (except convinced enemies) who thinks soberly and is aware of the realities of the years 1981-1983. Not one of the revivifying impulses provided by the 9th Congress and the June 1981 province conference has failed to produce a positive resonance. However, the effects of party work differ in different domains and fields. For--and this is not being glossed over at all--the grounds for satisfaction are not the same everywhere, and it is not everywhere that the results of activity fully meet the expectations of the public.

The resolution adopted on 11 January 1984 by the 5th Province Reports-Elections Conference of the PZPR constitutes the determinant for further action in both the ideological-political and the socioeconomic spheres. We desire to achieve the goals that are the most urgent, realistic and most important from the standpoint of the working people and population of our province. This can be done only if all the echelons, organizations, aktiv and members of the party display full commitment. We have propagated the texts of

our resolutions among all the communities. It is the affair of the province committee and province control organs to watch over the consistent and tenacious materialization and implementation of the planks of the party program.

The delegates to the 5th Province Conference addressed an appeal to all working people of the province for magnified effort and commitment to implementing the program tasks, particularly those relating to the sphere of socioeconomic life.

The National Conference of PZPR Delegates outlined to the party new tasks to promote the further normalization and stabilization of life. Duties of this kind also face the members of the Przemyśl Province party organization. These duties have been defined in detail at the province committee session on 25 April of this year. Their consistent implementation will be decisive to the full materialization of the decisions of the 9th Extraordinary Congress. The awareness of this evident truth among the members and candidate members of the PZPR in Przemyśl Province is becoming increasingly widespread. They demonstrate this by their day-by-day work and attitude.

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CSO: 2600/266

PROVINCIAL DEFENSE COMMITTEE MEETINGS

Jelenia Gora, Zamosc

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 22 Nov 84 p 5

[Text] Jelenia Gora

A meeting of the WKO [Provincial Defense Committee] took place in Jelenia Gora. The activity of the local agencies of state administration at the basic level in relation to persons absent from work in the present year was analyzed. As a result of joint actions undertaken with the Citizens' Militia and regional procurators, the number of persons without a permanent job was reduced in Jelenia Gora Province. Persons who persist in being absent from work, however, still remain a serious problem. The committee postulated that these absentees be more frequently directed to work for public purposes.

The WKO also examined tasks connected with recruiting for professional military training and instituting normative acts on civil defense.

Zamosc

On 21 November, the WKO in Zamosc completed an evaluation of the cadre, socio-political, and economic situation in the Zamosc Meat Plants. It was stated that although work discipline has improved in the present year, the rather large cadre fluctuation and high illness absenteeism is cause for worry. Nonetheless, the plants are successfully implementing this year's tasks, as is seen in the completion of 83.8 percent of the annual plan in the course of 9 months.

Slupsk Province

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 9 Nov 84 p 5

[Text] At the 8 November meeting of the WKO in Slupsk, the committee evaluated the functioning of economic units in the past 10 months; particular attention was paid to economic relations and to implementing conservation and anti-inflationary programs in individual factories and enterprises. The situation in this area has undergone considerable improvement lately. The economic activity of work in plants has been stabilized, among other ways, by improving the dynamics of growth in industrial production--by about 7.9 percent--in

comparison to a similar period last year. Industry and construction indicate an increase in work productivity and a better utilization of raw materials and goods. The share of exports to both payments areas is growing, and thus the so-called index of manufacturers' profitability is also more favorable. Among unfavorable phenomena, the committee cited insufficient utilization of work time and the difficulties with the quality of production in some plants.

Krakow, Skierniewice

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 21 Nov 84 p 2

[Text] The Provincial Defense Committees met on 19 November. The WKO in Krakow examined problems of employment and work discipline in the enterprises of the province. The analyses made up to now show that the utilization of nominal work time in the economy and work discipline are improving, but these changes are not proceeding at a sufficient rate of speed.

On 20 November the Provincial Defense Committee in Skierniewice evaluated the state of road, bridge, and rail track maintenance during winter. It was stated that the state of the preparations is adequate.

Bydgoszcz, Ostroleka

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 3-4 Nov 84 p 2

[Text] The Provincial Defense Committee meeting in Bydgoszcz was dedicated to analyzing the sociopolitical situation in the region and the functioning of the Civil Defense in enterprises, which was subordinated to the local organs of state administration as a result of the economic reforms.

In Ostroleka the Provincial Defense Committee evaluated the preparation of the region for winter, mainly transportation and road services and the complex of generating stations. The actions designed to ensure uninterrupted and safe work in the plants during the peak of autumn and winter were given a favorable evaluation.

Bydgoszcz Province

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 13 Sep 84 p 3

[Text] The regularly scheduled Provincial Defense Committee meeting, which took place on 12 November in Bydgoszcz, was dedicated to evaluating the state of public safety. National Defense Vice Minister and Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Army Div Gen Jozef Uzycki and Pomeranian District Commander Div Gen Zbigniew Blechman participated in the sessions.

The WKO stated that in the recent period there have not been any attempts to disturb public order in the Bydgoszcz locale. The amnesty act of 21 July 1984 also met with public acceptance, although misgivings were expressed among the population at the increase in delinquency resulting from the remission of punishment of those guilty of petty crimes. These apprehensions are justified,

since a 30 percent increase especially in the theft of personal property--mainly in apartments, automobiles, and farming plots--was noted in the past year. At the same time, however, there was a considerable increase in detecting the perpetrators of these crimes--it reached 83 percent in the last 8 months.

Div Gen Jozef Uzycki also presented the problems of the present sociopolitical situation of the nation and of its external circumstances resulting from an increase in the imperialists' antisocialist and anti-Polish actions.

9451

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CONTROL OF 'NOMENKLATURA' IN DEMOCRATIC CENTRALISM STRESSED

Warsaw NOWE DROGI in Polish No 9, Sep 84 pp 38-51

[Article by Edward Erazmus: "The Class Content of the Cadre Policy"]

[Text] Cadre policy occupies an important place in the general theory and practice of socialism-building as well as in the mechanism of the adoption and implementation of political decisions by the party. In this context, we can state that, being broadly conceived as the party's total control over the grooming, selection, deployment, advanced grooming and recall of the cadre, and particularly of the executive personnel in the government and the political system, cadre policy is a component part of the party's theory and its principles of action. Since the party exercises the leading role in the society and the state, when it determines the aims, forms and methods of socialism-building, it must link them closely to the individuals implementing these tasks. It is thus a legitimate thesis that cadre policy is closely linked to the requirements of socialism-building at a given stage in the country's development. The party's cadre policy also stems from the assumption that, in order to maintain its power and accomplish its program, the party must be interested in all the principal leading posts in the state and the social organizations. This interest should manifest itself in both the theory and the practice of the party. Of course, the main assumptions and directions of cadre policy stem from the ideological principles of the Marxist-Leninist party, and primarily from democratic centralism. Hence, cadre policy cannot be isolated from democratic centralism. It cannot be isolated either from the premise that the efficient and correct steering of social processes and political institutions, including the state, hinges on the party members who hold elective or appointed posts in seats of power. On them depend the effectiveness and modes of implementation of the party's general policy. This fact is a major factor in broad public opinion.

Cadre policy determines the level of the confidence of the citizens in the people's rule. It affects their confidence, because it is materialized in collegial forms, within the framework of a hierarchic structure with allowance for all the democratic and centralist norms, inclusive of the procedure for making recommendations and the democratic procedure for identifying,

selecting, appointing and recalling executives as well as for their basic and advanced training.

Cadre policy is not an attribute of the Marxist-Leninist party alone. This aspect was pointed out by V. I. Lenin when he stated that "no class in history became a ruling class unless it gave birth to its own political leaders, its own representatives capable of organizing and directing the movement" (V. I. Lenin, "The Next Tasks of Our Movement," in: "Works," Vol 4, Warsaw, 1957, p 391). On the other hand, personnel changes, particularly at the highest levels of party and state structure, were and are a topic of interest to party members and public opinion in all the socialist countries. When the party exercises power, such changes as a rule determine the pace of socialism-building. It is these changes that modify policies and sometimes cause a radical turnabout in political programs and, above all, in the forms, methods and means of the exercise of power.

In the social reality three tendencies can and usually do emerge: the centralist tendency, the democratic-syndicalist tendency and the tendency consonant with democratic centralism. The first tendency manifests itself in the reservations and fears that non-party members, and by the same token supposedly unreliable individuals--unreliable, because they are, on the one hand, not amenable to control by party echelons and, on the other, they are susceptible to destructive, disloyal behavior--might penetrate the state administration and the social organizations. In practice, official posts are reserved not so much for party members in general as for individuals with amenable, "loyal" qualities, above all those who have proved themselves in their previous posts. Professional qualifications and efficiency are in this case relegated to a secondary plane. In this case also, these hand-picked executives are not expected to reflect the views of their voters or take a position on their behalf. In the recommending mechanism the principal functions are played by the executive elements of the party, as well as by the party apparat. These elements select the candidates and opine on, select and analyze the performance of the executive cadre. A narrowly interpreted democratic centralism--with respect to the cadre--displaces or relieves party organizations and party authorities from responsibility for the selection of the cadre and control of its performance. Such a situation is conducive to the rise of conditions promoting the alienation of the executive cadre and its orientation chiefly toward the structures situated within the supreme party echelons. This tendency also entails the right of the executive cadre to freely choose associates, not according to political tasks but often on the basis of other, secondary criteria, such as amenability, loyalty, a gift for flattery, etc.

The consequences of such a situation are often of a systemic nature. They may cause party members and the society to feel mistrust toward the leadership owing to its secret rules for cadre selection. This also may result in strengthening the factors promoting the alienation of executive personnel from the party and the system of party organizations. Party members appointed to executive positions do not feel bound by party decisions, and neither do they feel responsible toward their party organizations. In such a situation, the base for cadre recruitment within the party and the society will diminish.

The resultant asymmetry exposes the party to deformations in the system of cadre policy. The idea of leadership is supplanted by domination by groups and individuals, detrimental to materializing socialist goals. Instead of a collisionless continuation of the socialist direction of the country's development, an asymmetric system becomes consolidated, and it includes an incorrect mechanism for replacing executive teams that at the same time entails the game of "musical chairs" interpreted as the rotation of the same individuals among diverse executive positions. This is because the mechanism for replacing the executive teams is not an autonomous system; it is rather closely linked to the manner of appointing individuals to particular duties. The consequences are, of course, negative. They manifest themselves most glaringly when the executive teams at the level of the central and local authorities abandon the effort to organize societal life so as to utilize the most valuable elements of the party and the society, and when they focus on activities that attract the attention of appointed rather than elected organs and show no concern for obtaining the support of voters and party organizations. The figures at our disposal with regard to Poland provide the basis for formulating the working hypothesis that emphasis on the vertical structure had been increasing during the years 1948-1980. This structure was strengthened by the administrative redistricting of the country, particularly when appointing party and state authorities. As a result, the mechanism for replacing executive teams was used but once as part of the policy of "federating" the province party committees, departments of the Central committee, ministries and the economic administrators. The centralized decisionmaking system was penetrated by the elementally evolving decentralized system. In such a situation, democratic centralism ceased to play a decisive role and became an empty phrase rather than reality. The hierarchical structure of discrete elements of the system grew stronger. The flow of ideas and people was slow. As a result, advancement was achieved by the individuals who knew how to install themselves in the pyramid of dependence. This process was strengthened by fears of a supposed material downturn in the event of the loss of a particular position. These fears were not groundless in view of the differences in the wage system or in social prestige linked to the exercise of power. But this does not warrant the petrification of attitudes. The apparatus of power cannot be treated as a means of promoting personal gain.

These phenomena require answering two questions: how can the consequences of a centralist cadre policy be counteracted, and how can the attendant parochialism be prevented? The predominance of the centralist system engenders an unilaterally hierarchical system of dependences that results in inertia and the stagnation of party and state posts. The predominance of the federalized system engenders cronyism, cliques, etc. Then also the party voluntarily abandons the possibility of dialogue with democratically minded non-party professionals. These restraints weaken the party; they impel educated individuals, who are committed to building socialism, toward the position of neutral observers and subsequently critics.

If the centralist model of cadre selection is a permanent tendency, the individuals elected or appointed to leading positions invest no effort in

organizing societal life. They focus instead on activities that attract the attention of those who selected them.

The starting point for a cadre policy consonant with democratic socialism is, first, the assumption that the party, desiring to exercise its leading role, must decide on the executive cadre, and second, that the party must make sure that candidates should also emerge from within party organizations. These are two sides of the same coin. For otherwise there arises the danger of bureaucratism or an even more dangerous tendency: the domination of executive positions by forces hostile to socialism. Consequently, the strategic posts in the apparatus of state and in the economic, cultural and educational apparatus, and also in the social organizations, must be of concern to the party.

The centralist tendency has its own particular procedure for identifying, selecting and appointing candidates to the organs of power and administration. Above all, the initiative in this respect is within the competence of only the authorities at a certain level or superior authorities, although this does not preclude decisive influence by the auxiliary elements, i.e., by discrete departments of the party Central Committee or the province party committees. This tendency is dominated by the system of direct elections, and sometimes by the system of coopting individuals through other processes than elections. If the electoral route is followed, the principal role is played by the election commissions. They submit a list of candidates previously submitted to them by the resigning executive organs.

Under this centralist tendency, authorities and individuals are elected on the basis of unidirectional nominations. The act of election itself is rather of a formal nature. The executive organ recommends the candidate and expresses its approval of his participation in the authorities. The voters ratify an agreement concluded outside them. Thus while under a democratic procedure the candidates are nominated by a party meeting, under the centralist model these powers are taken over by the executive elements, always in the name of preserving continuity, as if party members, or party delegates gathered at a party conference, desired something else.

The voter has two alternatives: to vote for or against. The act of election is preceded by a nondemocratic selection of candidates. The resulting practice--which besides is not warranted by theory, not even by particular aspects of theory--may be that the candidates are culled and selected by the executive branch. The system of consultation is oriented more toward ratification than election. The political and moral consequences of such a model are negative. Above all, the mechanism of candidate identification remains in abeyance when party members, let alone [ordinary] citizens, have to approve candidates without feeling any personal convictions about them. Such a procedure is incomprehensible to party members. Under these circumstances, the conviction may arise that elections do not promote the emergence of best representatives among the party members as well as among the general public. When elections do happen at all, they exercise in the best case the function of replacing some individuals with others. Besides, in Poland in the 1970s such an electoral system in the party and state had been positively assessed in the literature. It was supposedly correct. For it did not provide for competition among

candidates. At the same time, it enabled and obligated the authorities to freely replace the executive cadre.

As a result, a poorly understood and even more poorly functioning electoral system made it impossible for the best qualified individuals to rise to executive positions at every level of authority in a natural manner and through the will of voters. Thus while some new blood did emerge during every election campaign, it did not reach the leadership. The individuals holding leadership posts arbitrarily determined their own suitability; that was a matter not open to discussion. If some individual was replaced after all, that was only owing to a decision of the supreme leadership team itself. The party congresses ratified such previously taken decisions. Such was the custom. Of course, the model outlined above did not operate in a pure form. It reached its final shape only after 1971. It was characterized by an undemocratic procedure as regards both the nomination of candidates and the electoral rules.

The opposite tendency, which takes into account the awakened aspirations of citizens, stresses above all professional qualifications. At the same time, it disregards the danger harbored in the anarcho-syndicalist and procapitalist forces present in the society, in their striving to gain bridgeheads in the structures of state and economic power. It also ignores the process of the transformation of the intra-party opposition into factions, and subsequently into counterrevolutionary attitudes. Under this tendency, the dominant view is that any qualified individual can exercise important state and social functions and at the same time guarantee activities consonant with the interests of the working people. The elected administrators can only represent the views of voters and take decisions authorized by voters and on behalf of voters. The views of the executive cadre are the views of voters.

The principal role in the mechanism of the emergence, and not just of the nomination, of the executive cadre is played by party members, basic party organizations (POPs) and the lowest elements of social organizations. Under this tendency, the POPs and OOPs (branch party organizations) assign, as it were, candidates for vacant positions or for the lists of candidates for, e.g., councilmen, deputies, etc. The basic party organizations thus strive to take over the handling of these matters from the plant directors, plant management or social organizations. The criteria for cadre selection are then different. For while under the centralist trend primary emphasis is placed on boundless devotion to the party, hatred of class enemies and political intuition, under the democratic trend of anarcho-syndicalist hue the highly valued qualities are education, organizational talent, ability to direct teamwork, high political morals and, above all, loyalty and attachment to social groups. This trend is supported by the philosophy of a nationally minded party desiring the moral and political unity of the nation at any price. The idea of the absence of conflict disaccustoms the party (members and POPs) from conducting discussions of the theory and practice of cadre selection in the context of ideological and political struggle. Isolating the cadre policy from the class struggle not only affects adversely the ideology-mindedness of the party apparatus but also promotes the abandonment of class criteria in cadre policy. In such a situation, attention is focused on

personal aspects in the party echelons and apparatus. The situation then is viewed not from the standpoint of the tasks, aims and principles that are to be implemented but from the standpoint of local, parochial interests and needs, as well as with allowance for deals and ability to manipulate people and party organizations. Sometimes the struggle for cadre becomes a kind of personal contest among representatives of different social milieux, and the attendant contradictions arise as a result of the behavior of discrete social and occupational groups within the local communities.

The above passages represent a tentative description of two negative tendencies: the centralist tendency and the democratic-anarcho-syndicalist tendency. Most generally speaking, while under the former tendency the executive elements of the party (party echelons and apparatus) take the initiative in staffing the state and economic machinery (and it is they above all that control personnel changes and the mechanism of advancement in rank), under the latter tendency this right is exclusively usurped by party organizations. For example, in Poland in 1981 attempts were made to exercise such powers within the framework of the so-called horizontal structures. This second tendency is linked to a different concept of the emergence of executive teams. In this case the principal source of executive teams and cadre is not the party activists at all levels but the POP members. It is precisely at the POP level that the procedure for identifying new cadre originates. Whoever lacks POP support has no chance to become a member of the party authorities. Proceeding from the just assumption that the cadre base should be expanded with qualified individuals who are not party members, the representatives of this other tendency deprived party activists already holding particular party or state offices of the right to hold additional offices. They envisaged a different electoral mechanism with a grassroots-based nomination of officeholders within the framework of self-organizing party and social groups.

Both tendencies disregard the dialectics of party development and cadre policy. Studies reveal that everything relating to the party and the cadre is governed by the dialectical laws of unity and the struggle of opposites. In social practice, sometimes there is an increase in the number of elements that unify and at the same time restrict the freedom of members, citizens, and executive teams, chiefly for the sake of strengthening the positions of chiefly the individuals devoted to the party, and sometimes it is the tendencies toward broadening the cadre base that may intensify, though never at the expense of the activists who proved themselves in the political struggle. Of course, strengthening the position of the so-called experts and pragmatists, or the so-called gray eminences adroit at acting behind the stage of the party authorities and against democratic centralism, is out of question. An inseparable trait of these contradictions is social conflicts and hence also conflicts within the party. Hence, the development and life of the party manifest themselves both in unity and the struggle of opposites and in unity and the struggle between centralism and democracy. These aspects must be considered in reflections on cadre policy, the replacement of executive teams and party unity.

I mention this because this dialectics is not normally considered, not even in textbooks. It is not considered when implementing social-engineering

directives as well as with respect to the needs for and selection of individuals who do not avoid public appearances, who are ready to sacrifice personal ambitions and at the same time are ambitious to analyze facts and draw theoretical conclusions on social processes and phenomena, and who know how to utilize efficiently the creative energies of the working class.

Theory provides us, of course, with the answer to the questions of what should the cadre policy be like and what individuals should hold offices. But it does not answer the question of why--although theory makes it obligatory to provide chances for committed, ideology-minded individuals--the ladder of advancement has also been climbed in, e.g., Poland, by the so-called accidental people, and why have certain individuals exercising important political functions become depraved during the stabilization period, and lastly whence comes the readiness of individuals to accrue additional power and offices under conditions which do not necessitate this. There is no answer to the question of why cadre selection has been of an asymmetrical nature. This asymmetry may manifest itself both in a situation when all offices are decided upon by handfuls of individuals concentrated within party echelons and apparatus, both as regards nomination and selection, and in a situation when all offices are decided upon by voters themselves, with the voters selecting from among an unlimited number of candidates. In other words, we are dealing with asymmetry when the centralized electoral system intertwines with an elementally arising decentralized system. The cadre policy then becomes part of the policy of the "federation" of executive boards, sections, ministries and departments. Asymmetry also is present when, as part of a correct political line of the party, officeholders are replaced on the basis of nonuniform or fortuitous criteria. A converse situation may also apply in which officeholders are selected according to positive criteria such as devotion to the cause, education, outstanding ability, expression of readiness to serve the working class and ability to direct teamwork, but a clear party line is lacking. Space does not permit describing the entire mechanism of this dualism. It is possible, though, to formulate the hypothesis that such asymmetry promotes deviations in cadre policy. An asymmetrical system does not mobilize the correct mechanism for cadre replenishment, and it does not prevent the game of musical chairs represented by the rotation of the same individuals among the posts included in the "nomenklatura."

Here, democratic centralism would be a preventive means, a kind of remedy for such deviations. Democratic centralism provides the framework for the manifestation of the correct tendency in cadre policy. And that tendency is correct only when the theory of absence of conflicts or of the presence of contradictions alone in the society and the party is replaced with the theory of [dialectical] unity and contradictions in the society, and when cadre policy is accompanied on the macro- and micropolitical scale by integrative and disintegrative measures curtailing the actions of groups and individuals who either act out of parochial interests or promote only long-range and general social interests.

Essentially, this concerns a mechanism of cadre selection and replacement of leadership teams in the party and state that would promote the acceleration and consolidation rather than retardation of the processes that stabilize the

cadre and unify the party. This would, as a result, accelerate the building of socialism, and the new mechanisms would be sufficiently functional to result in the rise of a relatively self-regulating system. This tendency may be regulated by democratic centralism, as well as by other systemic principles such as the principle of equality, social justice, worker-peasant alliance, and legality, as well as by crystal-clear criteria for cadre selection. Generally speaking, it is a function of democratic centralism in the system of cadre policy and replacement of leadership teams to mobilize the mechanism regulating cadre movement in a manner such that, on the one hand, the leading role of the party and state authorities would be strengthened and, on the other, the controlling and creative role of the working people, as well as of persons situated in the structure of power, would be dominant. The essence of this tendency is that the persons situated in the structure of power would control the apparat as well as the parochial strivings of (formal and informal) social groups in the name of implementing the principle of the people's rule and accelerating the pace of socialism-building. This context makes more explicit V. I. Lenin's suggestion that "communists should rule the apparats which they are to lead, instead of, as often happens, letting the apparat rule them" (V. I. Lenin, "Works," Vol 33, p 458).

Communists rule apparats only when the opinionmaking, evaluating and control functions relating to the cadre are exercised by the resolution-making elements of the party: congresses, plenary sessions, conferences, local committees and party organizations. It is they that are responsible for the condition of the cadre. Thus interpreted, the principal sense of democratic centralism as regards cadre policy consists in that all main offices in the party, the state and the social organizations are, on the one hand, subject to open discussion among party authorities and, on the other, of interest to party organizations, social organizations and party members. Then also cadre policy is interpreted as the proper selection of officeholders by collegial bodies operating within the framework of a hierarchical system, with allowance for all the democratic norms, including the democratic procedure for the identification of candidates, their election, their recall, openness of elections, and consultation of working people about the candidates. A procedure consonant with democratic socialism has no room for policies originating from individuals and based on their parochial interests. Suitability for holding an office is determined not only by personal qualities but also by amenability toward the party programs, the resolutions of party authorities and the party echelons. If cadre policy is not clear and monitored by party organizations and the party's collegial bodies, and if instead it is implemented by individuals, the following negative phenomena are an inevitable corollary: careerism, cronyism and stagnation or destabilization of personnel, at the expense of principled approach, diligence, commitment to general matters and readiness to serve the working people.

In sum, when structured in accordance with democratic centralism, cadre policy leads to a relative equilibrium between the influence of the party's central authorities and its executive elements, on the one hand, and that of the party organizations, on the other, on the selection of executive personnel for the machinery of state. In addition, it presupposes a definite decisionmaking procedure that consists in, first, that personnel decisions are part of the

system of the party's resolution-making bodies, including the POPs as well. Thereby also this means that these bodies prevail over the executive bodies. Democratism in cadre policy precludes the predominant standing of certain party-echelon departments vis a vis the elective bodies. A machinery for reaching an agreement on candidates with the elective bodies, inclusive of the POP, is the ideal. Another ideal is a machinery for control of the selection and decisionmaking procedures by the echelons and POPs, as well as a machinery for consultation with party members and with working people if the candidate is to hold a government office. The purpose of this machinery is to select personnel adequate to its tasks, and the criteria here should be sagaciousness, conscientiousness, ideology-mindedness and readiness to defend socialism. Thus the point is that the working class too should take part in the process of identifying able executives and executive teams. However, the participation of the working class in the process of identifying executive teams, and indirectly also individual executives, also depends on other factors. Here the predominant role is played by the electoral system in the party and state. It is correct to state that the intraparty electoral system is an integral and at the same time fundamental part of the mechanism for replacing executive teams. This is not and cannot be an autonomous mechanism. It hinges on the flow of impulses from the working class, that is, from the principal power center. It is the working class, too, that as the final instance is the principal barrier against arbitrary ["voluntarist"] decisions.

Another and secondary, as it were, issue is the constant influence of party members and party organizations on the mechanism of personnel replacement so far as the party authorities are concerned. A third issue is the variety of procedures for the identification and selection of candidates. The fourth and equally important component of this machinery is the procedure for electing delegates to the party congress as well as the procedure for electing executive teams.

The tendency consonant with democratic centralism is characterized by the electoral doctrine of the PZPR, worked out in 1981 at the Extraordinary PZPR Congress. It became spelled out in "Bylaws for the Election of Delegates, Officers and Control Bodies Within the PZPR," voted by the National Conference of PZPR Delegates in March 1983 (see the article, "'Bylaws for the Election of Delegates, Officers and Control Bodies Within the PZPR," ZYCIE PARTII, No 7, 1984). The following electoral principles are mandatory in the PZPR Statute: 1) secrecy [of balloting] and unlimited number of candidates to any party office, executive body, auditing commission and control commission; 2) active and passive voting rights of delegates to conferences and congresses, and passive voting rights for the incumbent resigning office-holders; 3) direct election of the first secretary from among members of the newly elected committee; 4) a specific term of office and decumulation [disaggregation, single office-holding] of the duties involved. Pursuant to the Statute "the same executive office may be continuously held for no longer than two terms of office," unless, in justified cases, a majority of two-thirds at a conference votes otherwise ("Statute of the PZPR, Including Revisions and Amendments Voted Upon by the Ninth Extraordinary PZPR Congress in July 1981," Warsaw 1982). This dilemma is resolved by the aforementioned "Bylaws for the Election of Delegates, Officers and Control Bodies Within the PZPR." Pursuant to these

Bylaws, "active and passive voting rights at the POPs and OOPs are held by all of their members, and, at the congress and conferences, by their delegates." In this connection, the resigning "members of the executive bodies of the committee, the auditing commission and the party control commission, as well as party members recommended by a superior committee or by the resigning committee," have the right to be candidates, with the number of these candidates to be determined by the congress and the conference." ("Bylaws....," ZYCIE PARTII, No 7, 1984). Thus in this matter an equilibrium is preserved between the centralism and the democratism of electoral principles. An identical tendency is assured by the principles for the election of officers, control bodies and delegates. All candidates and bodies are "elected by secret balloting," with the number of candidates being unlimited, and in this connection the [party] congress determines the number of members and candidate members of the Central Committee, the Politburo, the Central Committee Secretariat, the Central Auditing Commission and the Central Party Control Commission, as well of their presidiums, while the party conferences determine the number of members of the local party officers and members of control bodies.

Of course, these are not the only criteria for an intraparty electoral system consonant with democratic centralism. Other important criteria are the voting procedure, the number of officers and members of control bodies, and the mechanism of changes in the composition of the delegates--the authorities and control bodies, during the current term of office, as well as the practice of identifying and selecting members of executive teams. And indeed, once the fundamental problems have become settled by the resolutions of the party authorities, the heart of the matter is that the fundamental electoral principles be respected and the discrete norms be interpreted so that some of them would not be perpetuated by custom. For example, the principle of the unlimited number of candidates may be curtailed to 15 percent or so, because the procedure for the identification of candidates varies depending on the meeting, conference or congress. It is also possible that a onesided procedure for electing first secretaries may become perpetuated by custom. Here I am referring not to the Statute's provisions but to the practice of nominating not more than one candidate for first secretary or, e.g., secret balloting on procedural questions--questions that are so important to intraparty democracy.

This line of reasoning necessitates mentioning the so-called coopting. This is one of the theoretical and practical aspects of the formation or complementation of executive teams at various levels of party authorities. Coopting may be a principle, or it may be an instrument. When coopting is repetitive, this instrument becomes a principle. It is in the nature of an instrument only when applied under exceptional circumstances, most often those imposed by the ongoing acute political and ideological struggle. Of course, the coopting of members of an echelon may be a consequence of the conditions of conspiratorial work or of the exacerbating political struggle against, e.g., the counterrevolution. But already at the inception of the party of the new type it had been assumed that individuals coopted to the leading party echelons would be part of the authorities only so long as the conditions warranting the selection of persons through elections, in accordance with the Party Charter, would remain unchanged. It is characteristic that coopting as a

way of complementing executive teams was abandoned in the USSR immediately after the ending of the civil war in favor of the principle of electiveness of all organs from bottom to top. Subsequently, the principle of coopting was restored. In Poland the coopting machinery had functioned in the years 1948-1956. It was restored during the 1980 crisis. The 9th Congress had eliminated it only partially in favor of the selection of individuals from among the elected authorities. Thus coopting was not permanently eliminated. The growing crisis within the party has necessitated mobilizing the machinery of coopting.

This question was settled in the "Bylaws on Delegates..." Namely, it was resolved, at the National Conference of Delegates, that, first, during any single term of office the replacements of committee members may not exceed one-fifth of the membership elected by the congress or by the reports-elections conferences. Secondly, it was resolved that "The Central Committee and all lower-level committees have the right to recall their members and candidate members, as well as members and candidate members of the Central Committee Bureau, executive board members, and secretaries and first secretaries, and elect in their stead, by secret balloting, new comrades from among their delegates..., as well as from among the party aktiv" (Ibid.). It is worth noting in this connection that during the period of the crises, which were characterized by, on the one hand, demonstrations of the working class (1956, 1970, 1980) and, on the other, a growing influence of the procapitalist forces in the state and anarchosyndicalist forces in the party, persons certain to implement the new party line were coopted into the Central Committee. The process being analyzed (beginning in 1948 and until 1980) reveals, considered from one side, the efforts made to surmount the crises and, when considered from another, the concern shown for satisfying all the directions and tendencies. Since the pretenders outnumbered those they were to replace, the size of the membership of the supreme party organs--the Politburo and Secretariat of the Central Committee--was increased. As a result, the divergences grew. The majority of members of the Central Committee was not in accord on how to cope decisively with the new situation. A situation is conceivable in which a majority of Central Committee members elects a Politburo membership that is of one mind as regards the country's basic problems. But this had not been the situation during the period between the 7th and 8th Central Committee plenums in the second half of 1956. It was then that the differences in the views of the Central Committee on the Politburo and the Secretariat manifested themselves tellingly: those sharing responsibility for the crisis were not relieved of their posts. Beginning with the 8th PZPR Congress, various forms became intertwined. The 8th Congress did not elect P. Jaroszewicz to the Politburo, and his declaration of resignation from the post of premier was accompanied by changes within the Politburo and the government. These changes were not fundamental. But it had been thought that they could influence the course of events.

It appears that the cumulation of elective functions and functions exercised in the organs of state administrations [i.e., appointive functions] [in the hands of individuals] disrupted the machinery for replacing executive teams. In view of the processes occurring in Poland and other socialist countries, the thesis is justified that the currently evolving system for the rise and

formation of executive teams is closest to democratic centralism. A major role in restoring and developing the concept of collegial decisionmaking on, among other things, cadre policies has been played by the congresses of communist and worker parties. Generally speaking, this system consists in that the initiative for the identification of candidates, their discussion and their consultation is handled by both party elements, i.e., by the superior authorities and, to the same extent, by the party organizations, including the basic-level ones. The candidates are nominated by members of basic party organizations and party echelons. The delegates take the floor and present to voters their assessments of the situation, their intentions and the ways and means of translating the program into reality. As a result, they become known. Both comment on matters of interest to the entire party as well as to organizations at a given level. Both provide information on the ways in which they intend to implement the resolved-upon program. The final chord of the democratic model is the elections. The balloting is secret. At the same time, the principles of a fixed term of office, rotation, and disaggregation of functions [singleness of office-holding] are adhered to. In the model regulated by democratic centralism the elected individuals are treated as holders of a mandate from both the voters and the party. Of interest in this respect is the Hungarian experience. In Hungary non-party members hold many more offices in the name of strengthening socialism, within the framework of socialist systemic principles. The experience so far shows that this is one of the most difficult models, yet it is a feasible one. If it is to be materialized, organizational and formal safeguards will not suffice, even though they are indispensable. In addition to the intraparty mechanism, there is a need for a favorable political climate and, above all, a democratic political maturity of leaders and candidates for leaders. Its absence between the central and local party levels, between the resolution-making organs of the higher levels and party members, and among potential candidates for leaders, disrupts this mechanism. Now a disrupted mechanism for the replacement of executive teams promotes the rise of closely linked leadership groups, interest groups, which in its turn promotes, above all, the strengthening of the position of individuals displaying traits of "grey eminences," capable of behind-the-stage manipulative activities.

The 1970s opened the floodgates to behind-the-stage activities, to the influx of individuals with such traits. The mechanism that then functioned blocked information on candidates, and at the same time it blocked the mechanism strengthening the party's role as both the ruling party and the "opposition" party so far as its own errors and oversights are concerned. It blocked the party's internal control role within itself as well as with respect to, e.g., the state. This "oppositionist" attitude for and against candidates for leaders is the behest of the time. The system for replacing executive teams may display the attributes of a "prime mover" of the self-regulating and self-control mechanisms. This concerns not only safeguards at election time, such as the identification of candidates or secrecy of balloting. This also concerns such permanent safeguards as criticism and self-criticism, the rotation and disaggregation of functions, and fixed terms of office for the party authorities.

The point is that these safeguards should not remain on paper, that they should function as a system. The point is that they should facilitate instead of curtailing, restricting or aggravating, e.g., the conduct of mid-term elections, the transfer of posts during the period between elections, and the transfer of power during elections. The mechanism for replacing officeholders has always been at its most defective whenever entire leadership teams had to demonstrate their credibility. In one way or another, the absence of such mechanisms always produces serious consequences. During the crises, beginning with 1948 and ending with the crisis of 1980/1981, there was no clear mechanism for replacing leadership teams, although theory solves this problem in favor of the democratic mechanism. In practice, the idea of democratism either did not materialize or materialized only partially. Differences in the views of the party authorities became variously polarized and crystallized. During the period of stabilization these differences usually failed to turn into collective wisdom. This resulted in weakening democratic relations within the party, while at the same time strengthening bureaucratic mechanisms. Changes occurred either without the participation of party members and aktiv, as in 1948 for example, or as a consequence of an acute crisis in the society (1956), or too as a manifestation of a crisis in the relations between the party and the working class (1970), or as a consequence of a general socioeconomic and political crisis (1980).

The last crisis was and is the most unfavorable one. It has involved the entire society, and in a situation at that when the party and the social organizations were caught unaware by the spontaneous movement. Intermediate states also are possible, as in the case of the crises of 1948 and 1976, when they were characterized by either a conflict within the party leadership or by the rising activism of the working class or other social groups.

The foregoing reflections warrant formulating yet another hypothesis, namely: intraparty transformations have as a rule been accompanied by changes in the circumstances of the PZPR, as well as by changes in the leadership teams of the allied parties [the SD and the ZSL] and the government. Here again a similar pattern is discernible. The turnabout in the PZPR resulted in changes in the membership of the leadership teams in the ZSL [United Peasant Party] and the SD [Democratic Party], that were the greater the more explicitly these allied parties declared their support of the PZPR. Hence also the leadership teams of all the political and social organizations participating in power changed in their composition.

This is the place for posing the question of what are the mechanisms of the selection and replacement of cadre and leadership teams in the party when it is organized in accordance with democratic centralism, and whether all offices are decided upon by small groups of individuals, regardless of whether this concerns the identification, nomination or selection of individuals from among several candidates.

I consider these questions to be the point of departure for formulating the thesis that what is required is both constant political criteria, an appropriate ideological and cultural level, political and professional qualifications, and personal qualities as well as accomplishments so far, on

the one hand, and an explicit mechanism for the identification and selection of candidates by party organizations and leadership bodies, on the other. While basing itself on the general criteria for selection of candidates, the leadership should in practice also rely on specific criteria such as, e.g., the quality of performance of the candidates, their standing in the community, authentic and prolonged commitment to public affairs, ability to listen to and consider circumambient opinion, ability to foresee public responses, skill at working with people, independence of action, ability to assess the situation, etc. On the other hand, it is not good when greater importance is attached to ability to issue recommendations, write directives, make speeches and take notes, or readiness to obey.

Of course, criteria in themselves do not guarantee the implementation of a correct cadre policy. In a correctly functioning mechanism for the identification and selection of executive personnel, even fortuitously selected individuals soon prove their worth or their unfitness.

In the context of the above reflections, it is worth it to devote some attention to the cadre "nomenklatura," here construed as the the party's formally guaranteed right to staff with its members the leading posts in the state and in the social organizations. This immediately raises the vital question of what posts in the vertical structure of various organizations should be occupied, at a given stage of development, by party members. Who in the party can make such important decisions?

Above all, there is a need here for closely defined criteria and boundary lines relating to the posts subject to the "nomenklatura," as well as for an explicit operating procedure. The "nomenklatura" cannot be a guarantee--as has happened in the past--of holding an executive office for life, and regardless of one's performance at a previous post at that. It should apply primarily to posts with a strategic importance. It should be confined exclusively to superior and leadership offices that are of decisive importance to further socialism-building. This does not mean that the party, or its allied political parties, should relinquish their influence on cadre policy in other domains. For that would have signified relinquishing the party's basic political function, namely, the creation of sociopolitical power. The point is that wherever possible and not indispensable, sincecures of power should be avoided and the most qualified citizens should be selected and appointed, regardless of whether they are or are not party members.

As part of this reasoning, I wish to point out the fact that cadre "nomenklatura" is one thing and cadre policy is another; or, more precisely, cadre policy should not be identified with cadre "nomenklatura." The former does not relieve the party--and in Poland also the allied political parties--of the responsibility for the quality of the cadre at all levels of political and socioeconomic power. At the same time, it obligates the creation of forms promoting the manifestation of talent and organizational ability by individuals ready to serve the society. As for the latter, i.e., the cadre "nomenklatura," this is a form assuring that, during the period of transition from capitalism to socialism, the posts decisive to the further development of socialism would not be taken over by persons desiring to restore capitalism.

It is worth noting that various perils are engendered against the background of using the "nomenklatura." By providing the candidates for executive posts with opportunities for a permanent exercise of their functions, while at the same time exempting them from control by the working people and party organizations, the "nomenklatura" promotes disalienation [as published] processes. It displays other flaws as well. It entails a hierarchy of responsibility. This is reflected in that decisions on penalties, rewards and expulsion from the party are made at the levels of party authority to which corresponds the "nomenklatura" of particular offices. Of course, this observation does not apply to solutions of theory. In practice, however, it has often happened that members of a particular POP who exercised functions under the "nomenklatura" were not directly responsible to their own party organization, and were instead responsible to the party element recommending their appointment. Conversely, too, the POP did not have to take a position on, e.g., reprehensible behavior of its office-holding member until the recommending party element did take a position on it. This practice, about which complaints have been made, is being surmounted. Thus, e.g., the PZPR Statute voted by the 9th Extraordinary Congress resolves this problem as follows: "As regards members of the party authorities at all levels, a resolution on party penalty may be made by their local basic organizations as well as by the party authorities of which they are members. The pertinent resolutions of the party organizations are valid once they are ratified by the party committees at the appropriate levels. The party echelons have the duty of taking a position on POP resolutions and notifying the party organizations of their decision, and its rationale, within 3 months" (Statute of the Polish United Worker Party, With Revisions and Amendments Voted by the 9th Extraordinary PZPR Congress in July 1981, Warsaw, 1982, Paragraph 11).

In sum, it is not only the "nomenklatura" itself that is important. What also matters is the political mechanism for selecting executive personnel-- identification of candidates, their evaluation, their nomination, their recall. Experience confirms that deviations are promoted by a mechanism which serves to select executive personnel on bypassing elective bodies or in their behalf. The question of who monitors the personnel also is not indifferent. Here, the main role should be played by the party authorities rather than the apparat. Similar though not identical duties rest on the shoulders of the party organizations, for it is they that provide the evaluations of the suitability of their members for, e.g., positions in the state administration, etc.

The concern of the party authorities for the quality of party and state cadre stems from the duty of implementing the party's general line at all levels of political and economic power.

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IDEOLOGICAL PREMISE OF KWIATKOWSKI'S ARTICLE SCRUTINIZED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 42, 20 Oct 84 p 10

[Article by Jan Ruranski: "Polemics--Who Deserves What: With a Hat on a Stick"]

[Text] POLITYKA Note:

Elegance and simplicity with which Stanislaw Kwiatkowski draws our readers' fire is admirable. But he is not a heroic radiotelegraphic operator directing the fire of his own artillery onto himself but a cowboy waving with a hat on a stick from behind a rock. In the first article (see POLITYKA 35) the assistant professor seemed to risk his neck. The article drew light and heavy caliber fire. The readers rained birdshot on Kwiatkowski, and Passent fired at him with a heavier weapon. They were sure they had hit the target, but Kwiatkowski only suffered a hole in the hat that he waved mockingly (see POLITYKA No 41).

In the first article Stanislaw Kwiatkowski deals with my thesis that "the reevaluation of human labor and raising simple labor, requiring physical effort, above intellectual work in the social hierarchy, leads to the degradation of knowledge and science as elements of progress."

Kwiatkowski lectures members of the "petit intelligentsia" who instead of "teaching and educating, reconciling the natural vitality of the workers' movement with the latest scientific achievements" complain that the social position of knowledge and science keeps deteriorating in Poland.

He reproaches the intelligentsia for their petit-bourgeois nature and venality, for their coquetry to pay for the Western parcels and for their contempt, typical of the gentry, for hard working men. Furthermore, he wonders why readers are attacking him and states that the discussion concerns problems which he, himself, considers controversial.

Stanislaw Kwiatkowski writes that "it is pointless to make a row because somebody earns a little more." Clearly, it is pointless for the person who earns more. It is important, however, for the one who earns less. Moreover, one can mention a few important moments in history brought about by the fact that some earned a "little" more than others.

This, however, was not what I was driving at a couple of months ago in discussing the intelligentsia's frustrations. If Assistant Professor Kwiatkowski did not understand it, I must have explained poorly, with insufficient clarity, my thesis of the dangerous social degradation of the position of the intelligentsia and of the role of knowledge and science in progress.

This problem can be discussed within various frameworks: economic, social, political, and ideological. Stanislaw Kwiatkowski's pamphlet must have been created within the last one.

Kwiatkowski has mistaken concern for the economic situation of the intelligentsia for an attack on the leading role of the working class. The assumption is at least strange, given the 4 years that have passed since August. Nobody can deprive the working class of this role today. Therefore neither the tune, nor the style, nor the argumentation used by Kwiatkowski suits the present.

Assistant Professor Kwiatkowski uses somewhat archaic methods in outlining his party intellectual's duty toward the working class. Under the scheme capitalist-exploiter, worker-exploited-developing class conscience was the main duty of the intelligentsia. In a state governed by the party of the workers and peasants allied with the intelligentsia an ally's courage is required, Dear Assistant Professor. Why, under a system whose ideology is based on the scientific approach, does science drop to the bottom of social hierarchy? This should be sufficient reason for making a long, loud row so that the workers, at the long last, start demanding increased outlays for science (they are alarmingly low in Poland; 3-4 times smaller than in other socialist countries), education, culture and health service. If we had, as a wise ally, warned against "stuffed" unions and not allowed the party restraints of the 1970's (imposed by the top), perhaps our dispute would concern more pleasant subjects. I, for my part, view the intelligentsia's duty and the party intelligentsia's in particular, toward the working class differently.

Too many intelligentsia party members swallow their pride at meetings and listen silently to scoldings reminiscent of the early 1950's. Unfortunately, some publications, including Stanislaw Kwiatkowski's article in POLITYKA provide arguments for such practices. At party meetings, the intelligentsia cannot tell their party off, while workers can. They cannot confess the party their intellectual subtleties without being threatened with the "dictatorship of the proletariat."

Perhaps closing party ranks during a political crisis calls for more critical, simplified assessments of the situation and attitudes. I get the impression, though, that these rough assessments are abused for settling questions that require more precise investigation.

Stanislaw Kwiatkowski quotes the findings of research (unfortunately, not published in full) which allegedly contradict the financial degradation of the intelligentsia. A certain weekly immediately jumps at the opportunity to suggest that POLITYKA lies. Meanwhile, a careful reader of Kwiatkowski's article will conclude that the figures quoted can illustrate an entirely different discussion. It could be easily foreseen that in many working establishments the administration's earnings are on the average slightly higher than those of the workers. Yet, the directors of coal mines earn more than the miners (which evidently does not bother Kwiatkowski).

Assistant Professor Kwiatkowski could easily have cited research findings to support our reasoning, but that was not his purpose. So I will cite the most impressive figures. According to the Central Statistical Office [GUS] there were 82,761 citizens in the socialized sector in September 1982 with monthly incomes exceeding 30,000 zlotys. This figure included 57,300 blue-collar and 25,400 white-collar workers. The overwhelming majority were industrial workers, employed mostly in the mining industry. For the cultural sector, the figure was 80, and for science and education, 34 (including three blue-collar workers).

In science and technology eight people earned more than 30,000 zlotys and in higher education only 3 people. Remarkably, all of the people in the last two groups are blue-collar workers.

These figures (the most recent, available data) speak for themselves. There is no indication, though, that the situation has changed greatly. The findings of a study based on a representative study, published in the August issue of WIADOMOSCI STATYSTYCZNE, reveal that the pay structure remained unchanged through September 1983, although the average pay increased by several thousand zlotys. For instance, in September 1983, there were 38,900 blue-collar workers and 22,800 white-collars who earned 39,000 zlotys a month.

I did not cite these figures in order to claim that the intelligentsia has been wronged or harmed. These categories are not applicable here. Without any sociological research, however, what these figures show is clear.

The statistics reveal that the economic reform has set in motion mechanisms motivating better and better-paid work. Yet, these mechanisms have been employed mostly in industry and applied basically to workers. Evidently for Kwiatkowski this shortcomings of the Polish economy is an ideological virtue. Everyone knows these flagrant disproportions in the Polish economy result primarily from the special wages paid for work on free Saturdays and Sundays in the mining industry, 200 or 300 percent higher than the regular wages. Certainly, this measure effectively boosted coal production, but it quickly shattered the outdated pay structure in the non-productive sectors of the economy. Kwiatkowski sees no problem at all, and he considers workers earning more than engineers to be quite healthy and normal in a socialist system. One trip to Silesia suffices to realize it is neither healthy nor normal.

Perhaps, the present anomalies in the pay system are merely temporary. Perhaps the reform will develop a self-regulating mechanism in this area. After all, the rule that more money buys better commodities applies to both the intellectual and the vegetable market. Once the simple methods of boosting production have been exhausted, the importance of technological and organizational progress will grow considerably. Once the workforce's earnings are commensurate with the qualifications and talents of the plant's engineering staff, our problem will resolve itself spontaneously and independently.

Admittedly, salaries, which arouse such strong emotions today, are not the main reason for frustration among the intelligentsia. They are merely a symptom of the threat, the tip of the iceberg of troubles we are going to face in many areas of life.

The severe cuts in budget subsidies caused by the country's economic limitations have affected all sectors of the economy, especially the non-productive sectors such as science, education, culture, and health care. Everybody realizes they cannot be neglected in the long run. Our readers, and presumably Stanislaw Kwiatkowski, are familiar with many examples and figures that illustrate the dramatic situation. Therefore, claims that the intelligentsia's demands for more funds are guided by mean motives are wide of the mark. Sometimes even what a Marxist decides, God provides.

CSO: 2600/305

LOCAL GOVERNMENT IMPROVES ITS PERFORMANCE, FUNCTIONS

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 17-18 Nov 84 p 3

[Interview with Pawel Kaminski, member of the PZPR Central Committee, by Jerzy Wierzcholski: "One Should See Beyond One's Own Nose" subtitled "There Is a Need To Demonstrate--With the Entire Force and Authority of the Party--That People's Councils Are the Local Authorities Against Whose Powers No One Can Raise His Hand With Impunity"]

[Text] [Question] Much is being said about the renewal of self-government and democracy. Do these concepts acquire a specific meaning to the average citizen? Can he, at his workplace or place of residence, point to signs of the changes occurring in the state?

[Answer] I think that here we are at the root of the matter. For nowadays, following many legislative decisions and in view of the ongoing stabilization of the country, the principal problem is that the transformations which we term socialist renewal should reach the people and become tangible in town and country, and particularly in small communities. It is there that changes in the methods of the exercise of power, in the performance of gmina [parish] or municipal offices are most strikingly evident. It is there, too, that it is easier to notice whether respect for the individual has grown, and whether arrogance of office, waste and incompetence are declining. It is the people themselves who observe and draw conclusions, who compare what they heard from the high tribunes, on television, with what they see on the spot.

[Question] And what do they see?

[Answer] Above all, how much is still to be accomplished. And their conclusions vary. Many believe that it is the authorities--the people's council or the gmina or municipal administration--that should demonstrate their willingness and ability to operate in the new manner, their willingness and ability to cooperate with the citizenry. It is from the behavior of the authorities that the people draw their own conclusions on the renewal, waiting to see how this will affect them personally. But there also are some who understand that only through common effort we can accomplish anything, that the greater the increase in the society's participation and interest in and

control of the local authorities, the better their performance and the greater their accomplishments become. My observations indicate that it is the latter group that still continues to be in the minority, outweighed by the number of those who adopt a wait-and-see attitude. The point is that these proportions should be reversed by specific and sagacious measures.

[Question] It follows hence that the renewal still has not penetrated public awareness more deeply, that, under particular local conditions, it still remains too much of an abstract concept.

[Answer] I believe that in this respect we are still at the beginning of the road. It is much easier to change laws than to change human consciousness, in which the image of the "helpless" council or the arrogant, arbitrary gmina administration is quite strongly rooted. People have seen too many deals of various kinds and too much incompetence and wasteful management. They have experienced too many instances of disregard [by the officialdom] and operation of cliques. Over the years, too much distrust in the manner of the exercise of power has accumulated for the new laws, whose nature is besides not universally known, to reverse the situation rapidly.

Just consider, I had been for 16 years a member of a powiat [county] council, and subsequently of a province council, and I know these matters from inside out. After all, for many years these councils were regarded--as I emphasized at the 17th Plenum--as useful auxiliaries in settling minor matters and convenient means of rubberstamping unpopular decisions, without being asked for their own opinion. This was bound to affect the consciousness of both the representatives of the local administration and the councilmen and citizenry. The concerned deputy province governors rarely participated in the sessions of the commissions of the Province People's Council; most often, these sessions were attended instead by the director or deputy director of a department, and sometimes even only by an inspector. The council sessions were generally sham, and their treatment by the administration was often formalist. It is thus hardly surprising that, given such a--solely postulative--nature of the councils, they were practically bereft of powers of their own and ceased to feel responsible for affairs within their own districts, thus leaving so to speak a free hand to the administrators.

This caused councilmen to feel discouragement and frustration, which reverberated among the local communities. I must admit that these feelings had not been alien to me either. It was simply that the efforts and devotion invested in public activity were quite incommensurate with the effects achieved. That is why many people refrained from civic activities, from providing initiatives in public activism--a reluctance to become committed which we observe to this very day, despite the sore need for such commitment.

[Question] This state of public awareness is a major menace to the entire process of reforms, to materializing the idea of self-government and democracy, which includes also enhancing the importance and authority of basic-level people's councils.

[Answer] I agree, and that's exactly why I devoted to these matters my speech at the 17th Plenum. Besides, I was not alone. During the plenary session the road we traveled so far since the 9th Party Congress was analyzed objectively and thoroughly, on paying special attention to trends imperiling the correct application and social effectiveness of the reforms.

Now I fear that the old public awareness may turn the new decree on people's councils into more or less something that exists only on paper. This is all the more dangerous considering that many people's councils, particularly the gmina-level ones, are not at all eager to exploit fully all of their powers. The reason lies in, as I stressed at the plenum, the atmosphere, the political and moral climate of gmina or small-town life. In such small communities, all the important institutions taken together--the gmina office, the gmina cooperative, the local bank, the local cooperatives and sometimes also the gmina committee--often are vitally concerned to prevent anyone from watching their hands and interfering with their decisions. Yet it is the councilmen, as citizens, residents and employees, who depend on these institutions. The result is that, as mentioned at our session by a Central Committee member who is a farmer, the village is ruled by the storage-depot manager and the weigh-in inspector [who between them receive and weigh produce delivered by farmers].

Here I wish to repeat what I said at the plenum, namely, that the party, its echelons and organizations, must immediately come to the defense of the rights of people's councils and stand guard over the respect for and inviolability of the powers of legislative bodies. No time can be lost if we are to prevent the perpetuation of old attitudes under new circumstances among councilmen who are now enabled to exercise their mandate for the first time under the two-thirds rule, and who display an authentic goodwill and commitment. There is a need to demonstrate--with the entire force and authority of the party--that people's councils are the local authorities against whose powers no one can raise his hand with impunity.

Unless we succeed in properly enhancing the importance and authority of representative bodies everywhere in the country even before the end of this year, time will be against us, against the letter and spirit of the decree on people's councils, against the process of democratizing power.

[Answer] These are strong yet true words. I feel, however, a nagging doubt as to whether this aim can be accomplished, whether the barriers extant in local communities that we discussed previously are too tall to achieve rapidly the intended goals.

[Answer] The barriers are indeed substantial--they are extant in people and, I would say, circumstances. Besides, they apply to the entire process of renewal--of both the economy and various forms of social life. Does this mean that this road could be abandoned? The 17th Plenum provided an unequivocal answer to this question. There are many who wish for the sake of personal gain to impede the process of reforms. This makes all the more necessary nowadays--within the party and among the broad circles of the society--a broader consolidation round the program of renewal, round a consistent and decisive

application, particularly at the lowest levels, of the already accepted principles of democratic rule and governing.

I'm convinced that our society desires to live in a law-abiding, efficient and well-organized state. The local population expects this of the people's councils, of the province governor, the mayors, the councilmen and the officials, these being precisely the representatives of the state who are in most direct proximity to the people. And after all, a majority of these representatives are party members. This means us above all, but this also concerns thousands of non-party members who are active in public work or are employed by the local administration--jointly, we must demonstrate by concrete deeds, convince the society, that the renewal is a new page in the annals of our reality, that the state is the same yet no longer the same as regards public participation in rule and governing, that this concerns our working together to solve our common Polish problems, on the scale of both the state and the gmina.

This is, of course, a major and difficult task and of a certainty it will take some time before it produces results. But it also is an absolute necessity. There is simply no alternative. Hence, above all, the need for greater discipline and effectiveness of the measures taken. In my opinion, it is indispensable that the party strengthen its influence on the comrades exercising executive posts in the city and gmina administration by severely and unambiguously reminding them of their subordinate position toward the people's councils, with all the consequences to be drawn therefrom. That is, consequences such as a conscientious implementation of the resolutions and recommendations of people's councils, keeping the councils fully informed about the situation in the gmina or city, and submitting to them various alternative proposals so that the councils themselves could independently and optimally decide on them.

The councilmen in their turn cannot merely confine themselves to expressing postulates concerning the administration or plants in their districts; instead, they should resolutely and consistently demand and require the enforcement of their decisionmaking and control powers. And above all, they must maintain constant and authentic contact with their voters and have their eyes and ears open to whatever is happening around them, let alone to the planks of their election programs.

These are the indispensable prerequisites for elevating the importance and authority of the councils. I believe that in this respect a great role can be played by a sagacious conduct of the work of the teams of party-member councilmen.

[Question] Yet another occasion has now arisen for a judicious and penetrating discussion of these matters and of the related ways and means. The elections to resident self-governments, which after all are being organized by people's councils, are of special importance precisely in the small communities, in the gminas and villages. Occurring as they do barely a few months after the elections to people's councils, these elections provide an opportunity for

profound reflections on the performance of local self-governments, on the practice of the processes of the democratization of power.

[Answer] In the gminas, and in the towns and villages as well, this is a particularly important campaign relating to what could be termed direct democracy, the participation of the whole of inhabitants in the solution of their own local affairs. In this field, too, things so far have not been optimal. In many localities self-government was simply nonexistent, for reasons that we already discussed. But now, being a natural continuation of the people's councils, self-governments in localities have gained greater rights and rest on the institutional support represented by the councils. The point is that they should also rest on authentic support. We have attained some cohesiveness of the representative system, from the gmina to the province levels. The point is that this system should start operating autonomously and be of benefit to the society, chiefly by capably meshing group interests with national interest, overcoming the division into "we" and "they."

I mention this with concern that is all the greater considering that I observe the phenomenon of some intoxication with self-government and autonomy. Nowadays, autonomous plants and self-governing cooperatives or other organizations are so unwilling to engage, whether financially or organizationally, in broader social undertakings. They view them from the standpoint of their own parochial interests. They are vigilant in not letting anyone accidentally infringe on any of their rights. But it also happens that self-government is a cover-up for outright arbitrariness, for ruling it over one's own puddle. Thus great care should be taken to prevent far-reaching decentralization and strongly developed self-governments from leading us via a circuitous road toward voluntarism that disregards public interest. That still is grist to the mills of the renewal's opponents.

I believe that these tendencies can be effectively counteracted by a thorough strengthening of the decisionmaking and control powers of the people's councils, as well as by an authentically performing resident self-government. This is because greater rights mean more responsibility, more thorough work with the people. After all, the issue is that citizens in every gmina be provided with the basis for feeling themselves to be the bosses of their own gminas.

If this is indeed to happen, the gmina people's councils must first become aware of the full extent of their powers. I do not believe that this is impossible. When basic-level people's councils fully exploit the rights granted to them under the decree, this will provide, in my opinion, yet another chance for ultimately making the gmina an authentic and basic unit of the organization and activation of the society. This can be pithily put as follows: the greater the importance of the gmina in the system of the state, the greater the presence of the state in the gmina.

1386

CSO: 2600/228

INPUT FROM NONPARTY WORKERS SOUGHT

Warsaw TRYBUNA LUDU in Polish 5 Nov 84 p 2

[Article by Henryk Prawda: "A Difficult But Correct Path"]

[Text] Since May 1984 a group of nonparty workers, presently 370 strong, has been functioning in the Provincial Committee of the PZPR in Szczecin. Similar groups have also started forming in local echelons.

In Western Pomerania, people have already managed to formulate quite interesting forms of work with the groups of nonparty activists. The Provincial Committee, for example, holds regular quarterly meetings with its groups of workers. The goal of these meetings, according to Provincial Committee First Secretary Stanislaw Miskiewicz, is first to create a policy of wide information and opinion exchange concerning the most important regional and national matters; second, to enable the workers to voice directly their comments and suggestions; third, to hold consultations when essential social and economic decisions are handed down.

At the first session--with the participation of the province's party and administrative authorities--the political and social situation in the region was discussed. At the second session matters of law and order were talked about, as well as the inspection work undertaken by the Supreme Chamber of Control and by the Chamber of the Treasury and, finally, the fight against wrongdoing in the economic and social life of the province was also discussed.

The meeting, taking place just before the 17th Plenum, was already integrally interwoven with its theme. The meeting was broadened by means of an anonymous questionnaire filled out by 109 non-party workers. They were given 23 questions concerning the functioning of the party in the workplace, concerning activities of the trade unions and that of employee self-management, concerning the activity of economic administration and the initiation of economic reform.

In this way more information about the situation in the workplace was obtained, as well as more information about the extant state of workers democracy, about work force participation in administering their own workplaces, and about those work forces' influence on the course of affairs in the province and in the country at large.

Strong and Weak Points

What would have to be done in order to increase the authority of the party in the workplace? Above all, say the nonparty workers, party organizations should realize their leadership role, should consistently bring into effect their own resolutions and those of higher echelons. They should more widely disseminate their resolutions and decisions among the work force and explain their essentials and goals which, after all, are consistent with the sentiments of the working class.

As concerns knowledge of party resolutions, there were sharp criticisms leveled. Of the questionnaire respondents, 88.4 percent claimed that party resolutions were known only to the party activists and not to the general workers, whereas 47.9 percent noted that resolutions were brought into force only timidly and inconsistently.

The majority of the poll participants judged the activities of the trade unions to be good (54 percent) or satisfactory. On the other hand, 43.1 percent of those polled regarded the workplace trade unions as still functioning ineffectively or even quite poorly. Above all, the unions are [considered] unsuccessful in maintaining their autonomy and independence vis-a-vis factory management.

The workers polled critically underscored the fact that the relation between, on the one hand, factory management and even the factory directors and, on the other, the trade unions is inequitable, that it is often based on autocracy, as one of the workers phrased it. In addition, the trade unions do not possess enough authority everywhere. The reason for this is that a considerable percentage of the engineering and technical personnel do not belong to them, and the same goes for middle level technical workers.

A Greater Role in Management

Employee self-management received higher grades. Only 15.5 percent of the respondents rated it critically. About half of those questioned acknowledged that the system of economic reform undertaken in the workplace is appropriate. The comprehension of that reform would be better if the workers were given simplified instruction in its mechanisms and premises.

Unfortunately, due to a lack of the appropriate economic knowledge many of them fail to understand the reform, and for that reason reform is not properly put into practice in every workplace. That is also the reason why we constantly have to face the manifestations of particularism, of looking out only for one's own interests, and of seeking benefit only for "one's own backyard." Accordingly, the nonparty workers believe that it would be necessary to improve indoctrination of personnel in the social and political fields as well.

A majority of the nonparty workers surveyed by the Szczecin poll are of the opinion that the influence of working people on social and economic life is growing. Crucial social and economic problems are being discussed and access to management level jobs for nonparty members is growing all the time.

Workers' Suggestions Implemented

Of course, there were quite a few more remarks and opinions. They referred to a wide range of factory and public matters: for instance, to strengthening the position of the representative organs of authority, to increasing the efficacy of workplace, domestic and social inspection, to intensifying the struggle for realizing workers' ideals of justice in society, against waste, indifference to duty, rule breaking, disturbance of the norms of socialist morality, and parasitism. Finally, they referred to having more law and order in the cities and in the countryside.

The Provincial Committee, supported by these workers' voices and opinions and, probably most important of all, by their readiness to act on the party's behalf among the sizable number of nonparty members in order to untangle the difficult affairs in society, will itself be able, in turn, to discharge its own leadership role in its own province better.

Thus, these meetings with nonparty activists turned out to be a good school of management and were propitious for the implementation of the resolutions passed by the 17th Plenum of the Central Committee.

12512

CSO: 2600/200

DEBATE ON CREATION OF INSPECTION TEAMS CONTINUES

Party's Attitude

Warsaw RADA NARODOWA GOSPODARKA ADMINISTRACJA in Polish No 19, 22 Sep 84 p 5

[Article by Jozef Stanek]

[Text] From the editor: The article which appears below is a report on the debate on the plan to create a worker-peasant inspectorate which has been conducted in part of Nowy Sacz Province. The report is presented here by the assistant director of the Regional Center for Party Work [ROPP] in Nowy Targ. The thoughts and suggestions contained in this report are part of the discussion which is currently taking place on this plan.

Following the recommendation of the 13th PZPR Central Committee Plenum to create a worker-peasant inspectorate, a heated debate broke out and diverse concepts appeared among the former and current activists of people's councils, of social control committees [KKS] and of plant managements. However, this did not create any greater interest among peasants and laborers, even though within these basic social classes the opinion prevails that there exists a necessity for creating a supervisory organ which would signal any and all irregularities from a social class standpoint and which would assure the functioning of the fundamental provision of social justice.

The thesis of bringing order by agencies of social supervision to their "own backyards" is thoroughly rejected by people who are familiar with the problems involved. This is substantiated by the interrelationship between those who supervise and those who are supervised. There have been known incidences during the period of KKS activity where those who do the supervising had their windows broken and were discriminated against in their place of work, in service institutions, or in other supervised institutions.

It is generally felt that the idea of creating a worker-peasant inspectorate and its role is justified. On the other hand, its position in people's councils is creating serious controversy, all the more because such elements have already existed in the past and failed. It is being pointed out KSS's had powers (State Council resolution of June 1978, directives of the chairman of NIK [Supreme Chamber of Control] and of the general public prosecutor of

the PRL, etc.) which authorized supervisory committees to work in cooperation with other supervisory organs. However, the directives of these powers were rarely observed at the basic level. The former GKKS [Main Social Control Committee] chairmen, as supervisory spokesmen, turned to NIK, PIH [State Trade Inspectorate], etc., delegations, often in vain, with the recommendation that they conduct thorough and professional inspections.

In order to assure the leading role of the party, people's council activists propose that a formulation be introduced into legal regulations which expresses the need for cooperation between the inspectorate and political organizations in defining their place. What is of concern here is that party organizations and echelons not be overlooked in this activity just because it is convenient to do so.

To assume that a worker-peasant inspectorate, as a council organ, would assure immediate reaction and would create an impact is considered to be a mistake by the activists.

In addition, to make the inspectorate a council commission would be a duplication of the supervisory powers held by the remaining council commissions which for a number of reasons they rarely used. There is also doubt as to the expertise of the inspections, even if we were to assume an improvement in cooperation with professional inspections, with which making contact from a basic level could create problems. It should be taken into account that new social obligations have fallen to the councilmen and they may become overburdened with tasks. Current basic level councils have at least five commissions--the inspectorate would make it six. A council is made up of 5 to 10 councilmen. On the basis of law (article 114, point 2), some of the councilmen would have to belong to two commissions.

The possibility of creating worker-peasant inspection teams alongside individual problem-solving commissions of people's councils should be considered a sound proposal. This would assure the fuller implementation of the supervisory functions of the council commission.

The discussion participants emphasized that regardless of the accepted variant of the inspectorate, it is advisable that social control be genuinely tied to trade control. What matters here is a simple solution with practical implementation.

Many of the activists cannot understand why the organizational operation of the inspectorate (in the first variant) is planned to be entrusted to agencies of people's councils. After all, the workers who provide services for people's councils have been given a series of additional tasks in accordance with the new law, e.g., the servicing of tenants' self-government, i.e., village administration councils and residential committees. This will involve a great deal of work.

The assurance of the effectiveness of the work of the inspectorate, of inspection teams, and the implementation of recommendations would require knowledge of the law and that of specific ministerial rules and regulations from those

working in the offices of people's councils and from those who conduct social control. It may be expected that in all likelihood the managers of supervised establishments or institutions will give evasive answers. For this reason, the analysis of issued recommendations and provided answers would require the work of a lawyer knowledgeable in ministerial rules and regulations concerning trade, administration, the servicing of agriculture and housing as well as laws, resolutions and ordinances.

The majority of the respondents were in favor of entrusting the operation of the inspectorate to NIK units and making the activity of the inspectorate accountable to them. The best solution would be to create small units in places which headquarter the offices of the public prosecutor, courts of law, revenue offices and offices of internal affairs. This would guarantee the close cooperation of social control with the basic units of trade inspection.

The link with the people's council could be in the form of the appointing of social inspectors by these units (similar to town councilors) and the presentation of reports by them or by the chief inspector, within a set period of time, at sessions or meetings of council presidiums.

The suggestion that the council or its presidium be the main executor of post-inspection recommendations will be difficult to implement due to the lack of so thorough a knowledge of the specific rules and regulations by the presidium members. Moreover, in smaller communities the presidium members can avoid getting in the way of unit managers. The assumption that the functioning of the worker-peasant inspectorate be the concern of every council session, of the presidium and that of commissions would be difficult to accept since the law has greatly increased the number of the council's own tasks. The agenda of a meeting, for example, includes a dozen or so items. Adding the above task would cause the expansion of the already overburdened subject matter of the meetings.

In summing up: the placement of the worker-peasant inspectorate solely in the system of people's councils would constitute the repetition of solutions which have already failed the test under a different title. The linking together of the worker-peasant inspectorate with NIK should be considered the most suitable solution, which would include the expansion of rights for inspection teams and the concurrent imposition of the obligation to present reports, for instance once a year at sessions of the council and to present regular up-to-date information on the results of conducted inspections.

Need for Direction

Warsaw SZTANDAR MŁODYCH in Polish 2-4 Nov 84 p 3

[Article by A. Podulka: "Kowalski Will Inspect--So What?"]

[Text] That's right. So what? Why do we need some sort of worker-peasant inspectorate? After all, we were not lacking all kinds of inspections, and yet didn't this lead to gross deviations? We will not do away with the crisis even by creating several more new inspectorates. It is time to do something and not just discuss in circles.

In the continuing debate on the subject of creating a worker-peasant inspectorate, it is possible to hear many similar opinions. There are also various extreme views which express a naive belief in the inspectorate as a miraculous remedy for all forms of wrongdoing.

From a public opinion survey conducted among 2,000 workers from large work establishments by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS], it appears that 26.7 percent of the workers are for the creation of an inspectorate, while 24.2 percent of those surveyed support this initiative but with certain reservations. As much as 29 percent of the workers surveyed are against it or have doubts, while a few, only 20 percent, did not have a well-defined opinion on this matter.

What moral qualities should this Inspector Kowalski have? Who should stand by his honesty? How can we be sure that it is not Kowalski who should be supervised? These are just some of the examples of uncertainty.

Questions are raised in discussions, among other things, as to what influence Inspector Kowalski should have over the planning, preparation, implementation and analysis of postinspection findings. Will it not come to the point where the here and there rampant, all-powerful bureaucracy will control the work of the inspectorate? Will there not be attempts at suppressing the inspectorate and its activity in the name of some special interests?

And finally, will our Kowalski be brave enough to stand up to any and all manifestations of wrongdoing regardless of whether they concern the Kaminskis, who are accumulating wealth dishonestly through the procurement and sale of slaughtered livestock, or the Baranskis, who practice nepotism in important gmina and provincial functions, and both of whom disregard nearly everyone who is weaker and everything, except for bribes, illegal transactions and favoritism?

--The worker-peasant inspectorate should have the rank of a social NIK and win the kind of trust that was held by military operational groups.

--The people's inspectorate should not take the place of state and trade control activity.

--Its activities cannot be lost in an avalanche of reports.

Some of the discussion participants question the will of the people to work for the inspectorate. After all, why should they take on such a not-always-pleasant job? Are there any such people at all left who are ready to take on the struggle with social wrongdoing and with damaging activity, which includes not only deviation from the law which is related to ill-will, crime, incompetence and desisting from activity but also other manifestations of the imperfections of our socioeconomic life which arise, for example, from improper interhuman relations, from habit or from simple human shortcomings.

The Kowalskis seem not to care because, after all, inspections will not produce more goods--in any case, not in amounts that could be noticed. The growth of consumer and capital goods depends mainly on the conditions of the production process, among other things on well-organized and productive work.

Here the inspectorate could not change very much, all the more so since it would have institutions which have been involved in inspection for years as its competitors. However, can we give up on creating an atmosphere conducive to cleaning up one's "own backyard"? Is it really better if intervention comes from the outside?

--The educational aspect of the effects of such social control is important.

--When necessary, social control should include trade control specialists in its work.

--Social control should be objective in its assessments, but it must also have guaranteed respect and immediate reaction to presented findings.

It is worth considering how much in the right those discussants are who reject the idea of creating worker-peasant inspectorates. Why take this into consideration? If only to avoid making some sort of mistake at the outset. They maintain that this new supervisory institution will not change a thing in our crisis reality even when it starts to work. They say furthermore that it is bound for the same fate as the social control committees created toward the end of the 1970's, which died a natural death without disturbing anyone in ruining our economy and in discussing our society in terms of the propaganda of success.

Those who deduce these kinds of conclusions are convinced that the problem lies not in the mechanisms of control but significantly deeper--in socio-economic mechanisms and in the system of government. They place the blame on the entire political system, which is not able to create proper conditions for skilled workers, respect for work and for common property in general. Certainly, when pressed against the wall they admit that the introduced economic reform and the process of renewal which is taking place in the sphere of politics are slowly trying to change this state of affairs. This is not an easy process because human habits, convenience, and at times incompetence and reluctance toward new things, stand in the way.

--What is important is that in the ranks of the inspectorate there be many young people full of enthusiasm, energy, sensitive to human injustice and ready to place the common good above personal matters.

--The activities of the inspectorate should find support in the party, in allied political parties, trade unions and other sociopolitical organizations.

--The inspectors should represent various social and professional communities.

In other remarks, the fact is also stressed that in our country multidirectional operations are being undertaken with the purpose of creating mechanisms which would protect our society from political and economic collapse.

One of these undertakings is the struggle against all phenomena which disturb law and order and which threaten the sense of social justice. For this purpose, NIK was again made subordinate and accountable to the Sejm, a system of revenue offices were instituted, a Main Territorial Inspectorate was created, and the

Council of Ministers Committee for Law and Order was called into being. We can also include in this activity the initiative of the 16th PZPR Central Committee Plenum with regard to creating a worker-peasant inspectorate.

Currently, the inspectorate's first pilot groups have begun their activity in certain regions of our country, among other places in the following provinces: Bielsko-Biala, Koszalin and Katowice. These groups were called together to test in practice the best variant, since currently they [variants] operate on different principles. Some operate on the basis of the law on the system of people's councils and territorial self-government, while others base themselves on the law pertaining to NIK. Another variant is based on these two laws and also makes use of the legal foundations of the Main Territorial Inspectorate.

Kowalski will inspect, but so what? This question is taking on new meaning, although it is still not easy to answer it unequivocally. In any case, it draws us away from rejecting in advance the idea of social control. However, it also moves us away from accepting the inspectorate as a miraculous remedy for all of our Polish problems.

The daily practice of the inspectorate's activity will provide us with the answer to this question. And this time we will become convinced how much depends on what we do ourselves. To what extent will we, the Kowalskis of our society, be courageous; how much will we want and know how to use our rights?

What matters is that the said Kowalski not be just anyone but a "Firm" of the highest caliber in every respect. And then no one will ask sneeringly, "So what?!"

9853
CSO: 2600/161

HOUSING SCANDAL IN WALBRZYCH RETRACED

Warsaw POLITYKA in Polish No 40, 6 Oct 84 p 7

[Article by Marek Henzler: "Preferences"]

[Text] General Wl. Oliwa's position is unambiguous. At long last, after a break of a few years, the public residential construction has been restarted and the apartments must be given to the people for whom they were built. There are precise regulations which must not be broken, says Colonel Szerauc, Chief cabinet director in the Ministry of Administration. When tips from Walbrzych had been received, the minister, despite being on leave, directed Colonel Wisniewski of the Internal Audit Department to investigate the situation.

The colonel came back rather quickly because on the apartment allocation list he found, among others, the name of the son of the provincial vice governor, the secretary of the Provincial Democratic Party Committee [WK SD], the chief of the Polish Socialist Youth Organization [ZSMP], a section director in the Provincial Committee [KW], names of provincial and municipal functionaries, actors and soccer players. In the ministry, they concluded that they cannot handle the matter by themselves and invited the Central Committee and the Office of the Council of Ministers workers to join the investigative team. The team is headed by Colonel Andrzej Muraszkiewicz, chief of the Audit Department in the Ministry of Administration and Land-Use Management [MAiGP] who at the end of August confirmed the irregularities.

As a result, top provincial and municipal officials, starting with the governor and ending with the head of municipal housing bureau, were subjected to disciplinary actions. The severest penalties were meted to the mayor, the deputy mayor, head of the WSL and the provincial office director--they lost their positions. Five persons were called in front of the WKKP [Provincial Party Control Commission] and two were expelled from the party. Names of the guilty persons were broadcast to the country through the press, radio and television.

"Each apartment in public housing and each potential renter should be carefully looked over. Apartments should be allocated to persons at the bottom economic level. The personnel changes will serve as a warning to officials in the whole country."

In the Walbrzych Provincial Committee and Office this affair pervades all activities, although in the last 5 weeks the rhythm of the work is coming back

to normal. At first, after the affair was made public, there was fear that the "class principle" was violated and that only some "society people" would move in to the housing in Blankowa Street. After counting the tenants, it turned out that out of 108 allocated apartments, 42 were allotted to workmen. Also, the gossip about bribes was not confirmed. This was most important.

All that has not started with an anonymous letter to Warsaw and the arrival of a ministerial commission. It started a year before when Mayor J. Listwan was disciplined by the party for lack of supervision over the Housing Affairs Department [WSL]. He has not accepted the reprimand and appealed it but without results.

In March of this year an employee of the Provincial Office conducted a previously planned check of the Municipal Office WSL in Walbrzych; she prepared her report in April and in the middle of May it landed on the governor's desk. Basically, the report covered everything that was subsequently confirmed by the ministerial commission. The report was then sent to the mayor with the request that he state his position on the subject. People started talking about this matter in the corridors of Municipal and Provincial Offices.

The avalanche started, however, only after a "Jan Kowalski from Walbrzych" wrote a well-aimed anonymous letter to the Ministry of Administration. That letter was returned from Warsaw to the local Provincial Committee in mid-June. Then the committee demanded an explanation from the Provincial Office and, when it was received, it passed the case on to the WKKP. In September, when personnel decisions are made, a commission will be established to check all previously issued public housing allocations.

Life in Walbrzych, a city of 140,000 inhabitants, is not easy. The city is wedged between some hills and mounds of mining waste, the air is full of smoke and the city's shape resembles two triangles connected by their apexes. The center of the city is where these two triangles meet. This creates an enormous transportation problem and an even worse housing problem.

The last war spared the city and today 76 percent of apartments were built before 1945. Most of these apartments are small and devoid of modern comforts. After the war, no proper maintenance work was done and the consequences of that careless management are showing up now. Currently, out of 2,664 buildings, 1,400 require maintenance urgently, and 130 should be torn down, including 19 which should be torn down immediately.

The city can afford to do maintenance work for 60 buildings annually. At this rate, the backlog would be cleared by the year 2007 but, in fact, the maintenance work must also be done on other houses, especially because the damage done by mining keeps growing. People from the torn-down houses and from the houses undergoing maintenance work must be provided shelter. Previously such problems used to be solved by erecting temporary buildings, but 7 years ago that type of construction vanished from Walbrzych, as from the rest of the country.

Originally, the city was allocated some apartments in cooperatives but, after August, members of cooperatives succeeded in allotting all apartments to themselves. Despite this, the waiting list includes 16,000 names, which is easy

to understand considering that 6 years ago 1,349 apartments were built and this year it is expected that only 459 will be constructed. An additional 1,300 names are on the City Office list of those who are qualified to receive quarters, i.e., those who cannot afford a cooperative apartment. These people are those who now live in apartments where there is less than 5 square meters per person, those whose income per family member is less than 4,750 zlotys, those whose houses will be torn down, those who have been transferred from other localities in the line of duty and those affected by natural disasters.

Despite the fact that practically all enterprises and institutions in Walbrzych are short of labor, about 600 families left town. They were fed up with water problems, the polluted environment and, most important, the lack of their own, or at least a decent, roof over their heads. Both old and young move away and they are the ones who have the skills indispensable for the city--no one else is willing to take their place.

The city is threatened with progressive degradation. After Walbrzych Province was created Walbrzych acquired a philharmonic orchestra, but it is falling to pieces now. Someone may say that "the commie city of Walbrzych" does not need a philharmonic, a weekly which is trying to become a daily, a legitimate theater and a puppet show--a first-league soccer team should be enough for the inhabitants. But the doctors and nurses are leaving, too. It is very difficult to attract architects, surveyors and teachers. The annual turnover of state employees is one-fourth of the total. New skilled people could be attracted and the old ones retained by offering decent apartments, preferably newly constructed. The authorities in Walbrzych, however, cannot offer them, they do not have apartments either from the so-called reclamation or from the cooperatives.

This is why the hopes were so high regarding the allocation of new public housing after 7 years of not having any to allocate. It was desired that this new housing would not only satisfy the most urgent needs of families on the waiting list but that it would attract new skilled people and stabilize the old ones.

In the first building, the 50 apartments were allocated as follows: health service--10, education--4, culture--4 (2 for the philharmonic, 1 for the legitimate theater and 1 for the puppet show), administration of justice--2 (the judge and the prosecuting attorney's secretary), state offices--5, sociopolitical organizations--3 (1 each for the PZPR Provincial Committee, the Provincial Committee of the Democratic Party and the ZSMP City Board), militia--2, Social Security Agency--2, construction and municipal enterprises--7, the Walbrzych mine--3 (including 2 for new soccer players), graphic plant--1, and 7 were kept in reserve.

In the next building, which was ready for occupancy this August, out of 58 apartments occupied so far, 9 are occupied by residents of torn-down houses and houses undergoing major renovation, 13 were used in exchange for other apartments and for temporary quarters, 2 are occupied by the handicapped and 41 were allotted to attract the new cadre and to stabilize the cadre already on board. Out of this number 8 went to the health service, 14 to municipal and housing functionaries, 4 to the construction employees, 6 to militiamen and prison guards, 5 to state employees, etc.

Additionally, a principal rule of allocating apartments was violated, i.e., that allocation must be made publicly with citizens' participation and having the list of the lucky ones posted for a month. In Walbrzych, this was done only for the lower quality apartments, those obtained from reacquisition. The modern apartments, those equipped properly, were allocated to plants and institutions by the mayoral board.

Plants and institutions allocated those apartments among their employees according to their need for cadre, frequently ignoring the fact that those apartments were public housing, whose occupants should satisfy certain criteria.

The selected persons' names were submitted to the WSL, which did not make the proper effort and, without checking the conditions specified by the housing law, issued allocations. Thus, almost one-half of 108 allocation decisions were issued illegally or were based on incomplete documentation, e.g., without information regarding earnings or without full accounting for the previous apartment.

Former Mayor Jerzy Listwan made an appointment with me for a talk in ... a private office in the city hall. He has received a few journalists at home and he would like to spare his family another vivisection. He is on sick leave--his blood pressure is up.

He is 51 years old; before and during his studies of economics he was active in the Polish Youth Association [ZMP] and since 1956 he has worked in the state administration in Walbrzych. He has occupied various positions, including that of WSL director, reached the position of deputy county chief. When the province was created, he became the director of the General Department of the Provincial Committee. After almost 30 years of service, his achievements include an unfinished apartment in a serial building, a Gold Cross of Merit and the name that is known throughout Poland.

"He was very highly thought of," says the Provincial Committee first secretary even today. "He was considered to be very attentive to details, even pedantic, one who adhered to the letter of the law and took good care of public interest. A good organizer and well known in town as a social activist."

He assumed the office of mayor at the most difficult time in 1981 (after the office was vacant for 6 months). He was highly successful--in the comprehensive inspection report of Walbrzych Province, General Edward Drzazga, chief of the Main Field Inspectorate [GIT], wrote the following: "In the area of effective and efficient management ... Walbrzych is one of the positive exceptions." The GIT inspection took place in November and December of last year, after people had already moved into the first public housing building on Blankowa Street. No injustices surfaced then.

"I have not seen the latest ministerial report, only short passages with accusations were read to me. I consider myself guilty to the extent that one responsible for public policy but not its implementation should. I believed that it was not my duty to teach the WSL employees the rudiments of their work."

J. Listwan is not denying that he was the author of the idea to allocate the apartments among places of employment but he says he had consulted with the chief of the City People's Council and the previous secretary of the City Committee. Places of employment were allocated the apartments on the basis of recommendations made by citizens' commissions, and he trusted those commissions.

The name of the governor's son was put on the list since the profession of surveying did not happen to be included. Also, two soccer players were put on the list by the mine. The mine, in turn, gave to the city accommodations downtown for the "Practical Woman's Center" and the office of the League of Polish Women. There was also a waiter's name on the list, which particularly upset people in Warsaw, but his apartment was scheduled for the major renovation and later it was to be given to the Social Security Agency. One can find a logical explanation for every controversial allotment. Only against two names did I find a "Provincial Committee request" or "Provincial Office request"; perhaps there were more requests like that. Listwan does not blame anybody for them--he accepts the responsibility. A comrade who moved from a cooperative apartment to a larger one in public housing must leave the system.

"Above all, I tried to run the city well. I worked for its good, hence I granted preferential treatment to people who were needed most," repeats the former mayor. "When I received the inspection report from the WSL in May, I convened a board which analyzed all allotments once again. We completed the supporting documentation; in some cases we changed the basis for allocation after consultations with the occupants. In those cases where the occupants did not agree with us, and the authorities were right, we wanted to petition the governor to invalidate the original erroneous decisions. But the inspection and the blame-setting mechanism was already in motion. The ministry wanted to show itself as the defender of the economically weak, and they did not consider the special conditions in Walbrzych."

In the Walbrzych affair, the role of the City People's Council has been brought practically to zero. Yes, the council presidium recalled the mayor, but ...

"We were cut off from all information. The Provincial Office knew already in April the results of the inspection of the WSL, but neither we nor the party City Committee were informed about the injustices," said Antoni Foka, the council's chairman. "Perhaps we would have prevented settling people in the second building."

Meanwhile, there is a "hunt" for a new mayor in Walbrzych.

"This office should be filled with the best man and we will be lucky if we find anyone willing to take the job," says Stanislaw Michalek, first secretary of the City Committee, who has the duty of recommending from the political point of view the new candidate for mayor. He has conducted 38 interviews but only 2 persons expressed interest. Others are simply afraid that what happened to Listwan may happen to them.

Also, they do not want to lose financially. Since the mayor's pay is 23,000 zlotys, both persons who expressed interest would be taking a cut of 10,000 zlotys.

"We often say, and in the party too, that it is embarrassing to talk about money, but we must have money to live," says the secretary.

On 26 September, the Provincial Committee executive board passed a resolution during a special meeting which says: "In order to eliminate subjective and erroneous decisions in allocating public housing apartments to persons essential for the community, the Presidium of the Provincial People's Council will establish clear criteria, the positions, professions and functions which may be accorded preferential treatment in allocating new apartments. The establishment of such criteria should be done independently for each calendar year or at least once every 2 years."

8801

CSO: 2600/124

MACEDONIA'S PANCEVSKI CALLS FOR LCY UNITY

AU051451 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Dec 84 p 7

[Text] In the period until the next party congresses it is necessary to work constantly in a revolutionary manner on changing what is holding us back. What is necessary is an ideopolitical differentiation in the LC and a concrete responsibility for all those working contrary to the policy of the LC and who have contributed to the current very complex socioeconomic situation, Miland Pancevski, president of the Central Committee of the LC of Macedonia, stressed in an interview to Radio Skopje.

A way out of the difficulties is possible only with unified positions on the circumstances, directions, means, and method of revolutionary action. Different views and positions in the LC are no great problem, if differences are democratically overcome. By adopting a unified platform for the 13th LCY Congress, the republican congress and the provincial conferences of the LC, we will make an important contribution to strengthening unity.

In their criticism, the antisocialist and antiself-managing forces attack everything, particularly the LC, the basic values of our revolution, and socialist building. Offering their concepts for the development of society, they demand that they be granted the status of a legal opposition. They launch their antisocialist theses in several fields, by taking over and by legally using certain of our social institutions and platforms, such as certain university departments, scientific organizations, arts associations, the press, publications, and the like. In this way they influence the formation of awareness, particularly of the younger generation, thus spreading defeatism and the demoralization of people. A way out must be sought in an ideological offensive of the LC and other socialist forces. We must work more energetically on asserting our basic values, but also on removing our weaknesses and shortcomings, in social activity, in improving the material and social position of the working people and the like, because these problems are most frequently the target of attacks by the ideological enemies of the LCY.

Also in the LC itself there is a certain lack of understanding, as well as serious deviations from democratic centralism in practical activity. This provides fuel for the enemies of democratic centralism, who raise a fuss and negate the very principle of democratic centralism. The strongest answer to these attacks is a complete and consistent application of this principle an irreplaceable means in the revolutionary activity of the LC.

Asked to state what he thinks about the fact that measures are not being taken against those who carry out their tasks in an irresponsible manner, Pancevski said that despite the fact that specific persons--proponents of various deformations, abuses, and other kinds of irresponsibility--are named, the procedure for assuming responsibility is frequently protracted, minimized, or generalized. People in power come forth who protect the proponents of various anomalies. In the LC of Macedonia, particularly in certain organs, organizations of associated labor, and in the organs in the republics we have taken several concrete steps to determine the responsibility of certain leading cadres, and this has, despite strong resistance and pressure, yielded good results. We must continue to work in this direction.

CSO: 2800/117

ARMY LC COMMISSION DISCUSSES DRAFT CONCLUSIONS

AU072133 Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian No 2369, 6 Dec 84 p 5

[Report by K. Milosevic]

[Excerpts] A session of the Commission for the Development of the LCY Organization in the Yugoslav People's Army [YPA] and Cadre Problems (under the chairmanship of Dr Drago Nikolic) discussed the Draft Conclusions of the 13th LCY Central Committee session.

Stress in the discussion in the Commission for the Development of the LCY organization in the YPA was laid on those passages in the Draft Conclusions that concern efficiency in the manner of organization, the cadre situation, the action ability of the LCY organs and organizations, the content and the method of work, and other questions from the remit of the commission which were broached by the 13th session of the LCY Central Committee.

The most frequent requests related to firmer unity in the LCY, the intensification of responsibility at all levels, the prevention of partial interests when decisions important for the unity of the LCY and the SFRY are adopted, the respect for the essence, sense, and significance of democratic centralism, the raising of the ideological consciousness of LC members and of the ideological building of the basic LC organizations for the purpose of independent work, and other points.

The realization was expressed by the members of the commission of the necessity of the turn that must be made in the sense of reviving the role of the LC, as well as the necessity of a change in the conduct of the LC as regards the combatting of opportunism, the affirmation of criticism and self-criticism, and the responsibility of LC members for the implementation of the decisions in conformity with the principles of democratic centralism.

The LC as an organization based on democratic centralism, it was said in the discussion, cannot allow ideas opposed to its revolutionary ideology to be launched in its ranks. The very important problem of consensus democracy in the LC was pointed out; its aim is to replace the majority principle as the basic principle of democratic centralism. It was said that the LC cannot have eight democratic centralisms, only one.

The implementation of the cadre policy was one of the essential problems raised in the discussion. The criterion for the cadre policy in the LC must not be the duration of the term of office, but work and the results of work. The LC member must be evaluated according to how he implements the LC policy in his community. It is believed that several candidates should be proposed for the several elective offices in society and in the LCY, so as to ensure an appropriate selection of cadres.

It is understandable that the session also discussed the cadre policy in the YPA. Despite positive results, certain omissions are evident. It is believed that the growing occurrence of territorialization of cadres [teritorijalizacija kadrova] gradually gives rise to material differentiation, and this ultimately affects the consciousness and conduct of people.

CSO: 2800/117

KOSOVO OFFICIAL ON SECURITY SITUATION

LD040050 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1541 GMT 3 Dec 84

[Text] Pristina, 3 Dec (TANJUG)--Rahman Morina, Kosovo provincial secretary for internal affairs, said today during his meeting with representatives of information media that the security situation in Kosovo in the course of this year was constantly improving and stabilizing despite the presence of specific forms of enemy activity from positions of Albanian nationalism and irredentism and other structures of domestic and foreign hostility. This was especially contributed to by the LC and all subjective forces' activity and also by security organs. However, Morina drew attention to the continuing activity of the enemy who is attempting to maintain the continuity [of action]. Underground organization from positions of Albanian nationalism and irredentism has by and large been smashed and all subjective forces and appropriate organs are pursuing their offensive and settling accounts with the protagonists of enemy activity. This is shown by the fact that the number of cases of enemy slogan daubing and pamphlet distribution has been reduced 50-60 percent in comparison with last year.

However, although reduced, irredentist activity is still present in diverse forms of a propaganda-subversive nature, in both the country and abroad.

Also present are manifestations of various forms of pressure on members of the Serb and Montenegrin nationalities, physical attacks, desecration of graves, insults, crop damage, and rape.

This has an impact on the process of Serbian and Montenegrin emigration from Kosovo. Through all forms of enemy activity, Albanian nationalists and irredentists continue attacking Comrade Tito's personality and achievements and damage, remove, and destroy his pictures. There have been approximately 20 such cases this year, and the offenses have been primarily committed by students. Morina also drew attention to the phenomenon students being drawn into illegal enemy activity, an indication of the presence of irredentist propaganda, especially among young people. The irredentists are also attempting to increase the activity among the remaining members of underground organizations, taking advantage of both objective difficulties and specific objective shortcomings that the province is confronting.

Speaking of the activity of Albanian enemy emigres abroad, Rahman Morina said they were especially resorting to the methods and forms of subversive-propaganda activity by organizing anti-Yugoslav demonstrations and meetings and other actions directed against our country, citizens abroad, diplomatic and

consular representatives, and workers' clubs. By quoting our press and published material out of context and using tendentious and malicious articles appearing in the Western press, Albanian enemy emigres have been carrying on a continuing propaganda campaign against our country through their publications; it is calculated to create an atmosphere of insecurity and mistrust towards Yugoslavia, threaten and weaken its position, role, and reputation in the world, and spread the psychosis of "an economic debacle" and "immediate collapse" of our constitutional system. The Albanian emigres' activity, Rahman Morina warned, continues to have a certain influence upon a number of our workers abroad suffering under the weight of nationalism, although an overwhelming majority of our citizens outside the country remain loyal to our self-management system.

Turning to Albania's propaganda activity aimed at the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo and Yugoslavia, Morina stressed that it not only supports Albanian nationalists and irredentists in their sinister goal of implementing the slogan "Kosovo--a Republic" but also continues to encourage and inspire such activity in the country and abroad. In this activity, an important place is occupied by the fanning of intranational hatred between Albanians and Serbs in Kosovo and elsewhere.

The provincial secretariat secretary for internal affairs announced in this connection that during the course of this year the security service had uncovered 2 organizations and 11 illegal irredentist groups comprising 167 members, of whom 152 had criminal charges brought against them and 15 were convicted of misdemeanors.

Morina also spoke about hostile activity based on Serbian and Montenegrin nationalism, and largely manifested through verbal propaganda, hostile public outbursts, and anonymous reports; there had also been cases of slogans being written and pamphlets distributed. They stressed the "threat to Serbianism in Kosovo" and ridiculed the results achieved in stabilizing the situation in that province. With various acts individuals had attempted to influence the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins, sow distrust regarding the effectiveness of the organs of authority, and show that the Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo were allegedly unprotected. A number of Serbian and Montenegrin nationalists also used verbal propaganda based on bureaucratic-dogmatic positions, to attack the personality and deeds of Comrade Tito, self-management, and the provincial and Serbian leadership, advocated the "firm grip" policy, and spread anti-Albanian feelings.

Also noticeable was the clergy's intensified activity, which has cast itself in the role of "protector of the nation," a tendency towards the politicization of the clergy, and greater mass participation in religious gatherings.

Rahman Morina recalled the important results that this service had achieved in ensuring public order and peace, personal safety, and the security of citizens' property and social property. He added that two groups had been uncovered this year in their efforts to undermine the country's economic base. One of the groups had already been sentenced and criminal charges had been

brought against 80 individuals. One of these groups, as was well known, had stolen silver from the Trepca Combine.

Morina concluded by telling the journalists about the progress of the all-party discussion on the proposed conclusions of the 13th LCY Central Committee session which was being held between communists and security service organs.

CSO: 2800/117

VOJVODINA'S MAJOR ON DECISIONMAKING CONSENSUS

AU052124 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Dec 84 p 7

[Text] The slowness that is noticeable in the coordination of self-managing interests is primarily the consequence of the fact that during the preparation of the decisions on the individual issues the delegate system is not sufficiently effective in finding common, that is, social interests, while the delegates are too rigid in defending their partial interests, and frequently they are also not prepared to seek to overcome problems. The bourgeois world has avoided the delay that constantly exists also in the adoption of decisions by majority voting, that is, by the coercion of a well or badly assembled majority. This frequently causes greater damage to all than any draft decision upon which the interested sides could not agree. A delay, of course, has similar consequences in our country also. This then serves as an excuse to the advocates of coerced solutions to demand a limitation in the application of the principle of consensus in the delegate system, said Nandor Major, president of the Presidency of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, in an interview to DNEVNIK and MAGYAR SZO.

We agree that delays must be eliminated in the functioning of the delegate system. We also realize that there also exist third-rate problems that must not be unconditionally solved by a general agreement. However, there are people who demand majority voting also for decisionmaking on major problems, problems that also refer to the equal rights of peoples and nationalities. This is unacceptable. Self-management, in essence, nonetheless presupposes relations of conscious agreements, and for this reason the application of majority coercion must be reduced within sensible frameworks. Naturally, it is illusory to think that majority decisionmaking can be completely neglected. In recent years, there have been cases of exaggeration in this field.

We must, therefore, seek a way out in such a way that we will make it possible for the cohesive role of the League of Communists to be expressed to a greater extent when the decisions are adopted, and this calls for the development of the political culture necessary for the practice of self-management and for working out corresponding standards. In principle, and also in perspective, the manner of decisionmaking in the socialist self-managing system must be more effective than the methods used by the previous system.

CSO: 2800/117

FORMER INTERNAL AFFAIRS CHIEF QUOTED ON STEPINAC

[Editorial Report] Zagreb GLAS KONCILA of 18 November 1984, page 1, publishes a quotation (without comment) taken from the 28 October 1984 Zagreb daily VJESNIK by national hero Ivan Krajacic Stevo, who was minister for internal affairs in Croatia from 1946 to 1953, commenting as follows on the imprisonment of Archbishop Stepinac: "We had to arrest Stepinac (after Lisak and Salic at the trial had implicated him). But although he was a prisoner, I tried to get a special space for religious service, so no one could say, 'See, those atheists are harassing Stepinac,' although at that time it was not simple or easy to get space in the prison. I was even able to get wine into the prison.... Thus, although he was a prisoner, he had certain privileges. When he died, I was against his being buried in his native village of Krasic, although such a decision was passed. I opposed this for many reasons. First, I did not want to create a new Marija Bistrica in Krasic. Certainly, large demonstrations would be organized here every year to commemorate his death. I believed that 2,000 people in a small village like Krasic was too much, and the Zagreb Cathedral can hold even 5,000 people, the doors can be closed and nothing would be seen."

CSO: 2800/124

BISHOP NOTES DISTORTED PRESS COVERAGE OF CHURCH CONGRESS

[Editorial Report] Bishop Mijo Skvorc, the Catholic Church representative at the September dedication of the Serbian Orthodox memorial chapel in Jasenovac, reported on the 2 December 1984 issue of GLAS KONCILA (Zagreb, page 2) that many press reports on the September National Eucharist Congress at Marija Bistrica distorted the facts and misinterpreted statements; this was "not only the result," he said, "of ignorance and lack of resourcefulness: this reflects nervousness and anger, every worry and fear, as if the Congress was a threat to someone and not an offering of love to everyone." He said journalists from the Eastern part of the country (non-Catholic areas) "were, generally speaking, more objective and uncovered the spirit and goal of the Congress, while those from Catholic areas called the Congress a religious farce, not a serious event, with few believers and many harangues and transparent insinuations."

CSO: 2800/124

YUGOSLAVIA

CATHOLIC WEEKLY PUBLISHES REAGAN NOTE TO CROATIAN-AMERICANS

[Editorial Report] The 18 November 1984 issue of the Zagreb Catholic weekly GLAS KONCILA publishes on page 1 the 17 October 1984 greetings by President Reagan to Croatian-Americans on the 1300th anniversary of the Catholic faith in Croatia; the congratulatory note is accompanied by a picture of the president and a Croatian translation of the greetings.

CSO: 2800/124

CATHOLIC WEEKLY NOTES CHANGE IN ATTITUDE TOWARD CHURCH

Zagreb GLAS KONCILA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Nov 84 p 2

[Excerpt] Isn't it time, especially after the meeting in the Croatian LC CC on questions of ideological work, that we understand how futile it is to repeat truths which others do not want to hear, how futile it is to expect that our views will be objectively assessed by some who call us "the increasingly insolent religious paper?"

For instance, how is one to understand that in articles and speeches by very responsible public workers the assertion is repeatedly made that the Catholic Church in Croatia, or its outstanding representatives and organs, are equating religion and the nation? We have so many times presented the texts of various speeches of our Cardinal and other archbishops and bishops, articles from GLAS KONCILA, and religious instruction material...from which it is obvious that no responsible person in our church is identifying religion and the nation; not only that, but many of the above-mentioned have been tirelessly trying for years to inspire among the wider strata [of the people] the awareness that there are many true Croats, valued and honorable compatriots, who are not Catholics and whom Catholics must accept as such, not only in their life together but also in cooperation for mutual benefit. Will someone tell us finally why our responsible Communists do not take into consideration these clear proofs but, like Celestina Sardelic (in VJESNIK of 15 November), say that "during and after the September events" there have been expressions of an unfavorable 'constant' in the Catholic Church and first among them is an openly expressed...identity between the church and the nation." This is obviously not true, but such statements are persistently repeated; to be sure, there are reasons. What? And why were the first assessments by responsible state persons on the celebrations at Marija Bistrica and at Jasenovac very favorable, but now after more than 2 months, different, unfavorable assessments prevail in these responsible circles? What has happened in the meantime? As far as we can see, it is a question of a very unpleasant mistake. Or perhaps it is a question of a different policy toward the church? Sardelic, namely, concludes that "the social position of religion and of religious communities in our country is at a crossroads." And again we do not see the reason. Perhaps one needs to know much more. We know that the church does not want to be a political factor, and we cannot be reconciled to the possibility that it is a pawn in some other political game. Perhaps the clearest thing is that which Sardelic writes about the "global integrative line which Pope Wojtyla represents and which is based on the deeply-rooted universal nature of religion and the church in each particular nation." Does

this mean that a cosmopolitan, i.e., nonnational, church would be acceptable to this speaker? And if he is disturbed that the Church has a large number of believers and that it is oriented toward young people, should one conclude that only a Church with a small number of old members would be acceptable?

As a result of such lack of clarity, it is left to believers, in fact to the Church in Croatia, as our cardinal has said, to do our duty, relying on God and on the sound reason of those who are well-meaning.

CSO: 2800/124

ALIMPIC ON PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM

LD081826 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1418 GMT 8 Dec 84

[Excerpts] Belgrade, 8 Dec (TANJUG)--In Yugoslavia today relations which are not capitalist are however, often lightly described as such. The struggle in our society against the usurpation of social property, the avoidance of social obligations, and various criminal activities is both justified and necessary. In this context, every working man who acquires his income by greater dedication, greater efficiency, and labor productivity, is also lumped together with others, Dusan Alimpic, president of the SFRY Assembly, said to a journalist of the PRIVREDNI PREGLED when speaking on the long-term economic stabilization program and its implementation.

There is resistance to the implementation of this program, Alimpic stressed, especially in environments which are afraid of losing their privileged position, status, or advantage. The exponents of old relations are mainly at stake. There are growing clashes between the old and the new. Therefore, unity in implementing the stabilization program is in fact a deep class issue.

Answering the question on the origin of the phenomena and view that we are threatened with the restoration of capitalism, Alimpic said: There are different causes, starting with lack of knowledge about the trends and development of society at the present level of production forces, right down to the fact that property differences of broader dimensions have increased in society, which I accept to be a fact. We bore this in mind when drafting the long-term economic stabilization program.

The president of the Yugoslav Assembly also dealt with the isolationism of the economy within republican, provincial, and municipal borders. He says: The isolationism of the economy within republican, provincial, and even municipal borders, has inflicted considerable damage, both to production structure as well as and especially, to expanded reproduction, investments, exports and efficient use of capacities. I would not, however, say that all the natural Yugoslav economic ties have been broken off.

Asked to give his view on whether state interventions in economic life was too obtrusive, Alimpic said: The state intervenes out of necessity. To ensure that the conditions of economic activity are not merely a matter for the state but also of associated labor. To the extent to which associated labor will

strengthen and become truly associated and carry out all its function, will be the extent to which the state intervention will diminish. The LC must also act within the system and not without, Alimpic stressed and added: Its role in creating a general climate favorable to the long-term economic stabilization program, greater responsibility for the work done, and greater commitment to resolving all these issues, is a great one.

CSO: 2800/117

SLOVENIAN POLEMIC OVER KOCBEK, PROPOSED MEMORIAL TO WAR DEAD

Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 23 Nov 84 p 7

[Excerpts] It has taken almost 3 months for Spomenka Hribar to reply to the polemical text of Josip Vidmar titled "Our New Saints" in which he gave his views on the cultural and political role of Edvard Kocbek and Vitomir Zupan in contemporary Slovenian life. During this period quite a few opinions, views, and emotional outbursts were expressed so that Hribar's article in the 22 November issue... of Ljubljana DELO pointed to the more complex dimension of Vidmar's article and to [Vidmar's] comment that part of the public wants "new" Slovenian cultural "saints."

Hribar's article says....: "I believe that Vidmar is afraid that people like Kocbek and Zupan will make new Slovenian saints entirely unnecessary.... This [sainthood] is even less necessary for Kocbek and Zupan who in their work have become rooted in the memory of the nation and no one can push them out. The fact that Kocbek is more a part of the Slovenian spiritual sphere than Josip Vidmar should be sought in the fact that he had a firm backbone attested to in his life and work. The creative spirit has its own way and even the "dead one" who it seemed to some was finally buried has re-appeared, in spite of this, in a dialogue with the living.

Regardless of such writing by Hribar, it is not easy for the average... reader to understand why Vidmar singled her out in his article. Joze Volfand, responsible editor of DELO, tries to explain: "In regard to the view of Edvard Kocbek about the fate of the Home Guard [Domobran] at Rog, it [this view] can be found in NASI RAZGLEDI of 9 May 1975 and in Spomenka Hribar's article (except that the author is not entirely sincere)....

"The members of the Home Guard who were killed (at the end of the war at Rog...), 'Hribar has written in spirit of Kocbek, 'are part of our people. And guilt felt toward the dead imposes obligation.' Such a philosophical interpretation and understanding of the fate of the Home Guard as being the fate of part of the Slovenian nation in the National Liberation War goes so far that the author suggests that an obelisk be raised in Ljubljana [both] to the Partisans and to the national traitors, because they all 'died for the homeland,'" Volfand quotes.

Volfand further notes that more expanded quoting from the essay perhaps does not explain fully the philosophical opinion of the author about guilt and sin,

but the proposal to establish an obelisk to all those who died for the homeland and the desire for "national reconciliation" is adequately clear and recognizably problematic.

"Even then, in April 1975, the Executive Council of the Slovenian SAWP Conference Presidium reacted to a similar concept by Edvard Kocbek. Among other things, it spoke about attacks on socialist democracy and the fact that 'the White Guard emigres are very active and seek in our country an answer to their slogans, either in political pluralism or in Slovenian reconciliation.' The foundation for this 'reconciliation' would be condemnation of the policy of the communists in the National Liberation War and putting the fighters for freedom on the same level with national traitors," Volfand wrote.

CSO: 2800/118

YUGOSLAVIA

BRIEFS

AMBASSADOR TO GABON APPOINTED--Belgrade, 10 Dec (TANJUG)--The SFRY Presidency has issued a decree appointing Nikola Skrelji, hitherto member of the Executive Council of the Socialist Autonomous Province of Kosovo, as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the SFRY to the Gabonese Republic. [Text] [Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1745 GMT 10 Dec 84 LD]

PCI DELEGATION IN MONTENEGRO--Titograd, 7 Dec (TANJUG)--The Italian Communist Party [PCI] delegation for the Apulia region which is visiting Montenegro at the invitation of the republic's LC Central Committee was received today by Miodrag Vlahovic, president of the Presidency of the SR of Montenegro; Cedomir Djuranovic, president of the assembly; and Radivoje Brajovic, president of the Executive Council. The talks centered on further possibilities of expanding cooperation between Montenegro and Apulia region within the framework of the fruitful and mutually useful relations between the SFRY and Italy. The delegation which is led by Massimo d'Alema, secretary of the Apulia Regional Committee and member of the Party Directorate, was also received today by Petar Rakocovic, president of the SAWP Republican Conference. The PCI delegation for Apulia region will also visit Cetinje, Bar, and Budva. [Text] [Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 7 Dec 84]

BULGARIAN ILLEGAL BORDER CROSSER--Piot, 6 Dec (TANJUG)--A Bulgarian national, Dimitar Patinov, 50, was sentenced to 7 months imprisonment yesterday in Piot, Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, for illegally crossing the Yugoslav border. Patinov crossed the border from Austria at Holmec, the Belgrade daily POLITIKA writes today. He was found carrying a rifle and considerable quantity of ammunition, as well as equipment for a lengthy stay in open air under difficult conditions. Patinov told the court that he had intended to cross the Yugoslav-Bulgarian border at Dimitrovgrad and to take his wife and child out of Bulgaria. [Text] [Belgrade TANJUG in English 0942 GMT 6 Dec 84]

INCREASED ATTACKS ON POLICE--Representatives of the Federal SUP (Secretariat for Internal Affairs) supplemented the report submitted to delegates of the council for internal policy within the Federal Chamber of the SFRY Assembly; the report dealt with training police to carry out security tasks in ordinary and extraordinary circumstances. It was pointed out that police discipline and police relations with citizens has improved and that special attention is being given to the law in their work. It was also said that during 1983, despite measures which were taken, 157 police were charged in criminal proceedings for over-stepping and misusing their authority. Police last year were also the object of 1,537 physical attacks in which 3 police died, 18 were wounded, 25 were seriously injured, and 332 slightly injured. The number of these attacks has been constantly increasing in the last few years. [Excerpt] [Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 21 Nov 84 p 3]

CSO: 2800/118

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